These are "discussion notes" I prepared for a seminar recently; perhaps they will be of interest to others. Bear in mind: they are merely discussion notes, not a draft of a scholarly paper! (One side note: I take up, below, the topic of Foucault, Weber, and the "iron cage of modernity" alluded to in an earlier posting, which prompted some reader queries.)
"NOM" is a reference to my Nietzsche on Morality, FR to Rabinow's The Foucault Reader collection.
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I. Nietzsche and Foucault: Why read them together?
A. Nietzsche is one of Foucault’s most frequent, and positive, reference points (see NOM, p. 2 for an example from The Order of Things). Foucault suggests (sometimes only implies) that he is developing Nietzschean themes, continuing Nietzschean lines of inquiry, etc.. I would like to understand both (1) why Foucault thinks this, and (2) whether he is right.
B. I begin from a position of some skepticism about whether Foucault is right. Here is an outline of the skeptical case:
1. Nietzsche is a philosophical naturalist: he thinks there are facts about human beings (type-facts, I call them, i.e., facts about the physiology and unconscious psychology of human beings) that explain much of their conscious life, in particular, their moral and philosophical beliefs. Nietzsche proffers a somewhat speculative account of how these type-facts figure in the explanation of beliefs, and embeds this naturalistic account in the context of a critique of morality (how an account of the genesis of the beliefs figures in a critique of the beliefs is a topic to which we’ll return at length).
2. This is not Foucault’s kind of project: Foucault takes “facts about human nature” to be artifacts of particular discursive regimes, i.e., structured discourses conceptualizing human selfhood that are propounded by the various human sciences. If “human nature” is a “construct” (a key notion, to which we’ll have to return), then there would be no special interest, beyond an historical or sociological one, in understanding how those facts about human nature figure in the explanation of, e.g., moral beliefs. We wouldn’t, in other words, understand anything about the real cause of moral beliefs, only about how a certain discursive regime—itself without any special epistemic standing—conceptualizes those causes.
3. The problem, in short, is that Nietzsche, on this rendering, is interested in first-order theory, i.e., an account of what human beings are really like, an explanation of our moral beliefs, and so on. By contrast, Foucault is interested in meta-theory, i.e., some account of the status or nature of our first-order theories. Here is a typical Foucault formulation (from “Truth and Power” in FR, 60): he describes his project as “”seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false.”
(a) “Effects of truth” are, I take it, the various first-order discourses or practices in which people make claims of the form, “It is true that X,” or “It is false that Y,” e.g., “It is true that our morality has its origin, in part, in the slave revolt in morals described in GM I.”
(b) An “historical” understanding of these “effects” aims to understand both (i) when these discourses or practices came about, i.e., when did it develop that, at a particular moment, under particular socio-economic conditions, people started talking about “the unconscious,” “the insane,” “the deviant,” etc; and (ii) how these discourses are structured (i.e., what are the “rules” for making “true” claims in these various discourses—this is the legacy of structuralism, which becomes less important in Foucault’s work after the 1960s).
(c) The claim that the “discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false” suggests that the first-order theories, whose historical origins are to be traced, are themselves non-cognitive, i.e., non-truth-evaluable. That is, to ask whether, e.g., the psycho-analytic theory of the mind is true or false is--syntactic appearances notwithstanding—on a par with asking is the yumminess of chocolate true or false? One can ask, of course, within the rules of psychoanalysis, whether it is true or false that homophobia is a kind of defense mechanism, i.e., a reaction formation (it is true); but it makes no sense to ask whether the psychoanalytic theory as a whole is true or false. (There is a curious resonance here with Rudolf Carnap’s old distinction between “internal” and “external” questions in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology”—one of the distinctions Quine purported to repudiate in “Two Dogmas” and subsequent work. An “internal” question, per Carnap, is internal to a “linguistic framework,” which is a conventional practice in which the criteria for truth or falsity of particular ontological claims are set [it is true that “there is a table in the seminar room” within the framework of things and the “thing-language”]. By contrast, an “external question” would be a question about the truth or reality of the framework itself [is the “thing-language” true, is it genuinely and successfully referential?]; this question can’t be answered; whether to adopt a framework is settled on pragmatic grounds. [Carnap thinks this because he thinks that “to be real in the scientific sense means to be an element of the framework” and therefore we can’t ask the question about reality or truth of the framework itself])
C. Is the skepticism too hasty? Here’s some reasons why it might be:
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