...or why the CCP is interested in Schmitt.
(Thanks to Matt Kramer for the pointer.)
UPDATE: A PhD student with a special interest in China writes with some useful perspective:
China's use of Schmitt to justify its foreign policy behavior is epiphenomenal to its behavior and the author dramatically overstates what China has accomplished and can accomplish with the One Belt One Road initiative. China's foreign policy is not distinctive or particularly Schmittian in character because it defines its goals expansively and seeks regional hegemony as the author argues. Consider that the U.S. defines its national interests broadly and maintains regional hegemony without reference to Schmitt. Historically, great powers have expanded their aims as their capabilities have grown, eventually seeking regional hegemony. The interest in Schmitt and references to his work appear to be nothing more than an aesthetic choice in light of that fact. The One Belt One Road initiative is motivated by a desire for state prestige and hopes to translate economic power into political influence. It also imitates the United States' use of economic investment and sanctions as a political tool. It is not clear that One Belt One Road can establish a network of quasi-vassal states as Goldman argues, since what attempts China has made to use its economic power for political influence in a coercive fashion have failed. For example, see: "Power Plays and Balancing Acts: The Paradoxical Effects of Chinese Trade on African Foreign Policy Positions" by Padraig Carmody, Niheer Dasandi, and Slava Mikhaylov or " What Money Can’t Buy: The Security Externalities of Chinese Economic Statecraft in Post-War Sri Lanka" by Darren Kim and Rohan Mukherjee.
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