With more than 1300 votes in last Friday's poll, here are the results for "most" to "least" preposterous philosophical view:
| 1. External world skepticism (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. Realism about possible worlds loses to External world skepticism by 621–597 |
| 3. Panpsychism loses to External world skepticism by 640–574, loses to Realism about possible worlds by 619–599 |
| 4. Libertarianism about free will loses to External world skepticism by 832–366, loses to Panpsychism by 832–366 |
| 5. Grounding is a real and unitary relation loses to External world skepticism by 804–285, loses to Libertarianism about free will by 587–444 |
| 6. Non-naturalist moral realism loses to External world skepticism by 866–328, loses to Grounding is a real and unitary relation by 515–499 |
I suspect the results tell us more about which of these views are and are not currently fashionable than about which are really the most preposterous! (Lots of non-naturalist moral realists around today, for example, very few possible-world realists and external-world skeptics.)
Recent Comments