Professor Terry Myers (English, William & Mary) writes:
The Johns Hopkins piece notes that "Unless patients can be transferred, we would then enter the uncharted territory of having to ration life-saving care in order to save the most lives—something we have never done before in an organized way.”
Is there a consensus among ethicists as to the best criteria for choosing to save one patient’s life instead of another’s?
I don't know the answer to this. New York prepared a report in 2015 about criteria for rationing ventilators, but I don't know whether this reflects any kind of "consensus" outside this particular committee, which included philosophers but, thankfully, non-philosophers too. From page 4 of the Executive Summary:
The primary goal of the Guidelines is to save the most lives in an influenza pandemic where there are a limited number of available ventilators. To accomplish this goal, patients for whom ventilator therapy would most likely be lifesaving are prioritized. The Guidelines define survival by examining a patient’s short-term likelihood of surviving the acute medical episode and not by focusing on whether the patient may survive a given illness or disease in the long-term (e.g., years after the pandemic). Patients with the highest probability of mortality with medical intervention, along with patients with the smallest probability of mortality with medical intervention, have the lowest level of access to ventilator therapy. Thus, patients who are most likely to survive without the ventilator, together with patients who will most likely survive with ventilator therapy, increase the overall number of survivors.
This article suggests a similar kind of consensus among the bioethicists consulted (those with best chance of surviving get priority for treatment). Links and comments from more knowledgeable readers welcome.
UPDATE: Thomas Cunnigham, the Bioethics Director at KP West Los Angeles and a faculty member at the Loyola Marymount Bioethics Institute, writes:
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