My former colleague Tom Smith correctly identifies a central issue between Hellie and his critics:
"The problem with the young professor's argument is pretty apparent. It rests squarely on a big, fat empirical claim that he seems not to think is an empirical claim, or is so obvious as to be beyond contention. Namely, that there exists some obvious alternative to standard mainstream American political and economic ideas -- economic freedom, political and religious freedom, relatively small government, etc. etc., which would, first, be better for the vast majority of American humans and second, would be supported by the majority, at least if they were not caught fast in the grip of false consciousness.
"Well, maybe I'm missing something here, but it is hardly obvious that this empirical claim is true. It certainly is not obvious that you would be better off being born randomly (assuming you could avoid getting aborted of course; 25% of fetal American get the chop before they make it through the veil of ignorance) into some European social democracy than into the heart of American darkness."
It is surely true that the Hellie argument depends on this empirical claim, and it is true that Hellie, by his own admission, doesn't spend much time defending it (his point is about the epistemological implications of certain--at least plausible--empirical assumptions). Now it may be true that it "is not obvious that you would be better off being born randomly...into some European [or Canadian, we might add] social democracy than into the heart of American darkness," though in fact it is the case that, by every available measure of well-being standardly employed, one would be better off. The lack of "obviousness" is a function, I take it, of lack of widespread familiarity with what the facts are about comparative well-being. But certainly on the basis of the "natural experiments" being run, e.g., in the U.S., Canada, France, Sweden, and Germany, it should be obvious that the average citizen is better off in the social democratic nations than in the reactionary U.S.
Here's a summary of some of the useful data from this site; this is only a partial listing, but is illustrative of the legacy of apparently unnecessary human misery produced by the American approach:
LIFE EXPECTANCY (female/male)
1. Sweden (83/78)
2. Canada (82/77)
3. France (83/75)
4. Germany (81/75)
5. U.S. (80/74)
INFANT MORALITY (PER 1,000 births, avg for male and females)
1. Sweden (3.5)
2. Germany (4.5)
3. France (5.0)
4. Canada (5.5)
5. U.S. (7.0)
INJURIES RESULTING IN DEATH (PER 1,000), AGES 15-24
1. Canada (56)
2. France (58)
3. U.S. (75)
No data on Sweden and Germany. Only New Zealand, among industrialized nations, was more dangerous for young people than the U.S., due to a remarkably high rate of automobile accidents.
MEAN LITERACY SCORES FOR 16-25 YEAR-OLDS
1. Sweden (311.1)
2. Germany (297.7)
3. Canada (295.1)
4. U.S. (273.3)
No data for France
RELATIVE POVERTY RATES
1. Sweden (6.5)
2. France (8.0)
3. Germany (8.3)
4. Canada (12.8)
5. U.S. (17.0)
These are just a few examples; there are almost no categories where the U.S. leads these social democratic nations.
Defenders of America's reactionary policies, when confronted with this data, typically suggest, cryptically, that there may be "cultural" factors or differences in "ethnic composition" of these countries that explain the results. But without some clear explanation of why having, e.g., more African-Americans per se in the population--as distinct from having more impoverished, badly educated people who also happen to be African-American--should be treated as an explanatory factor, it is hard to take this rejoinder very seriously. The default interpretation, one that relies on clear causal mechanisms, is that, e.g., universal health care, an expansive welfare state, and the like causally produce, unsurprisingly, less poverty, better health, and so on.
So the bottom line is that Hellie's empirical assumption is, indeed, a prima facie plausible one.
UPDATE: More on the subject here.
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