Among the many claims the United States has to being one of the most morally depraved nations in the world is that it is the only one to have ever used atomic weapons. Today marks the 67th anniversary of the second use. The philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe wrote a famous pamphlet opposing Truman's decision to use the atomic bombs (and Oxford's decision to award him an honorary degree); its contents are reprinted here (with an unnecessary introduction the reader may safely skip). The argument is a bit convoluted, in typical Anscombe fashion, but there is much that is interesting and worth recalling. Since this is mostly a philosophy blog, I'll just quote her jab at English moral philosophy at the end (not as an endorsement, however, but because it is so representative of her polemical style):
Protests by people who have not power are a waste of time. I was not seizing an opportunity to make a “gesture of protest” at atomic bombs; I vehemently object to our action in offering Mr. Truman honours, because one can share in the guilt of a bad action by praise and flattery, as also by defending it. When I puzzle myself over the attitude of the Vice-Chancellor and the Hebdomadal Council, I look round to see if any explanation is available why so many Oxford people should be willing to flatter such a man.
I get some small light on the subject when I consider the productions of Oxford moral philosophy since the first world war, which I have lately had occasion to read. Its character can easily be briefly demonstrated. Up to the second world war the prevailing moral philosophy in Oxford taught that an action can be “morally good” no matter how objectionable the thing done may be. An instance would be Himmler’s efforts at exterminating the Jews: he did it from the “motive of duty” which has “supreme value.” In the same philosophy—which has much pretence of moral seriousness, claiming that “rightness” is an objective character in acts, that can be discerned by a moral sense—it is also held that it might be right to kill the innocent for the good of the people, since the ”prima facie duty” of securing some advantage might outweigh the “prima facie duty” of not killing the innocent. This sort of philosophy is less prevalent now, and in its place I find another, whose cardinal principle is that “good” is not a “descriptive” term, but one expressive of a favourable attitude on the part of the speaker. Hand in hand with this, though I do not know if there is any logical connection, goes a doctrine that it is impossible to have any quite general moral laws; such laws as “It s wrong to lie” or “Never commit sodomy” are rules of thumb which an experienced person knows when to break. Further, both his selection of these as the rules on which to proceed, and his tactful adjustments of them in particular cases, are based on their fitting together with the “way of life” which is his preference. Both these philosophies, then, contain a repudiation of the idea that any class of actions, such as murder, may be absolutely excluded. I do not know how influential they may have been or be; they are perhaps rather symptomatic. Whether influential or symptomatic, they throw some light on the situation.
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