It is sometimes said (e.g., by Parfit, by Brink, and others) that "secular moral theory" is a relative new field compared to systematic theorizing in the natural sciences, so it is not surprising that there is more disagreement about ethical matters since we haven't had as much time (or made as much effort) to make systematic theoretical progress on the problems. I confess this has always struck me as a somewhat implausible claim. Consider: a perfectly typical "Introduction to Ethics" class (in an ordinary, secular university) might well start with the systematic moral theory of Aristotle, whereas the typical "Introduction to Physics" class will never start with Aristotle's physical theory. Current "secular" ethical theory traces its intellectual routes back over two thousand years. And even if the standard secular ethical canon leaps over a millenium or so, it's still the case that contemporary secular ethical theory has a history of 250 years. Yet can it claim as much progress as "secular" biology, which has a history of about 150 years?
What do readers make of the argument that secular ethical theory is relatively young therefore we should be optimistic about its progress over time? Post only once, comments may take awhile to appear.
Here. And the book is here. Professor Braver kindly sent me the book some time back, but I regret I've not had a chance to read it. But since the book aims to investigate thematic affinities between "Continental" and Anglophone traditions in philosophy, it might be of particular interest to some readers.
Short answer: no. I've just been skimming this entertaining paper, not sure whether it distinguishes between Kantians, who (with some honorable exceptions of course!) tend to behave pretty badly (they are blinded by righteousness), from other kinds of moral philosophers.
Not so much, according to the 'folk.'
With nearly 900 votes cast, we now know:
| 1. Plato (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. Aristotle loses to Plato by 367–364 |
| 3. Kant loses to Plato by 411–328, loses to Aristotle by 454–295 |
| 4. Hume loses to Plato by 534–166, loses to Kant by 533–176 |
| 5. Descartes loses to Plato by 597–117, loses to Hume by 356–269 |
| 6. Socrates loses to Plato by 548–101, loses to Descartes by 327–270 |
| 7. Wittgenstein loses to Plato by 610–85, loses to Socrates by 385–193 |
| 8. Locke loses to Plato by 659–29, loses to Wittgenstein by 311–239 |
| 9. Frege loses to Plato by 611–86, loses to Locke by 279–256 |
| 10. Aquinas loses to Plato by 642–57, loses to Frege by 289–284 |
| 11. Hegel loses to Plato by 615–82, loses to Aquinas by 288–285 |
| 12. Leibniz loses to Plato by 650–36, loses to Hegel by 281–266 |
| 13. Spinoza loses to Plato by 653–49, loses to Leibniz by 281–207 |
| 14. Mill loses to Plato by 645–39, loses to Spinoza by 272–247 |
| 15. Hobbes loses to Plato by 647–47, loses to Spinoza by 269–245 |
| 16. Augustine loses to Plato by 663–46, loses to Mill by 296–247 |
| 17. Marx loses to Plato by 653–52, loses to Augustine by 305–248 |
| 18. Nietzsche loses to Plato by 691–63, loses to Marx by 327–269 |
| 19. Kierkegaard loses to Plato by 622–106, loses to Nietzsche by 330–256 |
| 20. Rousseau loses to Plato by 638–41, loses to Kierkegaard by 280–209 |
Berkeley was a close runner-up for the top 20.
The top six are not surprising (though they wouldn't have been my top six, but that's another matter), but after that the results reveal how radically people's conceptions of philosophy diverge. Wittgenstein ahead of Locke, Hegel, Spinoza, Mill et al.? Augustine ahead of Marx and Nietzsche? Aquinas in the top ten? What explains it? Thoughts from readers? Signed comments strongly preferred, as usual.
Many academics use the term "philosopher" not as a description of the people working on the set of problems that occupy our time, but rather as a certain kind of honorific. As far as I can tell, on this usage, a philosopher is someone who constructs some kind of admirable general theory about a discipline - be it cultural criticism, history, literature, or politics. So while it would be odd for a philosopher to call themselves a literary critic because they work on interpretation, it is not unusual for English professors to describe themselves as philosophers. In contrast, we philosophers do not regard the term "philosopher" as an honorific. We tend to think that there are many people who are really truly philosophers, but are pretty bad at what they do. We also think that there are many brilliant thinkers who are not philosophers. This difference in usage has ruined many a dinner party for me. So I was pleased to discover this interview with Hannah Arendt, one of my great intellectual heroes. The interviewer asks Arendt what she thinks about being a woman in the traditionally male circle of philosophers. Arendt is bemused by the question - she protests that she does not belong to the circle of philosophers, and in no way feels herself to be a philosopher. Her "job" is political theory. She points out that just because she studied philosophy, that doesn't mean that she stayed with it. Arendt obviously doesn't think she is a worse thinker for not being a philosopher. She is just baffled that the interviewer confuses the kind of qualitative political and cultural theory Arendt built her career around with philosophy. Arendt knew enough traditional philosophy to understand the contours of the discipline; it might prevent some misunderstanding if our fellow humanists did as well.
Reader Andy Lamey has collected some fun stats here (and scroll down).
Reader Tracy Ho sends along the following interesting information:
I am a reader of your blog. Since you recently launched several polls about The Best Philosopher, I thought you might be interested in the following information.
In 2002, Professor Chen Bo (Philosophy, Peking University) was asked by one Chinese publisher about important contemporary philosophical works for publication in Chinese translation. At that time Prof. Chen was visiting at the University of Miami, so he asked Prof. Susan Haack for suggestions. They sent e-mails to sixteen philosophers in USA, England, Australia, Germany, Finland, and Brazil to recommend TEN of the most important and influential philosophical books after 1950. They received recommendations from twelve philosophers, including: Susan Haack, Donald M. Borchert (Ohio U.), Donald Davidson, Jurgen Habermas, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Thomas Nagel, John Searle, Peter F. Strawson, Hilary Putnam, and G. H. von Wright. (Sorry I cannot give you the full list, because their names are typed in Chinese. Two of them I cannot identify.)
The results were as follows:
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. 13 votes go to Wittgenstein. Among them, 9 for "Philosophical Investigation." 2 for "On Certainty." Each of "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" and "The Blue and Brown Books" gets one.
2. W. V. Quine, Word and Object. 15 votes go to Quine. 8 for "Word and Object." 5 for "From a Logical Point of View." 2 for "Ontological Relativity."
3. Peter F. Strawson, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. 11 votes go to Strawson. 8 for "Individuals." "The Bounds of Sense," "Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties," and "Introduction to Logical Theory" obtain one vote for each.
4. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 9 votes go to the same book, "A Theory of Justice."
5. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast. 10 votes go to Goodman. 7 for "Fact, Fiction and Forecast." 2 for "Ways of World Making." One for "Languages of Art."
6. Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity. 8 votes go to Kripke. 6 for "Naming and Necessity." 2 for "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language."
7. G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention. 8 votes go for Anscombe. 6 for "Intention." One for each of "The Collected Philosophical Papers" and "Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind."
8. J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words. 7 votes go to Austin. 5 for "How to Do Things with Words." One for each of "Sense and Sensibilia" and "Philosophical Papers."
9. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 5 votes go to him and this book.
10. M. Dummett, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. 8 votes go to Dummett. 3 for "The Logical Basis of Metaphysics." 2 for "Frege: Philosophy of Language." One for "Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics" and "Truth and Other Enigmas."
11. Hilary Putnam, The Many Faces of Realism. 8 votes go to him. 3 for "The Many Faces of Realism." Two for "Realism and Reason" and "Philosophical Papers." One for "Meaning and the Moral Sciences."
12. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. 5 votes go to him. Two for "The Order of Things" and "Discipline and Punishment." One for "An Archaeology of Knowledge."
13. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere. 4 votes go to the same book.
14. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia. 4 votes go to the same book.
15. R. M. Hare obtains 4 votes. Two each for "The Language of Morals" and "Freedom and Reason."
16. John R. Searle obtains 5 votes. Two each for "Intentionality" and "The Rediscovery of the Mind". One for "Speech Acts."
17. Bernard Williams gets 4 votes. Two for "Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. "One for "Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry" and "Moral Luck:Philosophical Papers 1973-1980."
18. Karl Popper gets 4 votes. One for "Conjecture and Refutation". Two for "Logik der Forschung." One for "Open Society and Its Enemies." (The last two were published before 1950)
19. Gilbert Ryle gets 3 votes, all of which go to "The Concept of Mind."
20. Donald Davidson gets 3 votes. Two for "Essays on Action and Event." One for "Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation."
21. John Mcdowell gets 3 votes. All go to "Mind and World." (Prof. Chen notes that Strawson and Putnam voted for him.)
22. Daniel C. Dennett gets 3 votes. Two for "Consciousness explained." One for "The Intentional Stance."
23. Jurgen Habermas gets 3 votes. Two for "Theory of Communicative Action." One for "Between Facts and Norm."
24. Jacques Derrida gets 3 votes. "La Voix et le Phenomene" and "De La Grammatologie" and "introduction a “L’origine de la Geometrie” par Edmund Husserl" get one for each.
25. Paul Ricoeur gets 3 votes. Two for "Le Metaphore Vive." One for "Freedom and Nature."
26. Noam Chomsky gets two votes. Each goes to "Syntactic Structure" and "Cartesian Linguistics."
27. Derek Parfit gets two votes. All go to "Reasons and Persons."
28. Susan Haack gets two votes. All go to "Evidence and Inquiry."
29. D. M. Armstrong gets two votes. Each of them goes to "Materialist Theory of the Mind" and "A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility."
30. Herbert Hart gets two votes. Each of them goes to "The Concept of Law" and "Punishment and Responsibility."
31. Ronald Dworkin gets two votes. Each of them goes to "Taking Rights Seriously" and "Law’s Empire."
Since most of the works on list are analytic philosophy, Prof. Chen asked Habermas to recommend some works in Europe. He recommended Axel Honneth, Kampf um Anerkennung (1992), Rainer Forst, Kontexte der Cerechtigkeit (1994)and Herbert Schnadelbach, Kommentor zu Hegels Rechtephilosophie (2001). [BL comment: Forst was Habermas's student]
It is unclear whether the advisers can vote for their own works.
The original document can be found here. However, this is in Chinese. I cannot find it in English. Prof. Chen Bo's website is here.
It might be interesting to see a new result voted by your readers.
Reactions from readers to the preceding? Maybe we will run a poll on this, so feel free to suggest other volumes that ought to be included as major post-1950 books in philosophy.
They're certainly better organized than most of the discipline!
I was reading the Normative Ethics volume in the great "5 Questions" series from Automatic Press, and was struck by this passage from the conclusion of the interview with Jeff McMahan (Rutgers):
I am highly optimistic about the prospects in normative ethics. It is evident to me that great progress has already been made since I entered the field in the early 1980s. Unlike many other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, which in recent years were seduced by bad French philosophy into a lot of silly "post-modern" theorizing that exposed them to derision and reduced them to irrelevance, analytic philosophy is flourishing. Part of the reason why analytic philosophy generally is in such a healthy state is that, as Jerry Fodor observed in a recent book review, philosophers no longer tend to have philosophies. We no longer devote our lives to developing comprehensive philospohical or ethical systems. We are individually narrower and more specialized, which enables us to focus more carefully and minutely on the problems we study, and as a consequence to produce work that is more rigorous and detailed. The results is that philosophy has become more of a collective endeavour than it was in the past, in the sense that different people are focusing selectively on problems that are elements or aspects of larger problems. When the results of the individual efforts are combined, we may achieve a collective product that exceeds in depth, intracacy, and sophistication what any individual could have produced by working on the larger problem in isolation.
Comments from readers? What are the areas of progress since the 1980s? Signed comments preferred, but, at a minimum, you must include an actual e-mail address (which will not appear).
48 choices, drawn from the top vote getters in the previousl iterations of these polls. I'll let this poll run for a week. It will be interesting, obviously, to see how the moderns fare against the pre-moderns. Vote wisely!
With 531 votes cast, here are the "top 20":
| 1. Plato (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. Aristotle loses to Plato by 231–229 |
| 3. Socrates loses to Plato by 366–81, loses to Aristotle by 356–122 |
| 4. Aquinas loses to Plato by 447–37, loses to Socrates by 328–130 |
| 5. Augustine loses to Plato by 458–22, loses to Aquinas by 279–115 |
| 6. Epicurus loses to Plato by 458–15, loses to Augustine by 291–106 |
| 7. Parmenides loses to Plato by 453–16, loses to Epicurus by 170–162 |
| 8. Heraclitus loses to Plato by 447–21, loses to Paremenides by 179–114 |
| 9. Confucius loses to Plato by 417–20, loses to Heraclitus by 152–150 |
| 10. Ockham loses to Plato by 462–9, loses to Confucius by 158–156 |
| 11. Anselm loses to Plato by 452–10, loses to Ockham by 162–150 |
| 12. Pythagoras loses to Plato by 457–12, loses to Anselm by 161–152 |
| 13. Duns Scotus loses to Plato by 436–11, loses to Pythagoras by 151–145 |
| 14. Machiavelli loses to Plato by 459–9, loses to Duns Scotus by 156–153 |
| 15. Democritus loses to Plato by 453–13, loses to Machiavelli by 166–151 |
| 16. Zeno of Elea loses to Plato by 458–10, loses to Machiavelli by 172–146 |
| 17. Plotinus loses to Plato by 441–7, loses to Zeno by 154–118 |
| 18. Avicenna loses to Plato by 426–8, loses to Plotinus by 134–114 |
| 19. Cicero loses to Plato by 450–6, loses to Avicenna by 140–134 |
| 20. Sextus Empiricus loses to Plato by 437–8, loses to Cicero by 142–134 |
Thoughts from readers? Signed comments only; full name and e-mail address.
The poll is here; 37 choices from the Renaissance back to antiquity, with a no doubt inadequate sampling of non-Western figures, but there are some. The "top 20" choices will be bolded in the results.
UPDATE: Several readers have already flagged some ambiguities and misspellings. "Zeno" is the Zeno of Elea, of paradoxes fame. And Pyrrho and Parmenides are boths lightly misspelled. Unfortunately, once the survey starts I can't get back in to fix the typos.
ANOTHER: Two knowledgeable readers have taken issue with my omitting Chrysippus the Stoic. Obviously this is not my field, so I have used the SEP table of contents as a double-check on my draft lists--but Chrysippus, alas, does not have his own entry, though is discussed in detail in the entry on the Stoics. So we may add him to some run-off.
At last we know the truth, thanks to input from nearly 750 readers:
| 1. Immanuel Kant (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. David Hume loses to Immanuel Kant by 409–209 |
| 3. Rene Descartes loses to Immanuel Kant by 474–138, loses to David Hume by 351–242 |
| 4. Ludwig Wittgenstein loses to Immanuel Kant by 497–123, loses to Rene Descartes by 382–218 |
| 5. John Locke loses to Immanuel Kant by 549–63, loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 359–219 |
| 6. Gottlob Frege loses to Immanuel Kant by 538–77, loses to John Locke by 295–242 |
| 7. John Stuart Mill loses to Immanuel Kant by 550–65, loses to Gottlob Frege by 285–260 |
| 8. G.W.F. Hegel loses to Immanuel Kant by 555–48, loses to John Stuart Mill by 280–265 |
| 9. Gottfried Leibniz loses to Immanuel Kant by 564–69, loses to G.W.F. Hegel by 286–262 |
| 10. Bertrand Russell loses to Immanuel Kant by 561–97, loses to Gottfried Leibniz by 291–274 |
| 11. Baruch Spinoza loses to Immanuel Kant by 564–81, loses to Bertrand Russell by 295–274 |
| 12. Thomas Hobbes loses to Immanuel Kant by 564–68, loses to Baruch Spinoza by 303–254 |
| 13. Friedrich Nietzsche loses to Immanuel Kant by 557–78, loses to Thomas Hobbes by 325–244 |
| 14. Karl Marx loses to Immanuel Kant by 558–55, loses to Friedrich Nietzsche by 264–252 |
| 15. Soren Kierkegaard loses to Immanuel Kant by 541–62, loses to Karl Marx by 287–263 |
| 16. George Berkeley loses to Immanuel Kant by 583–57, loses to Soren Kierkegaard by 299–261 |
| 17. Jean-Jacques Rousseau loses to Immanuel Kant by 577–66, loses to George Berkeley by 281–257 |
| 18. W.V.O. Quine loses to Immanuel Kant by 572–43, loses to Jean-Jacques Rousseau by 287–283 |
| 19. Saul Kripke loses to Immanuel Kant by 570–89, loses to W.V.O. Quine by 328–215 |
| 20. John Rawls loses to Immanuel Kant by 588–24, loses to Saul Kripke by 270–242 |
Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl came close to the top 20. Personally, I ranked Nietzsche 1st, Hume 2nd, and Marx 3rd, so I guess I wasn't quite with the program. Some enterprising reader can click on the detailed results and tally up how many #1 votes each philosopher got (Kant led, obviously). How many readers think that in 100 years a survey like this will put Kripke or Rawls in the top 20? Or Frege or Hegel or Russell in the top 10? Other thoughts on the results? Signed comments only: full name and e-mail.
Via Weatherson, I see that the irascible (and sometimes idiosyncratic and dogmatic [cf. paragraph 7]) Peter Hacker has a rather savage and critical review of Williamson's The Philosophy of Philosophy. In the hopes of clarifying what's really at issue here, I thought I would single out a substantive criticism from Hacker's review and invite reader comments on its merits. This is from p. 343 of the review:
Having shown to his satisfaction that philosophical truths are not generally about words or concepts, Williamson queries how philosophy might nevertheless still be an armchair activity that aims at conceptual truths. Since confinement to an armchair does not deprive one of one's linguistic competence, perhaps conceptual truths are those that can be achieved merely through reflection on that competence. This might be so, he writes (pp. 50–1), if all, or all core, philosophical truths were analytic in some sense which imposed no constraints upon the world and hence could be known from the depths of an armchair. Williamson suggests that this view was embraced by those analytic philosophers who believed that philosophical truths are linguistic or conceptual. But this is demonstrably false. Among Oxford philosophers who took 'the linguistic turn', the only significant one who thought that all philosophical propositions are analytic was Ayer (at the age of 26). The manifesto of the Vienna Circle followed Wittgenstein in denying that there are any philosophical propositions. Ryle, Austin, Strawson and others did think there are, but nowhere suggested that they are analytic. All insisted that philosophy is a conceptual investigation, but none held that its task is to disclose analytic truths. It is therefore astonishing that Williamson decides to use 'analytic' and 'conceptual' interchangeably (p. 50). So conceptual truths are analytic, according to Williamson. This is not only historically unwarranted, it is also arguably philosophically misconceived. Such philosophical assertions as 'Idealism and materialism are both answers to an improper question' (Ryle), 'Material objects and persons are the basic particulars of our conceptual scheme' (Strawson), or 'There can be no such thing as a "private language" ' (Wittgenstein), are not analytic, and their proponents did not hold them to be. But they are conceptual truths.
Thoughts from readers? Critical reactions must be signed with a full name and matching e-mail address.
By popular demand, your chance to rank order the important philosophers from the early modern era through the 20th-century. The top vote-getters in the earlier polls are included, plus Rousseau, who was wrongly left off the last poll. "Important" here means philosophically important, not "influential": as we know, Ayn Rand wins that one! Of course, opinions about what is important in philosophy will vary quite a bit (just like opinions about what philosophy is), but that's part of what we're after here. Have fun!
With more than 700 votes cast, the results are in:
| 1. Immanuel Kant (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. David Hume loses to Immanuel Kant by 421–232 |
| 3. Rene Descartes loses to Immanuel Kant by 443–201, loses to David Hume by 335–314 |
| 4. John Locke loses to Immanuel Kant by 576–85, loses to Rene Descartes by 508–136 |
| 5. Gottfried Leibniz loses to Immanuel Kant by 586–76, loses to John Locke by 351–272 |
| 6. Thomas Hobbes loses to Immanuel Kant by 596–64, loses to Gottfried Leibniz by 371–247 |
| 7. Baruch Spinoza loses to Immanuel Kant by 589–70, loses to Thomas Hobbes by 321–292 |
| 8. George Berkeley loses to Immanuel Kant by 625–31, loses to Baruch Spinoza by 377–230 |
| 9. Adam Smith loses to Immanuel Kant by 612–32, loses to George Berkeley by 337–247 |
| 10. Francis Bacon loses to Immanuel Kant by 603–39, loses to Adam Smith by 302–252 |
Thomas Reid was a distant 11th. Rousseau was mistakenly left off the list--would he have out performed Reid or Bacon or Smith? Maybe we'll find out.
I was a bit surprised by how small the gap was between Descartes and Hume. Other thoughts from readers? Post only once; signed comments will get strong preference.
So we established a month back or so, the most "important" philosophers of the 19th- and 20th-centuries, now we can tackle, with the same scientific method, the early modern period from roughly the 16th-century through the 19th. There are 28 choices, and the survey results will highlight "the top ten."
Have fun.
UPDATE: Ugh, I left Rousseau off the list. I guess we'll have to save him for the run-offs.
Jesse Prinz (CUNY Grad Center) writes:
One of my students, Geoff Holtzmann, is running a study on the relationship between personality traits and philosophical beliefs among both laypeople and philosophers. The study involves a 20-minute survey which includes a personality inventory, some demographic questions, and nine philosophical prompts. Would you be able help us recruit philosophers? For the purposes of this study, this means anyone who either holds a Ph.D., a D. Phil, or is ABD. Any help you could provide in helping us recruit would be greatly appreciated. Geoff can be contacted at this e-mail address , and the survey is up and running here.
Though the title of the piece should really be "the end of moral philosophy," though even then the research he cites does not quite establish that point. It is true that Haidt's research (among others) suggests, as Brooks puts it, that moral judgments often involve "rapid intuitive decisions and involve the emotion-processing parts of the brain" or, as Haidt himself puts it (quoted by Brooks), “The emotions are, in fact, in charge of the temple of morality, and ... moral reasoning is really just a servant masquerading as a high priest.” (Once again, empirical psychology catches up to Nietzsche!) Even Haidt does not claim, however, that reasoning never affects moral judgment, as Brooks eventually mentions. And if reasoning sometime affects moral judgment (surely it sometimes does!), then that might be a reason to do moral philosophy, rather than end it. (And, of course, there are other reasons to do moral philosophy.)
Brooks then goes off on some evolutionary psychology fantasies about the origins of our moral emotions, with a nod, as it were, to Sober & Wilson on the evolution of altruism. But he eventually gets back to his main theme, to which the evolutionary speculations are irrelevant:
The rise and now dominance of this emotional approach to morality is an epochal change. It challenges all sorts of traditions. It challenges the bookish way philosophy is conceived by most people. It challenges the Talmudic tradition, with its hyper-rational scrutiny of texts. It challenges the new atheists, who see themselves involved in a war of reason against faith and who have an unwarranted faith in the power of pure reason and in the purity of their own reasoning.
It's certainly not an "epochal change," given that in various forms something like an "emotional approach to morality" has been a mainstay of moral philosophy since at least Hume. (Haidt, who is often quite confused about philosophical matters, recognizes that.) But it is nice to have the NY Times declare one side of the debate the dominant one of our 'epoch'! The "bookish way of philosophy" is too ambiguous a category to assess: the "emotional approach" may challenge overly rationalist approaches to ethics, like the Kantian, but that is not a specific indictment of books! And nothing in Haidt's research impugns reason per se, just so-called "practical reason," "a special kind of reason," as Nietzsche derisively remarks, "in which one need not bother about reason." Nietzsche is, indeed, a skeptic about the "purity" of motivation of even theoretical reasoning, but nothing in Haidt's research supports that conclusion or suggests that the "new atheists" aren't wholly correct that theoretical reason lends no support to religion.
Reactions from other philosophers are welcome; ALL comments must be signed. Post only once, comments may take awhile to appear.
So the earlier poll, with more than 500 votes, is now complete. The results struck me as fairly sensible. Oxford University Press was the hands-down winner, and Cambridge University Press was a distant, but clear, second. Blackwell came in third, and Harvard University Press fourth. Three presses were fairly close to each other in the poll, but distant fifths from Harvard: MIT Press, Routledge, and Princeton University Press. Then there was another drop in votes before Cornell University Press and University of Chicago Press, which were very close. Yale University Press was a somewhat distant 10th, with Kluwer/Springer not far behind.
Some readers pointed out that Oxford may get an advantage from the fact that it publishes more philosophy than any other press--though the fact that OUP publishes leading work in every sub-field of the discipline probably ought to count in OUP's favor. But Oxford certainly has a much larger catalogue than most of the others. PUP, which may have the smallest catalogue, also, in my opinion, may have the highest 'per capita' quality. OUP, CUP, MIT, and Routledge all publish work in Continental philosophy quite regularly. Harvard is an unusual case, and not just because their catalogue is small, but because, as one friend put it to me, their catalogue actually has "a philosophical position" (roughly anti-naturalist, and whatever is on the agenda at Harvard and Pittsburgh, plus some ethics): this means Harvard publishes important books within the "party line," but nothing at all in many of the most lively areas of current research.
Thoughts from readers on the results? Signed comments only, meaning a full name and an e-mail consistent with that.
The poll is here. It is limited to presses that publish a significant amount of original philosophy work in English; thus, presses that publish mainly textbooks or editions of classic works are not listed. This poll will run through next Wednesday.
UPDATE: Kluwer merged with Springer, so the listing for Kluwer should be thought of as Kluwer/Springer books. Sorry about that error.
ANOTHER: It turns out that Ashgate has recently decided to stop publishing in philosophy. (Thanks to Michael Dougherty for the pointer.)
So with more than 500 votes cast, the earlier poll is now closed. Here are "the top 19" journals (after which there is a drop-off in votes). Some useful information here, also some surprises.
| 1. Philosophical Review (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. Journal of Philosophy loses to Philosophical Review by 275–125 |
| 3. Nous loses to Philosophical Review by 307–118, loses to Journal of Philosophy by 240–183 |
| 4. Mind loses to Philosophical Review by 309–108, loses to Nous by 221–192 |
| 5. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research loses to Philosophical Review by 361–80, loses to Mind by 307–132 |
| 6. Australasian Journal of Philosophy loses to Philosophical Review by 386–65, loses to Philosophy & Phenomenological Research by 327–102 |
| 7. Philosophical Studies loses to Philosophical Review by 277–47, loses to Australasian Journal of Philosophy by 153–143 |
| 8. Analysis loses to Philosophical Review by 384–71, loses to Philosophical Studies by 259–159 |
| 9. Philosophical Quarterly loses to Philosophical Review by 376–57, loses to Analysis by 222–179 |
| 10. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society loses to Philosophical Review by 387–44, loses to Philosophical Quarterly by 273–105 |
| 11. Philosophers' Imprint loses to Philosophical Review by 264–28, loses to Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society by 135–124 |
| 12. Philosophical Perspectives loses to Philosophical Review by 369–27, loses to Philosophers' Imprint by 167–141 |
| 13. American Philosophical Quarterly loses to Philosophical Review by 387–42, loses to Philosophical Perspectives by 138–118 |
| 14. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly loses to Philosophical Review by 410–23, loses to American Philosophical Quarterly by 169–167 |
| 15. The Monist loses to Philosophical Review by 385–38, loses to Pacific Philosophical Quarterly by 199–102 |
| 16. Canadian Journal of Philosophy loses to Philosophical Review by 393–32, loses to The Monist by 161–132 |
| 17. Philosophical Topics loses to Philosophical Review by 379–12, loses to Canadian Journal of Philosophy by 197–112 |
| 18. European Journal of Philosophy loses to Philosophical Review by 265–24, loses to Philosophical Topics by 135–133 |
| 19. Ratio loses to Philosophical Review by 395–22, loses to European Journal of Philosophy by 152–134 |
Comments are open; only signed comments will be approved (an e-mail is not enough, you must sign your full name to the comment).
The poll is now closed; with 600 votes cast, here are the results for "the top 40":
| 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. Gottlob Frege loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 261–160 |
| 3. Bertrand Russell loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 280–137, loses to Gottlob Frege by 218–156 |
| 4. John Stuart Mill loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 280–135, loses to Bertrand Russell by 204–178 |
| 5. W.V.O. Quine loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 291–150, loses to John Stuart Mill by 214–198 |
| 6. G.W.F. Hegel loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 290–130, loses to W.V.O. Quine by 214–210 |
| 7. Saul Kripke loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 314–138, loses to G.W.F. Hegel by 224–213 |
| 8. Friedrich Nietzsche loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 290–117, loses to Saul Kripke by 209–207 |
| 9. Karl Marx loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 359–95, loses to Friedrich Nietzsche by 254–138 |
| 10. Soren Kierkegaard loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 358–124, loses to Karl Marx by 230–213 |
| 11. Rudolf Carnap loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 345–90, loses to Soren Kierkegaard by 245–194 |
| 12. John Rawls loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 379–80, loses to Rudolf Carnap by 212–175 |
| 13. David K. Lewis loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 352–92, loses to John Rawls by 211–166 |
| 14. G.E. Moore loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 362–59, loses to David K. Lewis by 188–152 |
| 15. Donald Davidson loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 342–50, loses to G.E. Moore by 171–158 |
| 16. Martin Heidegger loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 351–63, loses to Donald Davidson by 188–161 |
| 17. Edmund Husserl loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 336–51, loses to Martin Heidegger by 169–140 |
| 18. Hilary Putnam loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 338–51, loses to Edmund Husserl by 148–138 |
| 19. William James loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 347–42, loses to Hilary Putnam by 151–146 |
| 20. Charles Sanders Peirce loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 333–40, loses to William James by 145–109 |
| 21. Alfred Tarski loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 323–55, loses to Charles Sanders Peirce by 132–109 |
| 22. J.L. Austin loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 346–29, loses to Alfred Tarski by 131–126 |
| 23. P.F. Strawson loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 339–42, loses to J.L. Austin by 137–127 |
| 24. Karl Popper loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 344–47, loses to P.F. Strawson by 135–127 |
| 25. G.E.M. Anscombe loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 326–35, loses to Karl Popper by 137–128 |
| 26. Jean-Paul Sartre loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 355–54, loses to G.E.M. Anscombe by 145–139 |
| 27. John Dewey loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 344–28, loses to Jean-Paul Sartre by 138–134 |
| 28. Wilfrid Sellars loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 348–29, loses to John Dewey by 123–116 |
| 29. Arthur Schopenhauer loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 352–30, loses to Wilfrid Sellars by 129–117 |
| 30. Henry Sidgwick loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 302–29, loses to Arthur Schopenhauer by 108–105 |
| 31. Alfred North Whitehead loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 333–24, loses to Henry Sidgwick by 108–86 |
| 32. Michel Foucault loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 357–31, loses to Alfred North Whitehead by 123–121 |
| 33. Bernard Williams loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 337–29, loses to Michel Foucault by 128–127 |
| 34. Gilbert Ryle loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 347–23, loses to Bernard Williams by 113–110 |
| 35. Maurice Merleau-Ponty loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 329–32, loses to Gilbert Ryle by 112–107 |
| 36. Franz Brentano loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 326–26, loses to Maurice Merleau-Ponty by 111–100 |
| 37. Michael Dummett loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 343–26, loses to Franz Brentano by 106–92 |
| 38. Jurgen Habermas loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 340–22, loses to Michael Dummett by 115–97 |
| 39. Hannah Arendt loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 336–29, loses to Jurgen Habermas by 107–98 |
| 40. Simone de Beauvoir loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 336–30, loses to Hannah Arendt by 110–100 |
I do hope some sociologist is prescient enough to hold on to these results; I imagine they will look both startling and revealing to the philosophers of 2059--though I'd expect some of "the top ten" to be the same (e.g., I'd imagine that Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Mill, and Marx will be there--perhaps even Hegel, Frege and Russell). I was surprised by Kierkegaard's climb in the last few days. It is also interesting to see how much better Kripke fared than Lewis when we switched from first-past-the-post to Condorcet.
Comments are open for post-mortem assessments; signed comments only. Post only once.
But a reader alerted me to a site that allows one to construct Condorcet polls, which are much more informative than the first-past-the-post polls we ran last week. So here is it is: Who is the most important philosopher of the past 200 years? 53 choices, and you can rank them (or express "no opinion"). 53 is the default rank, you must choose 'no opinion' if you don't want to penalize a philosopher's ranking. Have fun!
UPDATE: So with 300 votes cast, here are the results so far:
| 1. Ludwig Wittgenstein (Condorcet winner: wins contests with all other choices) |
| 2. Gottlob Frege loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 156–98 |
| 3. Bertrand Russell loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 172–90, loses to Gottlob Frege by 129–108 |
| 4. John Stuart Mill loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 171–77, loses to Bertrand Russell by 137–103 |
| 5. Friedrich Nietzsche loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 170–82, loses to John Stuart Mill by 120–119 |
| 6. W.V.O. Quine loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 185–74, loses to Friedrich Nietzsche by 129–120 |
| 7. G.W.F. Hegel loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 188–55, loses to W.V.O. Quine by 130–110 |
| 8. Karl Marx loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 195–50, loses to G.W.F. Hegel by 123–89 |
| 9. David K. Lewis loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 186–63, loses to Karl Marx by 109–107 |
| 10. Saul Kripke loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 194–53, loses to David K. Lewis by 113–92 |
| 11. John Rawls loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 205–48, loses to Saul Kripke by 115–107 |
| 12. Rudolf Carnap loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 199–46, loses to John Rawls by 116–102 |
| 13. G.E. Moore loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 208–40, loses to Rudolf Carnap by 101–99 |
| 14. Donald Davidson loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 214–28, loses to G.E. Moore by 121–82 |
| 15. Martin Heidegger loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 205–37, loses to Donald Davidson by 111–109 |
| 16. Edmund Husserl loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 210–29, loses to Martin Heidegger by 110–84 |
| 17. William James loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 217–26, loses to Edmund Husserl by 99–94 |
| 18. Hilary Putnam loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 217–29, loses to William James by 105–102 |
| 19. Charles Sanders Peirce loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 213–22, loses to Hilary Putnam by 95–90 |
| 20. Soren Kierkegaard loses to Ludwig Wittgenstein by 210–24, loses to Charles Sanders Peirce by 85–83 |
Alas, the myopia of the present (and of Anglophone philosophy). Some sociologist should save these results. Marx "loses to Hegel by 123-89." Oh, the indignity!
I wouldn't know whom to vote for myself. Think of this as asking: which of these folks brings the most disrepute on to our discipline by being associated with it?
UPDATE: Wow! Philosophers really loathe Ayn Rand. With over 300 votes cast, it's 71% for Rand, 24% for Derrida, and 4% for Strauss.
ANOTHER: Tad Brennan (Cornell) writes: "I think the disproportionate turnout for (against!) Rand is just a function of the recent week's news (with republican congressmen reading "Atlas Shrugged", utterly unproductive rich people "threatening" to remove their non-productive selves from the economy
by "going John Galt", etc.). If you had asked this question during the run-up to the Iraq War, when the neo-cons were basking in the Intellectual Seriositude of being the descendants of that brilliant philosopher, Leo Strauss, then the numbers would have tipped the other way. It's just a reflection of what's in the press at the time." Perhaps that's right.
A FINAL UPDATE (MARCH 14): So, with some 1500 votes cast, it's Ayn Rand by a landslide (75% of the vote), following by Derrida (21%), and then Strauss (4%). Of course, it would be nice if the media just stopped referring to any of them as philosophers. For Rand: "novelist" or perhaps "libertarian crank." For Derrida: "literary theorist." For Strauss: "political science professor" or "well-known academic cult leader."
Based, of course, on the top vote getters in the prior rounds--and, yes, the top vote getters here will then go head-to-head with the historical greats of the more distant past! And, then, at last we'll have an official canon. Have fun! (And, again, other philosophy blogs are welcome to link to this.)
UPDATE: I fear some folks are taking this way too seriously. This is just some amusing sociological data, which tells me more about the readership of the blog then it does about the greatness of philosophers! Please, just have fun with it or let it pass in silence.
ANOTHER: So with 1200 votes cast, here are the results:
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein (16%)
2. Friedrich Nietzsche (13%)
3. John Stuart Mill (12%)
4. Gottlob Frege (11%)
4. Bertrand Russell (11%)
6. G.W.F. Hegel (10%)
7. David K. Lewis (8%)
8. Martin Heidegger (5%)
9. Karl Marx (4%)
9. W.V.O. Quine (4%)
9. John Rawls (4%)
So two "anti-philosophical" figures are #1 and #2, two extravagant metaphysicians are #6 and #7, with more conventional figures tucked in at 3-5. More than anything, this list, and the failure of anyone to get even a clear plurality, is testimony to the fact that "philosophy" as people conceive it is more art than science.
APOLOGIES to those who voted the first time earlier today (there were about two dozen votes)--there was a problem with the poll, which had to be fixed. You'll have to vote anew.
===================
And while we're settling once and for all the only true and proper ranking of 20th-century philosophers, let's get to work on the 19th-century:
UPDATE (4 PM CST): Here are the results after about 530 votes: 1. Mill (31%); 2. Nietzsche (22%); 3. Hegel (21%); 4. Pierce (7%); 5. Marx (5%); 6. Sidgwick (4%). I expect if Schopenhauer had not pulled in 2% of the vote, Nietzsche would have a bigger lead over Hegel. I realize, now, that I accidentally omitted Kierkegaard, who might, of course, have pullled votes from both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. So much for polling science.
UPDATE MARCH 4 (11 AM CST): With more than 1400 votes cast, here are the results:
1. John Stuart Mill (28%)
2. G.W.F. Hegel (21%)
2. Friedrich Nietzsche (21%)
4. Karl Marx (7%)
4. Charles Sanders Peirce (7%)
6. William James (4%)
6. Henry Sidgwick (4%)
8. Arthur Schopenhauer (2%)
Bentham, Brentano, Emerson, and Meinong each garnered 1% of the vote, and Comte, Feuerbach, Green, and Spencer even less. Kierkegaard would have performed, I would guess, at least the Schopenhauer level, maybe a bit better. Alas, we'll never know.
I included everyone who polled 3% or more in the earlier survey, plus I added Frege and Husserl, since many folks felt they should be included, even though they straddle the 19th- and 20th-centuries. Please do not link to this unless you run a philosophy blog!
UPDATE (4 PM CST): Here are the results after about 750 votes: 1. Wittgenstein (27%); 2. Bertrand Russell (15%); 3. David Lewis (14%); 4. John Rawls (11%); 5. Frege (9%); 5. Heidegger (9%); 7. Quine (8%). There is a drop-off after Quine.
UPDATE MARCH 4 (11 AM CST): With nearly 1700 votes cast, here's where things stand:
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein (27%)
2. Bertrand Russell (14%)
3. David K. Lewis (12%)
4. John Rawls (11%)
5. Martin Heidegger (10%)
6. W.V.O. Quine (9%)
7. Gottlob Frege (8%)
8. Edmund Husserl (3%)
9. Michel Foucault (2%)
9. Karl Popper (2%)
I do think the Lewis and Rawls results reflect the myopia of the present, and both are aided greatly by the fact that so many of their students (and students of their students) are no doubt among those reading this blog!
I am prompted to ask this momentous question by an item in The New York Times pronouncing Wittgenstein to be the one. In order to bring this matter to a close, please vote only once in the following poll; I have listed all reasonable candidates (excluding Frege and Husserl, who are very much products of 19th-century philosophical culture--perhaps the same could be said for Bergson, but...).
ADDENDUM: I think we'll have a run-off based on the top vote getters in this round, so that we can get a scientifically sound result!
AND ONE MORE: Dearest readers, this is purely for amusement, no need to e-mail me about the 'order bias' or the composition of the list. We all know, in advance, the ten or so who are likely to get the most votes. Feel free to play, or not.
AN APT COMMENT from a reader: "I actually find these exercises more indicative of what current members of the profession are currently thinking of as central than of any indication of greatness (you might recall that Hume thought Addison was destined to be a greater philosopher than Locke... oh well)." Someone should tell The New York Times.
Here. And it ends on the right note: Nietzsche was right (in more ways than one)!
Readers have been asking for awhile that I run some more "hot topics" threads, like the earlier ones on ethics and epistemology. I apologize for not running these more frequently, and will plan on running more of these in 2009. So what are some of the hot topics in "metaphysics"? The specialty as a whole seems to be thriving (much to the distress of Quineans and retrograde positivists!). All the classic topics (time, persistence, identity et al.) seem to have received significant recent discussion, and the metaphysics of causation also seems to have returned to center stage in the last ten years. Post your comments, below, and the more detail the better. Also feel free to post links to on-line resources (papers, blog discussions, etc.). Post only once; comments may take awhile to appear.
Jonathan Wolff (UCL) comments.
I suspect many teachers of metaphysics will enjoy this amusing disclaimer crafted by philosopher Ron Amundson (Hawaii).
(Thanks to Jason Brennan for the pointer.)
Christopher Hitchcock, a distinguished philosopher of science at the California Institute of Technology and member of the PGR Advisory Board, has drafted, with input from some other philosophers of science on the Advisory Board (Craig Callender, Peter Godfrey-Smith, Alexander Rosenberg, and William Wimsatt), a very useful statement for students interested in philosophy of science and cognate fields and trying to decide about whether to pursue PhD studies in a philosophy program or a specialized program, such as "History and Philosophy of Science." This advice will appear in the new PGR, but I thought it might be useful to flag it here for the benefit of interested students and their advisors:
Students interested in the philosophy of science, the history of science, and/or logic may face the choice of whether to pursue a graduate degree in a traditional philosophy department, or in a separate department of history and philosophy of science (HPS), or logic and philosophy of science (LPS). In the English-speaking world, the following schools have separate HPS or LPS departments:
USA:
University of Pittsburgh (HPS)
University of California, Irvine (LPS)
Indiana University (HPS)
UK
Cambridge University (HPS)
London School of Economics (LPS)
(Note: LSE has a department of philosophy, logic, and methodology of science, but no separate philosophy department.)
University of Leeds (HPS)
Canada
University of Toronto (Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology)
Australasia
University of Sydney (HPS)
University of Melbourne (HPS)
University of New South Wales (HPS)
Members of HPS and LPS departments were included together with philosophy faculty in the faculty lists used both for overall rankings, and for rankings in specialty areas. (There are, of course, philosophy departments that are strong in philosophy of science that do not appear on this list because they do not have independent HPS or LPS programs. Prospective students should consult the relevant specialty rankings elsewhere in this report,)
In addition, a number of schools have interdisciplinary graduate programs in HPS or LPS that can be pursued from within the philosophy department (or other relevant department). These include Stanford University (HPS), University of California, Berkeley (LPS), University of Notre Dame (HPS), University of Chicago (HPS), University of California, San Diego (Science Studies Program, including HPS and also Sociology of Science), Duke University (History and Philosophy of Science, Medicine, and Technology), University of Washington, Seattle (HPS), Carnegie Mellon University (Program in Logic, Computation, and Methodology), Arizona State University (HPS; some of ASU’s philosophers are actually housed in the School of Life Sciences, rather than in the philosophy department) and Florida State University (HPS).
Graduates of HPS and LPS programs who focus on philosophy of science will often be competing with graduates of philosophy departments for jobs in philosophy. Of course, students who are interested in pursuing graduate work in an HPS or LPS department should seek detailed information about the placement record of that department, just as they would for a philosophy department. Note also that departments may differ in where they place their students. Pittsburgh’s HPS department places most of its graduates in philosophy departments. Indiana’s HPS department frequently places graduates in the history of science in history departments. Carnegie Mellon places a number of its graduates from its program in Logic, Computation, and Methodology in departments of mathematics, computer science, and statistics.
Typically, students in an HPS or LPS graduate program will be able to take courses offered by the school’s philosophy department, and will have opportunities to interact with faculty in the philosophy department. (And likewise, philosophy students will have an opportunity to take HPS or LPS courses and interact with HPS or LPS faculty.) Prospective students would do well to inquire of current students to determine to what extent this actually occurs. Those who plan to make extensive use of a school’s philosophy department would do well to consider the overall quality of that department, as well as of the HPS or LPS department. Moreover, students in HPS or LPS programs who plan to do extensive study in another department, such as history, or some branch of science, should consider the quality of the relevant department.
One important difference between and HPS or LPS department and a philosophy department will be the curriculum and academic requirements. Students in an HPS program can be expected to take a number of courses in the history of science, and may also have to take qualifying exams in the history of science. (This may be less of an issue at British and Australian schools, that put less emphasis on graduate coursework.) Moreover, students in HPS and LPS programs are often encouraged to take courses in the sciences. Most philosophers who pursue research in the philosophy of science find that a solid education in science and its history provides them with a deeper appreciation of their field, as well as a wealth of case studies. Moreover, students in HPS programs will typically receive a good education in the history of philosophy, as this field overlaps importantly with the history of science. On the other hand, it may be harder for students in an HPS program to obtain a background in other central areas of philosophy, such as metaphysics and epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, or ethics and political philosophy. Students in HPS programs are usually well advised to try to learn about some of these areas from the school’s philosophy department, to help them compete effectively for jobs in philosophy. Students in an LPS program will obtain a strong background in formal logic, which can be helpful in the philosophy of science and mathematics, as well as in areas like philosophy of language. These students may find that it is harder to obtain a background in other areas of philosophy, such as the history of philosophy.
Another difference is that HPS and LPS departments are sometimes willing to admit students whose background in philosophy is less extensive than that which is required for most philosophy programs. This is not to say that students can be expected to be admitted to HPS or LPS departments if they have done poorly in philosophy courses. But if a student has a strong background in a relevant area, say history or some branch of science for an HPS program, or mathematics or computer science for an LPS program, this may partially compensate for a shortage of philosophy courses on one’s transcript. This can be a mixed blessing, however, as all graduates of HPS or LPS programs will eventually need acquire a solid grounding in philosophy to compete effectively in the philosophy job market. Obviously, this is less of a concern for those who plan to seek employment outside of philosophy.
Michael Rosen and I are certainly grateful to Professor Vandevelde of Marquette for this generous review of The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy; his conclusion is particularly welcome, because it states well our aim and the aim of the contributors, and confirms that we achieved it:
In sum, this handbook is a remarkable achievement. On the one hand, the scope of the themes and authors is large enough to count as an excellent overview of the many facets of continental philosophy; on the other hand, the creative and critical nature of the contributions provides a thorough and in-depth discussion of the trends making up continental philosophy. It is both a scholarly work providing a large amount of information and a philosophical work testing and assessing the originality and fruitfulness of continental philosophy. If a case had to be made about the relevance, originality, and fruitfulness of the continental approaches, this handbook makes it rather convincingly and brilliantly.
An undergraduate in Britain writes:
I am a final year undergraduate student at the University of [name omitted] in the UK and am currently looking in to graduate schools. One of the factors which I am considering is which departments are strong in AOSs and AOCs that are marketable. However to answer this question I need to know which AOSs and AOCs are marketable. I read your article in the Chronicle Careers ten years ago and found it very interesting--for example the fact that Applied Ethics has an almost one to one ration of jobs to candidates.
My question is this: Which AOSs and AOCs have the most favourable ratios of jobs to candidates? If there were a ranking these I would find that very useful. Is there a reliable way of finding out (are there surveys) or do we have to rely on anecdotal evidence?
Of course I understand that it is somewhat perverse to go to graduate school and then choose your field based on job prospects. However it still seems like the information would be useful. For example students who have more than one main interest and are not sure which they prefer, the information could tip the scale in one direction. Even more so if they are choosing between graduate schools based on their specialty rankings, years before they have to write their dissertations. Similarly it could be useful for choosing between equally attractive sounding courses at masters level, for AOCs.
Please do not feel obliged to give me a detailed answer or to post this on your blog. I would however very much appreciate it if you could at least point me in the direction of where I could find some answers to my question (perhaps it has been addressed before). For example, is Applied Ethics still so marketable (I really like Applied Ethics)?
Comments are open; please post only once, comments may take awhile to appear.
David Chalmers (ANU) is working on a taxomony of philosophy for a new on-line resource. Help him out with feedback here.
Reader Rob Sica kindly calls to my attention a podcast interview with Raymond Geuss (Cambridge) about the subject of his most recent book, what he calls "real politics," and his Marxian diagnosis of where modern political philosophy has gone wrong. Given the, shall we say, "intense" and "passionate" response to our earlier post concerning Geuss's skepticism about Rawls, I imagine this podcast will interest a number of readers.
UPDATE: And here's a review of Geuss's latest book, on which the podcast is based.
Stephen Stich (Rutgers) has posted his interview for the 5 Questions volume in philosophy of mind recently noted. It has a particularly nice account of the meaning and significance of Quine's naturalistic revolution in philosophy...like all revolutions, it continues to meet with resistance from the forces of reaction.
Thanks to Professor Williamson for permission to post this outstanding and informative tribute to the remarkable philosophical career of Ruth Barcan Marcus (emerita, Yale): Download Laudatio.doc.
(I should note that, at the start, Professor Williamson makes it clear that he is a believer in the existence of "analytic philosophy," and as he conceives it, there is such a discipline, though it probably does not include many of the major figures in Anglophone philosophy in the last fifty years. But that meta-philosophical question is quite independent of the illuminating celebration of Professor Marcus's work.)
UDPATE: Dan Korman (Illinois/Urbana) reminds me that Professor Williamson's takes a more catholic and less stipulative approach to "analytic" philosophy on p. 21 of his important recent book on The Philosophy of Philosophy.
Psychologists at Harvard have designed a series of online tests they call the "Moral Sense Test" aimed at ascertaining ordinary people's judgments about trolley-problem-like moral dilemmas and discerning the sources of variability in those judgments. Eric Schwitzgebel (Philosophy, U.C. Riverside) and Fiery Cushman (Psychology, Harvard) have just posted a new version of the Moral Sense Test, and they're especially hoping to recruit people with philosophy degrees for this test so that they can compare philosophers' and non-philosophers' responses to moral dilemma scenarios. The test should take about 15-20 minutes.
A discussion launched on this blog a couple of years ago is now continuing in the pages of one of the fall 2008 APA Newsletters here. Manyul Im, a scholar of Chinese philosophy at Fairfield University whose comments stimulated the initial discussion, is hosting further discussion at his blog.
Sean Kelly (Harvard) and the Times Literary Supplement have kindly given permission to publish this quite interesting essay of Professor Kelly's from a few months ago about the renewed interest in phenomenology among many Anglophone philosophers: Download tls_kelly_husserl_published_version.doc. (The essay is, in part, a review of David Woodruff Smith's book on Husserl in the Routledge Philosophers series I edit, and which we have noted before.)
...and a different set of problems ensue. Philosophers will cringe when Gintis writes:
It is refreshing indeed to find a moral philosopher capable of expressing such elementary, yet widely ignored truths as "our moral beliefs are simultaneously relative to our evolutionary history and our cultural background, but at the same time objectively true" (p. 291). Why objectively true? Because our moral beliefs are just as much a material force in the world as our capacity to metabolize nutrients, and truth in this case means exists.
One hopes that this was not Professor Alexander's preferred explanation of the point.
Let me record, however, my high regard for Gintis, even if he seems a tad muddled about philosophical matters. Bowles and Gintis on Schooling in Capitalist America is still a brilliant piece of work. (There is a nice overview of the book here.)
A case study of the difficulties that ensue.
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