In this post, Brian raises what I think is an extremely important topic for philosophers, namely the worrisome divide between what Brian calls the "technical" and the "humanist" sides of the field of philosophy. Since this issue is so explosive, I'm hesitant to explore it. But I think it is important that it is discussed openly. I don't think Brian's vocabulary is helpful, though. The term "humanist" has no coherent use in which it excludes (say) questions about the nature of intentionality, or mind-body dualism, and "technical" has the pejorative connotation of 'merely technical'.
More interestingly, I also don't think that Brian's description of the divide as being between Metaphysics and Epistemology, broadly construed, on the one hand, and history and value theory, on the other is correct. My old department, Michigan, had great strengths in all of these areas. But I never saw any evidence that the ethicists and historians didn't support good metaphysics and epistemology hires, and vice-versa (quite the opposite in fact). More evidence that one can't make this elusive distinction by appeal to area comes from the fact that certain areas have representatives of both sides. For example, History of Analytic Philosophy, that intellectual Sunni Triangle of an area, includes some figures that are clearly on one side of the debate (Michael Dummett, Charles Parsons, Richard Heck, Jamie Tappenden), and others that are clearly on the other side (James Conant, Warran Goldfarb).
Perhaps one way of describing the divide is by framing the caricatures we have of one another. One side thinks that the other side's work consists of dry, pedantic repetitions of numbered-premised arguments, which at its best (and only after years of work) succeeds at establishing definitively how the semi-colon works. The other side thinks the work of the first side consists of large vocabulary words, occasional references to Wittgenstein, Freud, or 19th Century German philosophy, stuck together without any discernable arguments to produce the illusion of depth. This work, at its best, manages to use the word "normativity" coherently.
I have lots of questions about this divide. First, what is its nature (mostly style? mostly substance?), and secondly, are the two 'sides' (if that is what they are) bound to be locked in interdisciplinary feud until the practitioners of one die out? Comments open (no invective please, and I'm most interested in hearing from professional philosophers).
-Jason
