Hallvard Lillehammer (Philosophy, Cambridge) makes a nice point about a common (and not very compelling, to my mind) argumentative move in this recent review of a very nice new book by Russ Shafer-Landau:
"The basic thrust of companions-in-guilt arguments in ethics is the idea that if we reject objectivism about morality, then we are forced by parity of reasoning to reject objectivism about its target companions. But as the rejection of objectivism about the target companions is unacceptable, we should retain an objectivist view about morality as well. In spite of its frequent occurrence in the contemporary literature, the general prospects of the companions-in-guilt strategy for ethics remain poorly understood. The potential of the strategy clearly depends in part on the nature of the companions in question. Yet the nature of morality’s alleged companions is often itself controversial. It is therefore often unclear what is gained by linking morality to some alleged companion for the purposes of vindicating either its epistemological or metaphysical credentials.
"Frequently cited companions in guilt for morality are epistemology, mathematics, the mind, and philosophy itself. Each of these is put to service by Shafer-Landau at some point in this book. Moral skeptics and antirealists are challenged by claiming that a) we have no more grounds to doubt the existence of reasons for action than we have to doubt the existence of reasons for belief and the inferential relations between them (p. 203; 236); b) intrinsically normative moral facts are no more mysterious than intrinsically normative mathematical facts (p. 206)); c) since folk-psychology is itself normatively loaded (desires are responses to reasons), a purely descriptive metaphysic entails eliminativism about the mind (pp. 33-37); d) ethics is in the same boat as contemporary analytical philosophy in its methodological conservatism and its failure to produce provably correct accounts of its subject matter (p. 220; 236; 264). These claims to companions are accompanied by further claims of analogy between morality and alleged companions. Thus, commonsense appeals to perceptual memory (p. 263) and the practical expertise of mathematicians, mechanics, and teachers of Latin (p. 298-9) are introduced to elucidate the reliabilism that allegedly explains how non-inferential moral knowledge is possible.
"Perhaps the most interesting thing about these alleged companions in guilt is that none of them are obviously innocent. It is not as if no serious philosophical doubt has been voiced over the last century or so about epistemology, mathematics, folk-psychology, or indeed philosophy itself. This fact is cause for hesitation about the usefulness of appeals to companions in guilt, both in ethics and elsewhere."
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