Saul Smilansky (Haifa, Philosophy) has argued that free will is a beneficially necessary illusion. Without free will, no moral responsibility, and without moral responsibility, life would be so much more solitary, nasty, brutish, and...you know the rest. But, really, how necessary is it? Surely it’s an empirical question, which Thomas Nadelhoffer (Florida State, Philosophy) and Adam Feltz (Florida State, Philosophy) have tried to answer by empirical methods. Before you go look at their results over at Experimental Philosophy, answer the following:
1. Do you think that human beings have free will?
2. Do you think that our actions can be free if all of them are entirely determined by our genes, our neuro-physiology, and our upbringing?
3. Do you think that free will is necessary if we are to be ultimately morally responsible for our actions?
4. Now, for the sake of argument, assume that in the future scientists discover that all of our beliefs, desires, choices, decisions, and actions are entirely determined by our genes, our neuro-physiology, and our upbringing.
a. Now assume that this scientific discovery leads you to conclude that humans are neither free nor ultimately morally responsible for their actions. Would you be more inclined to behave immorally in light of this knowledge?
b. Now assume that this scientific discovery leads people to conclude that humans are neither free nor ultimately morally responsible for their actions. Do you think they would be more inclined to behave immorally in light of this knowledge?
Continuing our trip out of the armchair, Eddy Nahmias (Georgia State, Philosophy), Jason Turner (Rutgers, Philosophy), Steve Morris (Florida State, Philosophy), and Nadelhoffer have done three papers on folk intuitions and incompatibilism. Also worth a look is an interesting and important paper by Joshua Knobe (UNC-Chapel Hill, Philosophy) and Shaun Nichols (Utah, Philosophy), found here. (Thanks to Thomas Nadelhoffer and Manuel Vargas for correcting an earlier post.)
