I was quite astonished to discover this list of the "Top Ten" books in "Contemporary Jurisprudence" compiled by Larry Solum. Here's the list:
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law,
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
Randy Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law
Roger Shiner, Norm and Nature: The Movements of Legal Thought
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations
Duncan Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication
It's fair to say this is an extremely idiosyncratic list, though the main difficulty seems to reside in how the category "jurisprudence" is being conceived--more precisely, the difficulty is that I have no idea how to describe "jurisprudence" so conceived, such that all these books on the list are jurisprudential. Rawls's Theory of Justice is a seminal piece of philosophy, and parts of it are highly relevant to paradigm cases of jurisprudential debate, but I would have thought, conventionally, that it's a work of political philosophy, not jurisprudence. Ackerman's We the People (or, as I learned they call it at Yale, Me the People) is a major contribution to constitutional law and theory, but if that kind of work counts as jurisprudence, then where is Ely or Bobbitt or Perry etc.?
The books on the list that seem to be to be uncontroversially contributions to jurisprudence are: Hart, Dworkin, Finnis, Barnett, Fuller, Shiner, and Kennedy. I'm with Solum on Hart, Dworkin, and Finnis (though, arguably, Dworkin is better-represented with respect to his implausible jurisprudential views by the 1986 Law's Empire than by the 1978 collection of essays). Shiner is interesting, but idiosycnratic, and not in the same league with either Hart, Dworkin, or Finnis--or with some of the startling omissions (about which more in a moment). The same is plainly true of Barnett and Kennedy: philosophically, these works are not substantial contributions (whatever their virtues and importance in law), and Solum's implicit diversity criterion (Barnett's book "is the new locus classicus for libertarian legal thought," while Kennedy represents Critical Legal Studies) just can't suffice for a meaningful "top ten" list of works in jurisprudence. After all, where is the "locus classicus" of Marxist legal thought? of Schmittian legal thought? and so on? There are lots of eccentric categories one might create, for which one work is representative, but surely any such work has to pass muster by relevant philosophical criteria.
Fuller's work is a philosophical muddle, but it's been a stimulating muddle for many other writers, so his book arguably belongs here.
But the omissions are startling. As a remedy, here's the "Leiter Top 10 Books in Jurisprudence" list:
Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy
Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law
John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire
Gerald Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition
Leslie Green, The Authority of the State
UPDATE: More from Larry Solum on these topics here. I have to say I do not share his view that, "Legal theory is at its best when it is normative and entangled with substantive questions of policy and doctrine." Some normative theory (what is usually called normative jurisprudence, and what Solum calls first-order jurisprudence) is quite good, but not simply in virtue of its being normative.
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