Cornell philosopher Benjamin Hellie has kindly prepared a detailed (and, in my view, decisive) response to the critics on the epistemology of political commentary.
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I begin with a rehearsal of the facts; more slowly this time as an aid to those in the audience who don't move "gangasrotagati" (Nietzsche)---that is, for the easily distracted, and those unlikely to correctly supply elided steps if not held by the hand.
Suppose the popular will determines policy (this is obviously a simplification, about which more follows at the end). Then a policy will be adopted just in case, according to the beliefs of the majority, the policy supports the genuine interests of the majority. It follows that if a policy counter to the genuine
interests of the majority is adopted, the majority are ignorant, or have false beliefs, about it.
Suppose that one argues in the public sphere that a certain policy should be adopted. What one is doing is attempting to influence the popular will in a way that will result in the adoption of the policy: that is, to convince the majority that the policy supports their genuine interests.
Suppose that the policy one advocates does not support the genuine interests of the majority. It follows that if one is to advocate successfully---that is, to convince the majority that the policy supports their genuine interests---one must either fail to assert certain important truths about the policy or assert falsehoods about the policy. If one's job or hobby is to find ways to do this, one will attempt to advocate successfully. If one is any good at one's job or hobby, one will regularly end up either failing to assert certain important truths, or asserting falsehoods. One's advocacy writings will be repeatedly marred by sophistry, assertion of falsehood, and misdirection. This would be evidence of slovenly, unreliable habits of thought such as tendencies to employ unreliable patterns of argument; be easily distracted; fail to probe the evidence deeply; and exploit unreliable sources of evidence.
If one is no good at one's job, one will find another line of work; thus, one would expect any seasoned pro in the business of advocating on behalf of policies that harm the interests of the majority to have these sorts of intellectual vices. The pros serve as models for amateurs; so one would expect the same vices in the amateurs.
Now consider right-wing policies: which, just for fun, I will take to be coextensive with the policies of the present Administration concerning taxation, entitlements, health care, the environment, science, and foreign affairs. (*) For all of these policies, there are obvious alternatives which obviously support the interests of the majority rather than harming them. Thus, those who support the
present Administration and its policies either for money or love are likely to have intellectual vices which make them unreliable. By contrast, this argument doesn't apply to those who support the obvious alternatives, since they can advocate on behalf of their policy prescriptions by merely speaking the truth.
The only empirical claims here are the initial supposition and (*): the rest is a priori. Since (*) is so obvious as to be no longer in need of dispute, I will say no more. The initial supposition is a considerable idealization: most policy-making in
the United States is determined by a corporate oligarchy. Still, there is some very indirect influence on policy-making by the popular will, so the argument is worth something. And surely my right-wing opponents wouldn't wish to scotch my argument on the grounds that the popular will has no influence on policy!
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Now, on to the (least unimpressive) complaints brought against my arguments.
1. By far the most popular and least interesting complaint (Oman; Mirchandani; Stanley; Craig; Gressis; Reed; Buck) was the irrelevant red herring concerning whether right-wingers knowingly, in Lawson's morally-loaded terminology, "lie". As Leiter noted in his initial remarks on my For the Record (FtR) post (cf.
BigMacAttack, Wilson), it is irrelevant whether truths are concealed and untruths are asserted deliberately or due to carelessness; whether sophisms are presented deliberately or due to stupidity; whether the subject is changed deliberately or due to a short attention span. This is irrelevant because our topic is not the moral culpability of right-wing commentators, but their reliability. I don't care whether they are nice guys: what matters is that they not be taken seriously, but rather ignored or hooted off the dais. The thermostat in my oven is inaccurate. Whether it is morally culpable is of no interest. What is of interest is that if I want to bake something, I pay it no attention, but rather use a supplemental thermometer.
Of course I don't want to rule out deliberate mendacity by right-wingers. Straussians like Wolfowitz and Perle regard lying and concealment of intentions as a political imperative---this is one of the teachings of the Master. It's unlikely that this doctrine failed to rub off on Cheney and Rummy in their long
association in the PNAC, for instance (though plausibly the Straussians had nothing to teach the Nixon-admin veterans in this department).
A startling, amusing, and shocking non sequitur deserves to be singled out for mockery, namely Rasmusen's claim that right-wingers are unlikely to lie because they "tend to believe in absolute truth". Also in absolute falsehood, I take it, which they ladled in generous doses into the recent State of the Union
address.
2. Another irrelevant red herring is the nature of justice. The initial FtR post was explicit that this plays no role in the argument. Lawson missed this, tried to hype the point in a strategy of misdirection, and got smacked down; anyone parroting Lawson in this is hereby instructed to go back and read my reply, and apply the smackdown therein to himself. (Those vicariously smacked down: Gracchus; Rasmusen; Baker; Thomas; Ghertner. Gold stars for manifesting ability to pay attention on this one to jdsm; McG; Wilson---black mark on the soul of Reed for asserting that Wilson "seriously mischaracterizes" "starving the beast", then characterizing it in an indiscriminable way. A hapless attempt at conciliation between me and Lawson is made by Ray, who wants a definition of 'justice', failing to notice not only that justice plays no role in the argument, but that I provided one in the FtR post.)
3. A more interesting point concerns whether people vote for what they believe to be in their interest. Edenbaum ("people are greedy") would probably agree with me here, though, oddly, he seemed not to notice this fact. Now why might that be?
Marcus Stanley: "abuse often increases the victim's emotional ties to the oppressor"; this allegedly undercuts my assumption "that when policies cause widespread suffering the suffering must be concealed". My assumption was that when policies cause widespread suffering the *influence of the policies on the suffering* must be concealed. Here's the world as Marcus imagines it: "We're going to destroy Social Security and distribute your property taxes to the
colossally wealthy"; "please sir may I have another". Right, Marcus. (I could even concede this point; the argument would at worst show they've got more in their evil bag of tricks than falsehood, concealment, sophistry, and misdirection.)
4. Justin Blank makes the intelligent point that if someone baselessly believes himself to have a rich uncle, he might support scotching the estate tax, against what is in some sense his genuine interest---having a bit more in the way of public services and Soc Sec income in retirement. Still, in order for this
observation to destroy my argument, as Blank apparently takes it to, he needs some assumptions: first, this variety of irrationality is sufficiently widespread to make the sorts of effects I appeal to nugatory; second, attempts to dispel this sort of irrationality by left-wing commentators are met with silence, rather than countered, by right-wing commentators. Neither assumption is plausible. Similarly for the irrational belief that "living in a free country" is incompatible with (any?) taxation: the obvious point that needs to be drummed into peoples heads being that right-wing policies increase inequality, which decreases freedom. Not all oppressive institutions are democratically elected bureaucracies with an institutional aim of protecting rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness: some are totalitarian, plutocratically-controlled bureaucracies with an institutional aim of making profits!
5. Certain true-believers (Baker; Ghertner and his "large majority of mainstream economists" in the employ of the Heritage Foundation) deny (*). Wow! People with internet access actually believe right-wing policies are better for them? Maybe Baker and Ghertner believe they have rich uncles or something. Otherwise, like Wilson said, it's your Soc Sec, your pension. A more moderate line is "gee, we just don't know" (Stanley; Blank; Reed). Well, in
enough very important cases, that's not true either. Reread your Krugman if you're not convinced yet.
6. Aaron Baker claims to have empirical evidence against my conclusion: "if everything is as Hellie assumes, and leftists need merely report the truth, why is Noam Chomsky so consistently mendacious and sophistical? Why have so many on the left chosen to lie, and lie, and lie on behalf of this or that murderous regime or gang of terrorists? Are they just not as smart as Professor
Hellie?" I'm blushing. But in reply: (i) Who on the left are you talking about? Substantiate this slur! In any event, the obvious answer to your question is that your bogeymen have different motivations than I and those on my side. (ii) Quit dissing Chomsky. "Consistently mendacious and sophistical"? More so than
O'Reilly, Coulter, Savage, Limbaugh, Brooks, Safire, Friedman, Bartley, Sullivan, and their Heritage Foundation handlers? What planet are you on? Chomsky's typical argument form is 'don't forget to pay attention to this atrocity (committed by our third-world clients) that the NYT buried on page 22; and don't
forget to care'. Mendacity at best inherited from the NYT; sophistry only insofar as we should forget, or not care. (iii) Baker also claims Marxism is "the most immiserating ideology of the last century". False, but either way, irrelevant. You don't have to be a Marxist to reject the third-world style hyperconcentration of wealth and power the present Administration is working for.
7. Finally, some worried that the argument warrants a dismissive attitude toward right-wing commentary (Stanley; Eastman; Reed; Buck). This is, of course, not an objection, but an astute recognition of the argument's intended consequence: the thermostat in my oven has revealed itself to be unreliable; right-wing commentators have revealed themselves to have slovenly, misleading habits of thought; in both cases, the correct response for those
simply interested in the truth is to look elsewhere.
How should one react to this consequence? One interested in not just the truth, but also participation in political debate as a variety of political activity, has every reason to engage with right-wingers: one might wish to combat their corruption of the public discourse by repeating the truth and rebutting their
sophistries. By contrast, your average person with "more important things to worry about" should insulate themselves from exposure to right-wing views to avoid corruption.
