Cornell philosopher Benjamin Hellie has kindly prepared a detailed (and, in my view, decisive) response to the critics on the epistemology of political commentary.
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I begin with a rehearsal of the facts; more slowly this time as an aid to those in the audience who don't move "gangasrotagati" (Nietzsche)---that is, for the easily distracted, and those unlikely to correctly supply elided steps if not held by the hand.
Suppose the popular will determines policy (this is obviously a simplification, about which more follows at the end). Then a policy will be adopted just in case, according to the beliefs of the majority, the policy supports the genuine interests of the majority. It follows that if a policy counter to the genuine
interests of the majority is adopted, the majority are ignorant, or have false beliefs, about it.
Suppose that one argues in the public sphere that a certain policy should be adopted. What one is doing is attempting to influence the popular will in a way that will result in the adoption of the policy: that is, to convince the majority that the policy supports their genuine interests.
Suppose that the policy one advocates does not support the genuine interests of the majority. It follows that if one is to advocate successfully---that is, to convince the majority that the policy supports their genuine interests---one must either fail to assert certain important truths about the policy or assert falsehoods about the policy. If one's job or hobby is to find ways to do this, one will attempt to advocate successfully. If one is any good at one's job or hobby, one will regularly end up either failing to assert certain important truths, or asserting falsehoods. One's advocacy writings will be repeatedly marred by sophistry, assertion of falsehood, and misdirection. This would be evidence of slovenly, unreliable habits of thought such as tendencies to employ unreliable patterns of argument; be easily distracted; fail to probe the evidence deeply; and exploit unreliable sources of evidence.
If one is no good at one's job, one will find another line of work; thus, one would expect any seasoned pro in the business of advocating on behalf of policies that harm the interests of the majority to have these sorts of intellectual vices. The pros serve as models for amateurs; so one would expect the same vices in the amateurs.
Now consider right-wing policies: which, just for fun, I will take to be coextensive with the policies of the present Administration concerning taxation, entitlements, health care, the environment, science, and foreign affairs. (*) For all of these policies, there are obvious alternatives which obviously support the interests of the majority rather than harming them. Thus, those who support the
present Administration and its policies either for money or love are likely to have intellectual vices which make them unreliable. By contrast, this argument doesn't apply to those who support the obvious alternatives, since they can advocate on behalf of their policy prescriptions by merely speaking the truth.
The only empirical claims here are the initial supposition and (*): the rest is a priori. Since (*) is so obvious as to be no longer in need of dispute, I will say no more. The initial supposition is a considerable idealization: most policy-making in
the United States is determined by a corporate oligarchy. Still, there is some very indirect influence on policy-making by the popular will, so the argument is worth something. And surely my right-wing opponents wouldn't wish to scotch my argument on the grounds that the popular will has no influence on policy!
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Now, on to the (least unimpressive) complaints brought against my arguments.
1. By far the most popular and least interesting complaint (Oman; Mirchandani; Stanley; Craig; Gressis; Reed; Buck) was the irrelevant red herring concerning whether right-wingers knowingly, in Lawson's morally-loaded terminology, "lie". As Leiter noted in his initial remarks on my For the Record (FtR) post (cf.
BigMacAttack, Wilson), it is irrelevant whether truths are concealed and untruths are asserted deliberately or due to carelessness; whether sophisms are presented deliberately or due to stupidity; whether the subject is changed deliberately or due to a short attention span. This is irrelevant because our topic is not the moral culpability of right-wing commentators, but their reliability. I don't care whether they are nice guys: what matters is that they not be taken seriously, but rather ignored or hooted off the dais. The thermostat in my oven is inaccurate. Whether it is morally culpable is of no interest. What is of interest is that if I want to bake something, I pay it no attention, but rather use a supplemental thermometer.
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