Readers familiar with my views on Dworkin's jurisprudence will not be surprised that I find myself in agreement with the interesting (and also amusing) recent review by Thom Brooks (Politics, Newcastle) of Justin Burley's collection Dworkin and His Critics with Replies by Dworkin (Blackwell, 2004) in the January 2006 Modern Law Review (access may depend on whether your institution has a subscription, but the whole review is worth reading):
Ronald Dworkin's influence on legal philosophy is in some ways puzzling. No series of lectures in jurisprudence can ignore his tremendous presence and he is one of the most cited and read legal philosophers alive. Yet this wide readership has not translated into more than a small number of disciples. It is quite rare to find anyone in the field identifying herself as a "Dworkinian." Indeed, Andrea Dworkin may well have the larger following....
What will historians of legal philosophy make of Ronald Dworkin's work? They will surely note his being a major figure, but perhaps best known as a foil to advance competing views of both natural law and legal positivism rather than as someone who began a school of legal thinking. No one disputes the importance of Dworkin for legal philosophy. However, his importance for the field is well on the wane now as this collection seems to make clear. Not only is relatively little (or new) attention given to his third theory of law, but he seems more concerned with advancing his more successful views on egalitarianism among political and moral philosophers....[T]he question for legal philosophers today is how much longer Dworkin will command lectures on his views. I believe these days are drawing swiftly to a close.
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