Moral philosophy and empirical psychology

Tamsin Shaw (whose fine work on Nietzsche I've written about here and here) had an essay in the NYRB that discussed recent work in moral psychology by psychologists (some of it spectacularly and notoriously confused, like Joshua Greene's stuff) and the involvement of Martin Seligman and the "Positive Psychology" movement in the CIA's torture program.  This was unfair and misleading, I thought, a kind of slippery guilt by association.  Two psychologists, Jonathan Haidt and Steven Pinker, now reply, and Shaw replies to them (same link).   I'm not a big fan of Haidt or Pinker (though they've each done interesting work, though both fall short in interpreting the philosophical import of their own results), but I think their position in this debate is the slightly stronger one here.  I'll write something more substantive at a later date, but I thought readers here might find the back and forth interesting.