I've noted with appreciation some of philosopher Regina Rini's past public work, but her debut essay for a new "ethics" series at the TLS is neither a good piece of work nor a good advertisement for philosophy. The subject is the arrival of the novel coronavirus in Toronto, where Professor Rini teaches (at York University):
Toronto has a large Chinese Canadian community, particularly in the suburb of Markham. When I heard that someone had arrived with coronavirus from China, I admit that my first thought was to avoid restaurants in Markham for a bit. My second thought was that my first was dangerous, probably more dangerous than the disease itself.
"[M]ore dangerous than the disease itself"? You can read a vivid description of the condition of the sick for yourself: those with symptoms (we have no idea what percent of the infected develop symptoms) appear to suffer for two to three weeks before recovering, if they do. Ignoring that half of new infections are passed on by those who are not themselves symptomatic and that the virus appears to be spread just like regular influenza, Professor Rini assures us that,
Even in the unlikely chance you did catch coronavirus, the statistics suggest your risk of dying is quite small. As of February 4, with around 20,000 cases confirmed in China, 425 of those patients have died. Such a fatality rate is far less than that of Ebola or SARS.
This is an egregious mistake: all the experts agree that we have no idea what the fatality rate of this new virus is; here's but one example:
Usually, simple math would determine this “case fatality” ratio: divide the total number of deaths by the total number of people infected. In an emerging epidemic, however, both numbers keep changing, and sometimes at different speeds. This makes simple division impossible; you will invariably get it wrong.
For example: we don't know how many of those infected are asymptomatic, or simply not showing up in official data; we don't know how many are dying of the virus without ever coming to the attention of medical personnel; we don't know how many of the tens of thousands recently infected will die in the coming weeks; and so on. So this is "public philosophy" predicated on a falsehood.
But even if the mortality rate were 2% (as Professor Rini supposes), that would make it 20 times more fatal than seasonal flu. Why should anyone be nonchalant about an infection that has a 1 in 50 chance of killing you? If you want to convince the public that philosophers lack sense, this would be a good way to do it! Would people drive cars or fly in planes if those were the odds?
Since one thing we do know is that the virus originated in Wuhan, China, and that the vast, vast majority of cases originate in China, is it really wrong to avoid the one part of a major metropolis where people are far more likely than average either to have contact with people from China, or to have themselves been in regions of China where the virus was widespread? What is the countervailing greater "danger" we should be concerned with?
Professor Rini, invoking P.F. Strawson, explains:
What is so ethically troubling about epidemic disease is that it pushes us toward the objective attitude. We cease thinking about victims as persons, but instead as vectors of disease or ambling contaminated surfaces.
Would Strawson have agreed with this? According to Strawson, the truth of determinism is irrelevant to our actual practices of ascribing praise and blame, which are grounded instead in our (alleged) natural human responses (our "reactive attitudes") to other people; only when we adopt the "objective attitude" can we suspend such human responses (for some doubts, see the final part of this essay). As Strawson put it:
To adopt the objective attitude to another human being is to see him, perhaps, as an object of social policy; as a subject for what, in a wide range of sense, might be called treatment; as something certainly to be taken account, perhaps precautionary account, of; to be managed or handled or cured or trained; perhaps simply to be avoided….The objective attitude…may include repulsion or fear, it may include pity or even love, though not all kinds of love. But it cannot include the range of reactive feelings and attitudes which belong to involvement or participation with others in inter-personal human relationships....
But Strawson himself is clear that sometimes the objective attitude is the correct one to adopt: his claim is only that we can't make it our default attitude in human relationships (as taking determinism seriously would allegedly require). Strawson writes:
[W]e cannot, as we are, seriously envisage ourselves adopting a thoroughgoing objectivity of attitude to others as a result of a theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism; and…when we do in fact adopt such an attitude in a particular case, our doing so is not the consequence of a theoretical conviction which might be expressed as “Determinism in this case,” but is a consequence of our abandoning, for different reasons in different cases, the ordinary inter-personal attitudes.
The "objective attitude" is not an evil or "danger" that must always be avoided: what is impossible, claims Strawson, is to always take the "objective attitude" towards others humans. But there's nothing in Strawson that counts against taking a very attenuated form of the "objective attitude" (in this case, not eating at restaurants in Markham for the time being) towards strangers who may carry untreatable infectious diseases of unknown lethality--an attitude fully compatible with empathy and concern for their well-being as well--and that will be unnecessary once we know more about the disease and its treatment.
So this essay gets both the medical facts and the relevant bit of philosophy wrong.
ADDENDUM: I should add I know nothing about Markham. I am assuming, from what Professor Rini does say, that it is "the one part of a major metropolis [in this case, Toronto] where people are far more likely than average either to have contact with people from China, or to have themselves been in regions of China where the virus was widespread."
ANOTHER: Here's what the University of Chicago is now doing, in response to the same concerns, but more precisely focused in the "objective attitude" it recommends:
- Any students, academic appointees, postdoctoral researchers, staff or visitors returning from mainland China on February 3 and onward are instructed not to attend school or work for 14 days after the return date. The University will excuse absences for this purpose. Anyone in this situation should immediately notify [email protected] and your local department.
- Those who returned from mainland China before February 3 and do not have respiratory symptoms can remain in school and work, according to CDPH. Individuals who returned between January 21 and February 2 and have developed respiratory symptoms including fever, cough, and difficulty breathing should stay home except to get medical care, and contact [email protected]. University representatives will immediately notify CDPH and help provide individualized guidance.
- In addition, the University asks that anyone who has returned from China since January 21 notify the University through the [email protected]hicago.edu email so we can provide guidance,
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