Rick Garnett (Notre Dame, Law) takes issue with my reference to Justice Thomas's dissent in the pledge case (in particular, his view that the Establishment Clause should not apply to the states) as solidifying his status on "the lunatic fringe." Professor Garnett writes:
"It strikes me, though, that Thomas's observations are not particularly astonishing, and certainly do nothing to put him on 'the lunatic fringe.' With respect to the 'Establishment Clause as a federalism provision' point, I do not think he says anything that Steve Smith, Philip Hamburger, Gerry Bradley, Akhil Amar, and many others have not also said."
There is no doubt that on the limited point Professor Garnett mentions--the original understanding of the Establishment Clause as a "federalism provision"--Justice Thomas's view has scholarly support; it also has scholarly detractors, as I know Professor Garnett knows (Laycock's recent review of the Hamburger book in the University of Chicago Law Review is a timely example). Professor Garnett also knows that to adopt Justice Thomas's view would be to wipe away decades of precedent, and that it requires assuming that the constitutional revolution wrought by the Civil War and the post-War Amendments to the Constitution should not trump the late 18th-century understanding of the First Amendment. These are some of the "legal" reasons why most lawyers and scholars do not take Justice Thomas's view of the Establishment Clause--again, Professor Garnett knows this--which at least establishes that Justice Thomas is on the "fringe" on this issue. (Minor point: there is much other evidence that Justice Thomas is on the "lunatic fringe": as I said, this latest opinion merely "solidifes" his status.)
So if everyone admits Thomas is on the fringe, whence comes the "lunacy"?
It is a lovely thing about scholarly life that all kinds of positions can be explored and defended, no matter how contrary to received wisdom, no matter how dangerous in their consequences (vide the Yoo affair). Justice Thomas is not, to put the matter gently, a scholar. He is not engaged in scholarly debate or inquiry; he is advocating for a political revolution. On the basis of some scholarly arguments by others (not all of whom even endorse Thomas's preferred result), he would push aside countervailing scholarly and legal considerations (including decades of precedent), and free the states from the constraints of the Establishment Clause. What would that mean?
It would mean that here in Texas--where the Governor has already called for school prayer, and has led sectarian prayers in the public schools; where the Texas Republican Party platform essentially calls for a theocracy--that we would soon have mandatory Christian prayer in the schools; religious tests for public office; religious education in the public schools; extensive state funding of religious schools and religious activities; an official state religion (Christianity); and the increased marginalization and persecution, social and legal, of atheists, Jews, Muslims, perhaps Catholics, etc.
To advocate such a result is lunatic, is it not? Or, to put the matter differently, if one thinks that it is not lunatic, then one must say openly and clearly that one thinks it would be a good thing for Texas to force my school-age children to pray to a God that doesn't exist, in a religion they don't practice, and so on.
I am sure Professor Garnett could not think this, so I must take the blame for not expressing myself clearly the first time. So permit me to restate the point: when there are legal arguments on both sides of a question--say, whether the Establishment Clause applies to the states--to adopt the side that has repulsive moral and political consequences is lunatic. Of course, Justice Thomas does this all the time, which is why I noted that he has merely "solidified" his status on the lunatic fringe with his latest opinion.
Now back to the legal merits, as it were. Here is Douglas Laycock's explanation for why Thomas's view is both "extreme" and "wrong" (Doug is a very politic guy, he would never say "lunatic fringe," except maybe over lunch). I'll quote just part of it:
"[Justice Thomas] did not say merely that the clause does not apply against the states. He also said that the clause creates no individual rights. The only apparent application of this second pronouncement is that it creates no individual rights against the federal government either. So every Establishment Clause case the Court has ever decided would be obliterated at a stroke. He seems to assume that the free exercise clause would prevent coerced attendance at religious services -- unless, we have to assume, the service is rather short and is incorporated into some other official event that people attend for secular reasons.
"I do not doubt that one meaning of the Clause in 1791 was that the federal government could not interfere with establishments in the states. But I am equally sure that one meaning of the Clause in 1791 was that the federal government could take no steps toward a federal establishment of religion -- not in the states, and not in the federal district either. Either a federal establishment or a federal interference with a state establishment would be a law respecting an establishment.
"The debate in the First Congress did not focus on the federalism implications. It focused on the meaning of establishment, and on how far the federal government should be restricted. The argument for prohibiting only preferential aid to favored denominations was rejected; the most broadly worded draft proposed was adopted. This of course goes to the debate over nonpreferentialism; but even before that, it goes to whether this Clause was only about federalism, or also about the proper relationship between religion and government. The debate was plainly about the latter; I think the federalism-only interpretation is demonstrably wrong....
"What is incorporated is the protection for individual liberty in each constitutional right. The states cannot do to citizens what the feds could not do to citizens. The restrictions on government sponsorship of religion play an essential role in protecting the religious liberty of individuals; I am entirely comfortable concluding that those restrictions are a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States, just like the restrictions on government interference with free speech or free exercise. I understand the argument that the Establishment Clause doesn't speak to what government can do to individuals in the same way as the other provisions of the Bill of Rights, but I think that badly underestimates the role of the Establishment Clause in protecting individual liberty."
Fine legal arguments, to be sure, but the most striking thing, to my eye, about this analysis is the extent to which it simply takes for granted that reference to the "original understanding" is even relevant to the application of the Clause. It is the clearest indication of the victory of the right in American constitutional law that even liberals--from Laycock to Ronald Dworkin--now "talk the talk" of originalism.
The triumph of originalism is all-the-more extraordinary when you consider that, despite voluminous writing on the subject, there has yet to be a cogent explanation, from anyone, why the "original intent" of the framers of Constitutional provisions ought to control the application of those provisions. (See Andrei Marmor's discussion of these points here.) It can't simply be to "control" and "constrain" later courts, since that radically underdetermines the choice of original intent as the means of constraint ("plaintiff always wins" imposes far more constraint, for example--but that just shows that constraint can't be the only, or even the paramount, value). It can't be for reasons of democratic legitimacy, since no one alive today gave any consent, implicit or otherwise, to the framers of the Establishment Clause. It can't be because the framers had special moral and political expertise, since there has been no showing (how could there be?) that they have such expertise, such that we should defer to them. And so on.
Originalism is the current reigning pathology of American constitutional law: it is a theory without a sound justification, yet with real-world consequences, almost all quite conservative. And now even liberals, for no discernible reason, treat it as a constraint on their arguments! Perhaps the fringe is now the mainstream?
Meanwhile, Stuart Buck--yes, that Stuart Buck--has collected references to various legal scholars claiming that the "original intent" of the Establishment Clause was that it not apply to the states (or claiming, even more weakly, that that is one possible reading). Mr. Buck--who, alas, is a chronically bad reader--doesn't seem to notice that this wasn't in dispute; it is not even disputed by Professor Laycock. The issue is whether that "original understanding" warrants not applying the Establishment Clause to the states today; as Mr. Buck surely knows, few of the scholarly commentators go that far, since there are countervailing legal considerations, as noted earlier. (Even Mr. Buck acknowledges that "most scholars do accept that the Establishment Clause has been incorporated against the states.")
Indeed, the precise question here has nothing to do with what some scholars think about the original understanding of the Establishment Clause. The question is whether in the 21st century, the 18th-century understanding of the provision gives a powerful political actor like Justice Thomas--whose decisions can bring the coercive power of the state to bear--a good reason to allow the states to coerce religious observance from individuals. That suggestion is completely lunatic, for the reasons noted earlier.
Recent Comments