News item here. The comment from Salaita's lawyer is exactly right. They may get some claims dismissed, as noted before, but enough of the lawsuit will survive the motion to insure that Salaita may begin the process of "discovery," i.e., collecting evidence relevant to his claims from Illinois.
...against outspoken law professor (though see the very good statement by the Law Dean towards the end of the article). This is really appalling. The only silver lining is that I guess they concluded they couldn't get away with firing him outright.
Various blogs have been remarking on this study about faculty hiring networks and hierarchies: the short version is that very few graduates of PhD programs place at higher ranked programs, and most research-oriented tenure-track jobs are secured by graduates of a small number of elite PhD programs. The same, of course, is true in philosophy, though that was not the focus of this study. Particularly striking is the data reported here to the effect that in 2013-14, 88% of all reported tenure-track hires were graduates of PGR-ranked programs, and that a whopping 37% of all reported tenure-track hires that year took their PhD from one of the PGR top five programs. Fortunately, the PGR makes the relevant information about the hierarchy available to everyone, not just a select group of undergraduates.
Much of the discussion pertains to whether there is any correlation between these patterns and "merit." The original study (the first lilnk, above) looks at this in terms of publications, which isn't a very useful measure in philosophy. Based on my own experience, I'm inclined to say that, on average, graduates of the top programs (or the top programs in some specialties) are stronger candidates on the merits than others, but there are substantial minorities who are mainly riding the prestige effect out of the top programs, as well as substantial minorities handicapped by not have the halo effect of a top program.
ADDENDUM: Mason Westfall, a graduate student at the University of Toronto, writes:
While the correlation between graduates of top programs and tenure-track placement is robust, there are at least two causal hypotheses consistent with that fact. One explanation is the one that you highlight---a halo effect students enjoy by being from top programs. Another explanation is that the best undergraduates get into the best programs and choose them over less prestigious programs. That would mean the best students entering graduate school would be disproportionately at the most prestigious departments. It may be that the best students entering graduate school tend to be the best students leaving graduate school and then the best students leaving graduate school get the jobs. In order to test the contribution made by the department in particular, it seems like it would be necessary to locate a population of students who got into both higher and lower pedigree programs, but chose to go to lower pedigree programs. Even this would conflate the teaching/training contribution of the school with the halo effect, but it would give us substantially more information than the correlation highlighted.
I agree with all this. To be clear, I think there are some relatively weak candidates from top programs who nonetheless do well because of the "halo" effect or, in some cases, the loyalty of alums in teaching to graduates of the program.
ANOTHER: David Wallace (Oxford) writes:
Let me add to Mason Westfall’s two causal hypotheses a third: the training you get from top programs (undergraduate or graduate) makes you a stronger philosopher. I wouldn’t find it at all surprising, given two basically equally strong undergraduate philosophers who went to very different-strength grad programs, if one turned out much stronger than the other at the end. Indeed, I’d be depressed if that wasn’t so, at least on average and other things being equal: it would suggest that all the effort people put into providing a good education and good educational environment for students is pretty much epiphenomenal.
More novel is the bill’s requirement that schools and universities conduct surveillance on their students. Section 25.1 states that education institutions are among the ‘specified authorities’ – along with councils, prisons, hospitals and police chiefs – that must ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’....Administrators must conduct ‘risk assessments’ to uncover ‘where and how’ their students might be drawn to extremist ideology, including ‘non-violent extremism’. All staff members should be trained in ways to ‘challenge extremist ideas’, and if they find anyone who appears ‘vulnerable to being drawn into extremism’, refer them to local anti-terrorism panels for ‘support’....
In addition, all visiting speakers must be vetted for their anti-extremist credentials at least two weeks in advance, and their lecture notes and slides scrutinised. Maybe this will help procrastinating academics to plan their lectures ahead of time. Or perhaps they will just stop speaking....
IHE has the story, and here is the quite unbelievable letter from the Marquette Dean, which shows he understands neither academic freedom nor tenure despite citing the AAUP principles. (See the useful discussion by John K. Wilson.) The Dean's disgraceful letter does include a transcript of the exchange between the philosophy instructor attacked by McAdams and her student, and as far as I can see, McAdams is correct to assert that the transcript supports a number of the original allegations he made. But the accuracy of his blog post isn't the issue; the issue is whether it's really the case that a tenured faculty member in one department can not blog about the professional conduct of instructors in other departments. Is it really a detenuring and firing offense at Marquette to do so unless it is 100% accurate and is based on due diligence in telling the complete story and from all angles? Apparently.
(The last time I blogged about this sorry episode, a junior philosopher elsewhere took to cyberspace to denounce my "cognitive dissonance"; when I asked him to explain the dissonance, he pointed to the fact that I had sided with a student and against a faculty member in a sexual harassment case. As I pointed out, sexual harassment in the workplace is, in fact, unlawful, even when carried out with speech. Criticism of someone's pedagogy is not unlawful, or at least not yet! This simple distinction was apparently lost on this PhD in philosophy, alas, who, I infer, subscribes to the New Infantilism principle: "Any criticism by a tenured person of a student is an offense against decency." Alarmingly, this now appears to be Marquette's "official" position.)
UPDATE: I suppose I shouldn't be surprised that Justin Weinberg (South Carolina), the leading cyber-cheerleader of the New Infantilism, should be on the wrong side of this issue, but his comment in response to someone pointing out, correctly, that Marquette's action is a "chilling attack on academic freedom" is unbelievable:
It is nothing of the kind. McAdams is not being disciplined because of his research, his teaching, his academic views, nor his political views. He is being disciplined because he recklessly, libelously, and obnoxiously used students and colleagues at Marquette in an attempt to advance his own agenda.
Remarkably, over 100 readers "liked" this nonsensical comment. The AAUP statement on academic freedom includes freedom to make extramural statements among the components of academic freedom, and I would be surprised if Marquette did not endorse the AAUP statement and incorporate it, contractually, with its faculty. (One might make a stronger claim: namely, that academic freedom ought to protect the right of faculty to criticize institutional practices, including pedagogical ones.) Although there has been a lot of bluster by Weinberg and others about "falsehoolds" and "libel," it simply isn't clear, even from the Dean's letter, that McAdams actually said anything false, let alone libelous. (In any case, there are remedies for libel that do not include revocation of tenure.) One can agree that McAdams behaved obnoxiously, but that is not a firing offense, at least not consistent with tenure. What the difference is between "us[ing] students and colleagues...in an attempt to advance his own agenda" and "criticizing the pedagogical practices of a colleague" I do not know. Is Weinberg's criticism of McAdams "an attempt to advance his own agenda" (promoting the New Infantilism) at the expense of McAdams? If not, why not? (Faculty are not, in any case, under a generalized Kantian obligation to treat everyone as an end, never as a means!)
[W]hen I see comments such as the ones from the first commenter “This is an absolutely chilling attack on academic freedom, and I hope the philosophy community will condemn it as such” (and the 17 “likes it has at this point), it makes me truly appalled to know that I am part of a profession whose members are willing to prioritize a tenured male’s freedom of speech over the safety of women graduate students and their reputation.
But McAdams, in his speech, did not threaten anyone's safety; others did, but McAdams is not legally responsible for that, nor should he be, at least if one thinks freedom of speech deserves some protection, even for men. One may hope this comment was posted by a benighted undergraduate who might yet revise his/her view with the benefit of more education and experience.
My colleague Geoffrey Stone, a well-known liberal legal commentaor and First Amendment scholar, has a very sensible piece in Huffington Post; some excerpts:
[T]he concern with campus sexual assault has begun to take on the characteristics of a panic in which government officials and school administrators have increasingly lost sight of other fundamental values that must shape the culture of institutions of higher learning....
[T]he Department of Education has declined to define precisely what it means by sexual assault. Clearly, it includes the crime of rape. But the meaning of sexual assault, at least as used in this context, can be extremely, and dangerously vague.
Fundamentally, it is bound up with such concepts as "consent" and "unwanted" sex. The problem is in defining how those concepts apply in this context. In many instances, especially where alcohol is involved, as it often is, extremely difficult questions arise about the meaning of "consent" and "unwanted." Is it measured by the subjective state of mind of the "complainant" or by the reasonable understanding of the "accused"? How are the participants, and the institutions, to know whether in any given interaction the accused crossed the line?....
The Department of Education has...sent strong signals, however, that colleges and universities must be tough on those who commit "sexual assault," however defined. The result is that academic institutions feel compelled to adopt very broad definitions of sexual assault for fear that if they get it "wrong" the Department will find them in violation of federal law and strip them of federal funds -- a penalty that strikes at the very heart of many colleges and universities.
To eliminate such overreaction on the part of academic institutions, the Department should set a clear -- and sensible -- standard for what counts as sexual assault. This standard should focus on the reasonable understanding of the accused rather than on the subjective understanding of the complainant. To impose serious discipline on students for committing sexual assault when they could not reasonably have understood in the circumstances that the sexual interaction was unwanted sets a standard of culpability that is both unfair to the accused and demeaning to the complainant....
[A] second issue concerns process....By what standard should the fact finder have to decide whether her story or his story is true, before expelling him?
According the Department of Education, in all such proceedings "the evidentiary standard that must be used" is "preponderance of the evidence," that is, whether it is "more likely than not" that he committed a sexual assault. In my judgment, that is the wrong standard. Indeed, many if not most colleges and universities have traditionally applied the "clear and convincing evidence" standard in such circumstances. The difference between these two standards is roughly the difference between being 51 percent confident that the student committed the sexual assault before expelling him and being 75 percent confident that the student committed the sexual assault before expelling him....
For a college or university to expel a student for sexual assault is a matter of grave consequence both for the institution and for the student. Such an expulsion will haunt the students for the rest of his days, especially in the world of the Internet. Indeed, it may well destroy his chosen career prospects. This is especially likely, for example, for law students.
Moreover, the procedures used in these disciplinary hearings do not come close to those employed in civil actions [which use a preponderance standard], which involve judges, juries, rules of evidence, lawyers, discovery, and a host of other procedural protections designed to enhance the reliability of the proceedings. Even at their best, college and university disciplinary proceedings are a far cry from civil actions in terms of fairness to the accused.
Thus, although the Department of Education may well be right that "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" is unnecessary in these circumstances because there is no risk of imprisonment or a formal criminal record, it is completely unfair, in my judgment, for a college or university to suspend or expel a student on the ground that he committed a sexual assault if the institution is only 51 percent confident that he did so.
A number of philosophy professors are on what increasingly seems to me to be the wrong side of these issues; that is their right, but they should stop acting as though they occupy the moral high ground. They do not, and Prof. Stone's piece usefully explains why.
News release here; still digesting the complaint, will post more after I'm through it.
MORE: The complaint, which has been filed in federal court here, adds details about the initial offer and acceptance, and the conduct of the defendants that I had not seen previously. Salaita is suing the University of Illinois Trustees and administrators for violation of his First Amendment speech rights and for violation of his due process rights; he is suing all the defendants for "conspiracy" under the applicable Civil Rights statute (which basically authorizes a civil action for deprivation of constitutional rights); he is suing the Trustees on the basis of promissory estoppel (see the discussion under #5 here) and for breach of contract (these claims are in the alternative, he won't prevail on both); he is suing the (as of now) unknown donors for tortious interference with contract, basically wrongful interference with the contract he had with the University (some readers my age or older will recall that this was the claim on which Penzoil secured a multi-billion dollar verdict against Texaco in the 1980s); he is suing all the defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress; and he is suing Chancellor Wise for destroying pertinent evidence.
The defendants will, as I've remarked before, move to dismiss the complaint--in doing so, the court will take the facts as Salaita represents them and decide whether they state legal claims. Some of the claims may be dismissed: I'd bet on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim to be dismissed. What is certain is that some (indeed, I expect, most) of the claims will survive the motion to dismiss. At that point, Salaita will be entitled to wide-reaching "discovery" of defendants's e-mails, phone records, internal memos, and so on. Since that is bound to be a huge embarrassment for many or all of the defendants, a settlement will be reached at that point: that's my prediction in any case. It will likely be confidential, will involve payment of Salaita's attorney fees and, I would hope, a seven figure payout to Salaita.
UPDATE: Just to be clear, given the facts and the law, Salaita ought to prevail on the merits on his First Amendment claim and either his breach of contract or promissory estoppel claim; he will also prevail on the due process claim if the court finds that there was a valid employment contract, which as we discussed previously, it should, but that's not guaranteed by any means. Most likely to be dismissed are the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and the tortious interference with contract, though the latter might survive.
Few would disagree that the systems for preventing and prosecuting sexual assault on US campuses are in need of change. But the efficacy and fairness of recent reforms that focus on making college grievance procedures more favorable to complainants and on codifying strict new definitions of sexual consent remain highly questionable. Advocates of these reforms tend to dismiss their opponents as reactionaries and “rape apologists”—a characterization that is probably accurate in some cases—but feminists, too, have cause to view these measures and the protectionist principles on which they are based with alarm.
UPDATE: Ethan Jerzak, a Berkeley PhD student and Wisconsin native, writes "with deep shame for my home state":
It might be worth pointing out that, the same day that malevolent idiot Scott Walker announced the $300 million cut to the UW system, he pledged $220 million in state funds to build the Milwaukee Bucks a new arena. (The latter being, of course, a "common-sense, fiscally conservative approach"!)
UPDATE: Mark Tushnet, a law professor at Harvard, writes: "Of course I don’t understand his paper, but there’s a great line in it. After proving that the upper bound for gaps between primes exists and is less than 70,000,000, the next line is: 'This result is of course not optimal.'"
This is an informative overview of the law and the developments emerging from the current OCR in interpreting Title IX. My guess is the courts will eventually undo some of the interpretations promulgated by the current OCR.
CHE has the story. Among the researchers involved in this study was Princeton philosopher Sarah-Jane Leslie. My own impression has been that there are people who arrive in graduate school with what looks like an innate talent for philosophy (I can think of one man and one woman in the last 20 years that fall into that category), but that lots of others, through hard work, end up doing substantial work. What do readers think? And why would philosophy be more prone to such "innate talent" judgments than other fields?
The full text is here, but I'd call particular attention to this given recent mischief by universities carrying the fake Civility Banner:
[I]t is not the proper role of the University to attempt to shield individuals from ideas and opinions they find unwelcome, disagreeable, or even deeply offensive. Although the University greatly values civility, and although all members of the University community share in the responsibility for maintaining a climate of mutual respect, concerns about civility and mutual respect can never be used as a justification for closing off discussion of ideas, however offensive or disagreeable those ideas may be to some members of our community.
The law school violated Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the federal anti-discrimination law that requires colleges to investigate campus sexual assaults, by providing more rights to the accused than to the accusers, the department said Tuesday. In one case, the Harvard Law School took more than a year to make its final decision about an alleged sexual assault, allowing the accused student to take part in a lengthy – and ultimately successful – appeal process in which he was able to be represented by legal counsel.
The student who brought the complaint was not allowed the same opportunities, the department said.
At the time, this was in line with the college’s official policies regarding the post-hearing rights of accused students. The process also used a “clear and convincing” standard of proof, rather than the department’s recommended “preponderance of evidence” standard. During the four-year investigation, many institutions switched to this lower standard, but institutions like Harvard and Princeton University both held onto the higher standard until earlier this year. Princeton entered into its own Title IX agreement, which mirrors Harvard's in several ways, last month.
It does seem prima facie wrongful not to accord the accuser and the accused comparable due process rights, including legal representation. The lowering of the standard of proof is more controversial, but arguable: "clear and convincing" is essentially the criminal standard, while "preponderance" is the standard in a civil action. Whether a university finding of sexual assault, for example, is more like a criminal than a civil finding, in terms of both sanctions and stigma, is what is arguable.
The reaction by Harvard law professor Elizabeth Bartholet, who teaches civil rights and family law, is also notable.
Curious--an apology for the idiotic civility e-mail (that inspired this), but no commitment on whether to follow the Committee's recommendation that Salaita's appointment be taken up again by the College of Liberal Arts.
ADDENDUM: She also notes that Illinois has offered to compensate Salaita for his "reasonable losses," but I'm quite sure the University's definition of that and Salaita's differ. His "reasonable losses" would include not only all the moving and litigation costs, but also 35 years of salary and benefits. My expectation, as I noted early on, is that the case will not settle until Salaita's main lawsuit (for breach of contract, violation of his constitutional rights, etc.) survives the motion to dismiss and discovery is set to begin: many lawsuits settle at that point, and Illinois's incentive to not have all the (no doubt) unseemly details of what really happened aired in public will lead them to a new interpretatoin of "reasonable losses," that will be a bit closer to reality.
We do not believe that Dr. Salaita’s political speech renders him unfit for office. Further, we find that civility does not constitute a legitimate criterion for rejecting his appointment, and we recommend that statements made by the Chancellor, President, and Trustees asserting civility as a standard of conduct be withdrawn.
The report also finds that the University violated its own rules and recommends "that the university take responsibility for the financial consequences to Dr. Salaita of its irregular adherence to its own policies and procedures." (Thanks to Rick Laugesen for the pointer.)
It also recommends that a committee re-evaluate the appointment and, somewhat surprisingly, suggests the committee can consider whether his tweets bear on his "fitness." There's a useful discussion (under the heading "Fitness") of this aspect of the report here. This seems to me more dubious, and I note that the Committee itself is forced to defend its suggestion by claiming the circumstances here are (allegedly) sui generis.
I should note that the Committee includes one leading academic freedom (and labor and employment law) expert from the University of Illinois law faculty, Matthew Finkin.
This is an open letter on behalf of the Harvard Philosophy Department’s Graduate Student Organization. We were very concerned to learn about the public attacks by Marquette Professor John McAdams against Marquette graduate student Cheryl Abbate.
Anyone who teaches ethical theory will have to manage conversations involving politically sensitive topics, and in doing so, it is impossible to express agreement with every student on every occasion. Indeed, part of the point of an ethical theory course is to equip students to examine critically even their most deeply held views on moral issues.
These are sound and sensible points. But then the letter continues:
However one may characterize Cheryl Abbate’s way of managing a discussion of same-sex marriage inside or outside the classroom, she ought not to have been subject to the public attack orchestrated by Professor John McAdams. As a foreseeable result of this attack, Cheryl Abbate has been subject to an overwhelming volume of hate mail and threats, as well as negative attention in national media. In initiating this flurry of attacks, we believe that Professor McAdams exploited the power differential between a professor and a graduate student.
Universities owe their graduate students—who are among the most vulnerable members of their communities—a guarantee of protection from this kind of treatment. But at Marquette, we were recently disturbed to learn, Cheryl Abbate was put in a position where her best option was to transfer out of her doctoral program.
We call on Marquette to articulate a clear policy for protecting its graduate students from abuses by more powerful members of its community.
There is much that is strange about this, in roughly ascending order of significance:
1. Ms. Abbate was able to transfer to a much better program (Colorado), a silver lining in an otherwise dark rain cloud. It's hard not to see her as being better off professionally in the end, despite the ugliness that prompted her to transfer.
2. Professor McAdams's creepy behavior was not in any way facilitated by "the power differential between a professor and a graduate student." Note, first, that McAdams is, despite his many years in the academy, still merely an Associate Professor of Political Science. And apparently even his local institutional clout is so meager that the University is unabashed to suspend him without a hearing. More importantly, since Ms. Abbate was a student in the philosophy department, McAdams had no power over her at all. What enabled him to ignite a right-wing firestorm was his ability to use his blog to tap into a pre-existing network of "conservative" social and traditional media that love narratives about intolerant liberals in the academy. This has nothing to do with power differentials between faculty and students; graduate students, after all, have pulled the same kind of stunt against tenured professors! There is a serious problem with the way in which social media is used to harass faculty and students, which we have noted before, and universities ought to defend their teachers and students against such attacks, as they sometimes do, but not by punishing faculty or student speech.
3. In this regard, I do wonder what these graduate students are asking Marquette for by way of "a clear policy for protecting its graduate students from abuses by more powerful members of its community"? Presumably, the University already protects students, including instructors, from sexual harassment, physical assault, and other unlawful misconduct. But is it to protect them from speech critical of their pedagogy? How can a university, consistent with a commitment to free speech and inquiry, including about its own teaching and research, possibly "protect" anyone from that?
IMPORTANT UPDATE: A PhD student in philosophy at Harvard writes:
As a PhD student in the philosophy dept. here at Harvard, I wanted to write you regarding your recent post on your blog, entitled “More on the Marquette Case.” As you noted there, a letter was written by the “graduate students in philosophy at Harvard,” addressed to the Dean at Marquette. However, not all the students in our department approved of this letter, and indeed, some of us wanted not to send it. It was sent because we were outnumbered in a straight vote about whether to send it; effectively we had no choice after that vote.
I, for one, agree with your analysis of the latter half of the letter, and wanted to clarify, for what it’s worth, that the letter does not speak for all the students of the department. Rather it represents some of the more politically-inclined folks who get riled up about these sorts of things and then take action ‘on behalf of the students’ as soon as they have a straight majority. There is at least some significant minority of us not represented by this letter.
I had suspected as much, but it's good to have confirmation of this fact.
ANOTHER: Jeremy David Fix, another PhD student at Harvard (who gave permission to use his name), writes:
While I did not help compose the letter, the voting process did not require a 'straight majority'. A 75% majority was required to pass the motion and send the letter. This requirement was clearly stated in the open graduate student meeting where the letter was discussed, the email that asked for the vote through an anonymous online survey, and the email that confirmed the result of the vote, as far as I remember. Though my colleague is correct that "not all the students in our department approved of this letter, and indeed, some of us wanted not to send it", the actual percentage of supporting votes was significantly higher than 75%. Whatever the validity of the concerns about the content of the letter, this letter in no way indicates that the graduate community is overrun by politically motivated folks illegitimately pretending to speak for others.
I agree that there is no evidence that "the graduate community is overrun by politically motivated folks illegitimately pretending to speak for others," and I did not interpret the original e-mail, above, that way. The unknown is how many of the graduate students actually voted (my originally correspondent thinks only about 20 of the 40 students in the program voted). In any case, the important point, given that the letter is not very sensible, is that not all Harvard graduate students supported it.
The latest from IHE. The best hope is that the ratings will be such an obvious mess that they will make no difference. But realistically, almost anything the federal government puts its imprimatur on is going to have some kind of effect.
IHE has the latest details. The right-wing Volokh blog, whose selective interest in these issues is well-known, suggests this violates the professor's academic freedom. That seems to me dubious, except on a very capacious conception of academic freedom in which anything an academic says is part of that freedom, a conception which has no legal status. Professor McAdams's research profile does not suggest that his blogging critical of a colleague's teaching practices had anything to do with his scholarship, and so academic freedom is not at issue. On the other hand, he is clearly being punished for his speech, and while Marquette, as a private employer, is not bound by constitutional standards, it should honor a moral commitment to freedom of speech. As the IHE article notes, McAdams's suspension also does seem very suspect from the standpoint of AAUP guidelines. The strongest argument that could be made in favor of the university's action, at least on the facts that are public, is that by inciting a right-wing firestorm about the philosophy instructor's teaching, Professor McAdams interfered with university functions, though I'm not sure how persuasive I find that argument. (Consistent with the New Infantilism now running rampant in the blogosphere, some people suggested that because the philosophy instructor was a graduate student, though one running her own class, and McAdams a faculty member in a different department, he had some kind of special pedagogical or other obligation not to criticize her. That argument has no merit as a matter of law or AAUP norms.)
UPDATE: Over at IHE, there is a strong statement in the comments from longtime academic freedom commentator John K. Wilson (one of the few who was consistently on the right side of the Ward Churchill debacle):
I haven't studied the case enough to make a judgment on whether the TA was right or wrong (or both). But I know with certainty that Marquette is wrong to suspend a professor for talking about the case and expressing an opinion. McAdams is perfectly free to publicly criticize a TA's approach, and nothing about it constitutes harassment or some violation of privacy. The fact that the university can't even clarify exactly why they're suspending McAdams is particularly suspect. McAdams' blog should not be grounds for any kind of investigation; the fact that he was suspended without a hearing shows that this punishment is entirely illegitimate.
That last point is particularly important: suspension without even a hearing indicates that Marquette has just left the AAUP universe. What a disgrace.
ANOTHER: Justin Weinberg (South Carolina) offers a rather tendentious characterization of McAdams's offenses in the third update, and even if it were all true, it would not justify suspension without even a hearing. That McAdams is a right-wing creep is not grounds for his being sanctioned for his speech. Particularly odd is Weinberg's complaint that McAdams failed to show "any concern for Abbate’s welfare or future academic career." But McAdams has no obligation whatsoever to be concerned about this: Abbate is not his student, indeed, is not even in his department. The idea that this is a sanctionable offense on McAdams's part is, itself, a symptom of the New Infantilism, for which Weinberg's blog has become a leading cyber-cheerleader (though to his credit, he permits fairly wide-ranging discussion in the comments).
Continental Philosophy Farhang Erfani, a philosopher at American University, provides a useful set of links to news, events, interviews, reviews, videos, etc. related to "Continental philosophy" (broadly construed)