James Bohman (Saint Louis University), Paul Roth (UC Santa Cruz), Stephen Turner (South Florida) and Alison Wylie (Washington/Seattle) sent me the following thoughtful letter regarding the current specialty ratings for Philosophy of Social Science. I am posting it here with their permission and hope to solicit other opinions from experts. Here is their letter:
We write with some suggestions for reframing the specialty area, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. In particular, we urge that it be construed more broadly; the slate of the raters and the results reported in the most recent Philosophical Gourmet Report suggest an emphasis on philosophy of economics and rational choice/decision theoretic approaches. These are certainly important components of this subfield but, in the course of organizing the 1998 NEH Summer Institute on Philosophy of Social science and, subsequently, running the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable we’ve been impressed by the breadth and dynamism of philosophical work on the social sciences that lies outside these areas of interest and that comprises the core of what is now a fairly well defined and stable field of research and teaching interest in English-language philosophy. Here’s our thinking about the nature of this field; some recommendations follow.
As represented at the Roundtable, in the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and in several recent anthologies, this subfield integrates philosophical analysis of fields in the social sciences that range from qualitative (ethnographic) research programs in anthropology and historical inquiry, through the experimental research traditions now flourishing in social psychology, economics, and physical anthropology, to various forms of quantitative survey-based and demographic research, and the formal modeling typical of some areas of political science, sociology, and economics. The traditions on which philosophers draw when they engage the social sciences are equally diverse: centrally, analytic philosophy of science, philosophy of language and action theory, social ontology and political philosophy, as well as continental traditions of critical theory, hermeneutics and phenomenology.
The intellectual core of the field, as it has taken shape in English-language philosophy, is defined by a set of questions about the relationship between the social and the natural sciences, and by the "logic and methodology" orientation that structures its relationship to the multiple disciplines it studies. The stability of this core is evident in the interests of key figures—from Mill to Popper and Habermas—whose work has defined the field, and in a standard set of topics articulated in pivotal debates between, for example, Winch and MacIntyre, Hollis and Lukes, Hempel and Dray. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2003), featured at the top of the PGR specialty rankings page for Philosophy of Social Science, includes, for example, essays on theory formation and scientific methodology in the social sciences, on competing models of explanation and of interpretative inquiry, on questions about agency and rationality, the status of claims about social institutions and of appeals to norms and practices, the viability of ideals of objectivity, value neutrality, and critical engagement in the social sciences. In this it builds on themes evident in the canonical Brodbeck anthology of 1968: theory construction, the role of laws in explanation, holism vs individualism, teleological and functional analysis, the role of values and of a “positive” research methodology in social inquiry. This slate of topics constitutes a stable and well-defined research field; a search for "philosophy of social science" on the Cambridge University Press website, and the contents of this subject area on the Routledge or Blackwell sites, yields results that illustrate these core topics. A search for on-line examples of syllabi for Philosophy of Social Science courses at the undergraduate and graduate level generates similar results.
We are concerned that the Philosophical Gourmet Report does not take the whole of this field into account but rather, as indicated at the outset, tends to equate philosophy of the social sciences with philosophy of economics and with applications of rational choice and decision theory in the social sciences. Of the six experts assembled to rate the field, only two list philosophy of the social sciences as an AOS. One of them identifies this as “philosophy of the social sciences and economics,” and the other specifies economics as his primary interest in the field; both are centrally involved in philosophy of biology and indicate a particular interest in evolutionary theory. A third is an eminent philosopher of economics who also teaches broadly in philosophy of the social sciences. A fourth has published on economics but lists his AOS as philosophy of science and history of philosophy. And the final two are chiefly known for their work in decision theory, game theory, and theories of rational deliberation. Although these latter specializations bear on issues central to philosophy of the social sciences, we note that “Decision, Rational Choice and Game Theory” is a separately ranked specialty in the PGR. We are concerned that the distinction between this specialty and “Philosophy of Social Science” has been elided, and that the broad range of philosophical work that focuses on social sciences other than economics is not well represented.
Judging by the response to the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in the eight years it has been running, these are significant gaps. We routinely review 40 to 50 abstracts submitted by self-identified philosophers of social science for each annual Rountable; we select 10 to 12 of these for the program and publish 4 to 6 of these as an annual special issue of the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Of the 37 papers we will have published from the Roundtable programs when the 8th special issue appears (March 2007), there is roughly an even balance between analyses that focus on anthropology, sociology, social and developmental psychology, political science, history, and economics (there are 4 to 5 papers in each area, excluding several papers that are not discipline-specific). By topic, these papers concentrate in several broad areas: social ontology (including holism vs individualism), models of explanation, rationality and normativity, and meta-methodological topics (including ideals of objectivity, theory evaluation, and the role of values). Papers on topics in philosophy of economics, rational choice and decision theory are certainly in the mix, but they are a distinct minority given the range of other topics and social scientific fields represented. Our selections at each stage are governed by considerations of quality, not topic, so we expect that the sample of published papers is broadly representative, by area and topic, of the pool of submissions attracted by our annual call for papers.
It should be noted that the Roundtable call for papers draws submissions from philosophers of social science based in universities across North America, the U.K., Scandinavia, eastern and western Europe and, in a few instances, from Australia and New Zealand, so the resulting programs and publications represent a broad cross-section of English-language philosophy of social science. Most important, from the point of view of Philosophical Gourmet Report (as a guide for students selecting graduate programs), roughly a third of those who contribute to the Roundtable and the special issues of PoSS are young scholars; new PhD’s or advanced graduate students seek out the Roundtable because it is one of very few meetings (and the only one run on an annual basis) that provides them access to a broad spectrum of current work in philosophy of the social sciences. Their interests represent the growing edge of the field, and these track the distribution of topics we have described as the stable core of field.
The guiding principle at work in the ranking of programs by specialties, as described in the Philosophical Gourmet Report, is that each specialized field should be evaluated by experts in that field. If Philosophy of Social Science is not to be an exception to this principle it will be important to broaden the range of expertise included in the panel of raters so that it better reflects the balance of interests and core problems that animate the field. To do this effectively we recommend that a clearer distinction be drawn between philosophy of social science and decision theory and its applications, and that there be a stronger representation of philosophical interests in social sciences other than economics. Those members of the rating panel who identify philosophy of social science as an area of specialization would no doubt be able to make more specific suggestions along these lines, and the anthologies, journals, and conference programs we’ve mentioned all offer extensive lists of faculty teaching in these areas in graduate programs.
Professors Bohman, Roth, Turner, and Wylie articulate some concerns I had had about this specialty area, which is why I asked their permission to make their informative letter public. I would welcome comments from other philosophers working in and around philosophy of the social sciences. Non-anonymous comments will be very strongly preferred, and comments may take awhile to appear, so please post only once.