'a handful of very vocal figures (many otherwise quite marginal to academic philosophy), whose mixture of foolishness, sanctimoniousness and/or vindictiveness we've commented on many times before--for example, here, here, here, here, here,here. "Pathologically self-righteous people" (to quote an earlier correspondent) can't be reasoned with, but perhaps they can be stopped. But this will require more courage and forthrightness from the majority in the profession, both faculty and students, who find this climate of fear, with its harm to honest intellectual discussion, unacceptable.'
There is a group at my university who call themselves [an acronym for a group of female students of philosophy at the university]. They actively recruit members and take it upon themselves to organise things like reading groups, "how to apply" workshops, etc. They don't stand out for their philosophical ability but they give themselves an active role and visible presence in the department. When I began at the university, I joined, but have been disappointed to discover the core group are a clique who approach politics with exactly the sort of self-righteous and authoritarian attitudes and behaviours you mention here. None of them are faculty: they are people who have at least finished undergraduate studies and are looking to complete either a Masters or a PhD at some point. As I said, they don't stand out for having particular philosophical ability. Faculty don't seem to be either opposed to or particularly supportive of them. However I have found their presence intimidating and frustrating, because I don't agree with all of their political opinions, or at least have the audacity to believe they are open to question. It's not just that they promulgate their own set of dogmas, but that you feel like you have to watch your back and be careful what you say, otherwise they might mobilise people against you. I find them anti-philosophical: they don't seem to value academic freedom or free inquiry, preferring instead to police language and thought for "problematic" expression and views.
Anyway, I hope they fall by the wayside over time, and don't represent the future of philosophy. I hope all we are seeing is some kind of political fad that will die out sooner rather than later. Thanks again for taking a public stand against this worrying phenomenon!
That piece clearly touched a nerve with many readers. Another junior faculty member at another university wrote about his social media exposure to his colleagues at a temporary job he had elsewhere:
[T]he sorts of things I was seeing were just appalling. As one of your correspondents put it, the kind of pathological self-righteousness, the grotesque moral peacocking competition to see who could most aggressively signal their sensitivity to the marginalized and oppressed...it was just unbelievable to me that so many professional philosophers and graduate students could be so manifestly self-deluded as to what they were doing and why. I needn't provide examples to you, I'm sure.
In that time, you were one of the few people who helped me keep my sanity. I am normally a very outspoken person, and if not for being on the market, and having tenure to think about after that, I am very much the sort who would have relished the opportunity to weigh in on all this shameful nonsense. But at the time, I could barely keep my head above water, and am now proud I managed to resist writing some publicly available screed that might have kept me from getting a job. One of the most frustrating things about that time (and now) is that I feel less free to express my opinions than I ever did as a graduate student, where I felt very free. The climate is so censorious and grandstandingly punitive that I, like so many others, feel effectively silenced. And I still largely feel that way despite having a TT job now.
More folks, including the many senior folks I hear from, need to be more vocal in the lives of their departments and on social media about the unacceptability of this behavior.
Although I've not talked to any of those involved, it's hard to escape the conclusion that this is all a coordinated effort: here now is the University President Robert Zimmer, and here is my colleage Geoffrey Stone (lead author of the University's free expression statement). Stone's piece has a useful chronicle of examples of attempts to suppress expression on various campuses.
It is amusing to see various folks in philosophy cyberspace who are precisely part of the problem ridiculing all this as a publicity stunt; but these are the same folks responsible for the "climate of fear" in academic philosophy about attaching one's name to the defense of reasonable views about gender, diversity, the appropriate punishment of sexual harassers, and the nature and content of the philosophy curriculum. It will soon be time to borrow one of their favorite tactics and "name and shame" the folks who have degraded the profession with their vindictive intolerance. There is a robust culture of free expression at this University, which other schools would do well to emulate. (I note as but one example that my libertarian and law & economics colleagues at the University of Chicago Law School knew full well the range of my political and moral opinions when they hired me!)
UPDATE: This interview with Geof Stone suggests that the Dean of the College's letter that got all the attention was not something approved by the University Administration: Stone basically disowns the way it was written.
Everyone in cyberspace is blathering about this, so I will add my own brief blather:
1. Academic freedom protects the right of faculty to utilize trigger warnings if in their professional judgment it is important for the pedagogical mission in a class. To the extent the letter implies they are forbidden, it is nonsense. ("Trigger warnings" are a popular blather topic in their own right, but there's not much more worth saying than this.)
2. Insofar as the letter is meant to send a message, the message is that all ideas can be discussed at the University of Chicago, subject to norms of civility essential for learning. So, for example, if some faculty or students here tried to suppress discussion of Germaine Greer's views about gender--as happened in philosophy cyberspace not long ago--they would be unsuccessful here. If anyone interfered with the expression of such ideas, they themselves would be subject to discipline for disrupting the mission of the university. By contrast, criticism of Greer's views on gender would enjoy the same protection at the University of Chicago.
3. #2 is obviously the only way for a serious university to run--even Herbert Marcuse argued that in the famous essay on "Repressive Tolerance." Here the Marxian left, the traditional liberal and the libertarian right should all be in agreement. Only that consumerist phenomenon of elite universities and their narcissistic students--roughly "identity politics"--is the outlier here.
About thirty years ago, I was a grad student TA at Michigan, which had a union for TAs. Our wages and benefits (esp. health) were way better than those held by the TAs at Yale at the time (they were not, needless to say, unionized).
That was then, of course. Market conditions changed, and wealthy private universities--and not-so-wealthy ones like NYU--had to respond to market pressures, pressures created often by the existence of unionized grad students elsewhere. NYU beat off a unionization challenge a decade or so ago by dramatically improving economic conditions for their PhD students, but NYU is especially vulnerable since the university's endowment does not allow it to compete in the "big leagues," so it is highly dependent on tuition and other short-term revenue and cheap labor, now mainly in the form of adjunct teaching.
Now the National Labor Relations Board has ruled, in a case brought by Columbia students, that grad students who work as TAs have the right to unionize, reversing a 2004 decision involving students at Brown. As usual, this brings forth the usual nonsense and tired canards about unions and the "special" character of graduate education. Thus the President of Yale:
As a Yale graduate student, professor, and administrator, I have experienced firsthand how the teacher-student relationship is central to the university’s academic enterprise. The mentorship and training that Yale professors provide to graduate students is essential to educating the next generation of leading scholars. I have long been concerned that this relationship would become less productive and rewarding under a formal collective bargaining regime, in which professors would be “supervisors” of their graduate student “employees.”
Today the National Labor Relations Board has ruled that graduate students at Columbia University, who assist with teaching and research as part of their education, are employees of that school. I disagree with this decision....
The Graduate School of Arts and Sciences enrolls the world’s most promising students in its doctoral programs. These students choose Yale for the opportunity to study with our outstanding faculty, and to take advantage of the university’s wide array of academic resources, generous financial aid, and comprehensive benefits. Yale will continue to provide exceptional support to our graduate students as they focus on their scholarship, successfully complete their degree programs, and find rewarding careers.
I want to argue that this situation demonstrates an absolute fissure in contemporary progressive politics, that there is a direct and unambiguous conflict between our efforts to address mass incarceration and the insistence that people accused of crimes such as sexual assault should be presumed to be guilty and that those who are guilty are permanently and existentially unclean. I want to argue that there’s nothing particularly hidden about this conflict, that acknowledging it is as simple as noting the direct contradiction of two progressive attitudes: the belief that certain crimes, particularly sex crimes and domestic violence, should be treated not only with harsh criminal punishments but with permanent moral judgment for those guilty of them; and the idea that we need to dismantle our vast criminal justice industrial complex, to oppose the carceral state, and to replace them with a new system of restoration and forgiveness. I further want to argue that progressives are not doing any of the moral and legal reasoning necessary to resolve these tensions, and that if we don’t, eventually they’ll explode....
[I]f an acquittal is insufficient to prove Parker’s innocence, what would such proof look like? Is exoneration even possible? And what do we do with people who are accused of crimes like sexual assault and domestic violence when their cases never go to trial? The current progressive impulse seems to be to simply treat them as guilty regardless, and permanently. Yet this strikes me as unambiguously contrary to the spirit and philosophy that contribute to our drive for criminal justice reform. How can we make such reform possible if we condemn huge groups of people to the status of guilty despite never being found guilty of any crime? And if such crimes carry existential and disqualifying moral judgment for life even for those only accused, how can we bring those imprisoned and released back into normal adult life?
People swing wildly from talking about criminal justice reform to insisting that everyone accused of entire classes of crimes, let alone convicted, are necessarily condemned to a lifetime of guilt. These impulses are not compatible. I strongly believe that we can balance the need to give sexual assault victims far more support and understanding than we traditionally have, and to begin to fix our society’s ugly failure to protect women from sexual assault, while still fighting mass imprisonment and the carceral state. But it will take hard work to get there, and the issue does not seem to even been on the radar for most people.
Initially, Oberlin's President, Marvin Krislov, took the principled position regarding this unfortunate person: her anti-Semitic ravings on Facebook are extramural speech within the protection of her contractually guaranteed rights of academic freedom. Unfortunately, the Board of Trustees has forced Krislov to act (I have it on good authority that the pressure came from the Board):
Dear Oberlin Community Members:
In response to recent renewed national media interest in the matter of Professor Joy Karega, I am writing to provide an update to you in advance of any public statement.
In March, in consultation with me as President, Oberlin's Board asked the administration and faculty to use its governance processes to review Professor Karega's professional fitness in light of her social media postings. Accordingly, the faculty governance process began and is ongoing.
I am committed to continuing and completing an equitable review process. While the process is pending, Professor Karega is on paid leave and will not be teaching at Oberlin. Arrangements are being made to cover her teaching and advising responsibilities.
In recognition of the sensitivity of this continuing review process and the privacy of the individuals involved, we will have no other comment until the conclusion of the process.
Marvin Krislov President
We truly value alumni interest, inquiry, and support and will continue to share official information and updates as they become available.
M. Danielle Young Executive Director Oberlin Alumni Association
P.S. For a compilation of Oberlin College statements, articles, and updates related to these issues, visit the Alumni Association's News and Features page.
Oberlin already had a bad reputation for toleration of free speech on campus; the Board of Trustees must be really naïve if it thinks that would-be student censors are going to recognize an exception to academic freedom only for anti-Semitic speech.
MOVING TO FRONT FROM YESTERDAY: THANKS TO THOSE WHO HAVE SIGNED, THEY ARE SLOW TO UPDATE THE SITE, BUT I ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO SIGN AS WELL!
A philosophy graduate student (who did not want to be named, for reasons that will become obvious) calls my attention to this petition which I encourage all faculty to sign: it protests the creation of a blacklist of students deemed anti-Israel by an organization called "Canary Mission." The aim is to harm their professional and educational prospects. I do wish so many American defenders of Israel weren't disgusting fascists.
During college tours last year, we passed through Hamilton College, which my son liked, especially the open curriculum (he ended up going elsewhere in the end). But this decision is both pedagogically dubious and inconsistent with the absence of distribution requirements, which is probably one of Hamilton's most distinctive features in the landscape of elite liberal arts colleges.
Here. Dreger is an historian of science, who has herself been the victim of the thought police because she has discussed, sympathetically, disfavored views about transgender people. Her main theme is that threats to academic freedom in universities come from three sources: the "left" (as she calls the "identity politics left," which, of course, isn't the left, since for the actual left, only one identity counts, the human), the right (I.e., reactionary state legislatures that want to censor research and teaching), and corporate sponsorship (which wants universities to adhere to the "brand").
MOVING TO FRONT FROM JULY 10--MORE DISCUSSION WELCOME
Philosopher Cheyney Ryan, Director of the Human Rights Programs for the Institute for Ethics, Law, and Armed Conflict at Oxford University (who taught previously at the University of Oregon), writes:
The University of Oregon recently settled a case against it for almost $1 million brought by a young woman who had been assaulted by one of its basketball players. The basis of her suit was that the University knew or should have known that the player had been involved in a sexual assault incident at his previous university but still admitted him and did nothing to address the potential danger to others. Her suit cited other instances where universities have been held responsible for admitting students with histories of sexual assault/harassment. The new U of O president, a distinguished law professor, thought there was enough merit in the argument to settle the case immediately.
I should think that universities would evidence the same level of concern towards professors with such histories. Yet the impression up to now is that the Yale Philosophy Department was entirely too passive in this regard, in the Pogge matter. This impression is now confirmed by the remarks of Seyla Benhabib in the New York Times.
"Professor Benhabib, who served on Professor Pogge’s selection committee, said that she and other committee members had heard about the Columbia case but did not discuss it.
“I didn’t think it was my place to go searching into his history at Columbia,” she said. “Everybody slips once. That was our attitude.”
One can only hope she was misquoted. Otherwise, her remarks are absurd. "Everybody slips once"-- was this really the search committee's attitude about acts of harassing/assaulting female students?
If Pogge had been involved in an incident raising a weapons charge, would it then have been her place to go "searching" into his history? (How many "slip ups" would have been permissible in a gun violation?)
It's a matter for serious discussion how such histories should factor into a hiring decision. But progress in providing a safe environment for students will only be made when departments treat these matters as of more than casual importance.
I, too, was astonished by the "everybody slips once" comment attributed to Prof. Benhabib. What do readers think about the issues raised by Prof. Ryan?
Robin Wilson, a reporter at CHE who has covered academic philosophy quite a bit, kindly sent along a link to her latest article looking at the philosophy profession (the link should be free for about 24 hours, then behind a paywall again). Many of the changes described seem sensible, though a lot depends on the department and its members (it is possible to have parties with alcohol without stupid behavior, after all). The NYU "be nice" rules did make me laugh, not because they're terrible ideas but because a third or more of the faculty there were, historically, serial violators of them! I was astonished, however, by this other bit of the article:
[Philosopher Janice Dowell] initially refused to publish in the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, due out next year, because she had "a lot of independent evidence" that a male philosopher who had also been asked to contribute was harassing women in the field, she says. She told the editor, Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, about her concerns, and he confirmed that the other philosopher’s work would not appear in the volume.
This calls to mind our discussion from the other day. I wonder, did Routledge know that the editor of a purportedly scholarly volume was also a vigilante acting as judge, jury and executioner? (Ichikawa doesn't have much judgment, to be sure, but I do wonder what the philosophy editor at Routledge thinks about this.) How many other philosophers working in this field were excluded as a sanction for their alleged misconduct? What do epistemologists think about this? Doesn't this kind of editorial decision-making pose a threat to the philosophical integrity of your field? The Routledge Handbook is now damaged goods, isn't it? I'm happy to say I've never heard of this kind of editorial behavior in any of the fields I'm most familiar with, so maybe this is just a pathology of epistemology only.
Let me offer a constructive suggestion. If you believe you have credible evidence about misconduct by an academic elsewhere, contact colleagues in that department or contact the Title IX office at that university. I've done the latter on one occasion (with, alas, mixed results, but this was because a crucial witness in the end was not willing to speak further with the Title IX enforcement officer).
All the best suggestions for improving the PGR have come, without exception, from those who contributed to it over the years. Almost all the other criticisms were on the spectrum from self-serving to silly. The PGR was a fabulous resource, unlike anything else in any field, that let prospective students in on the secret sociology of the hierarchy in the profession. I hope it can continue, but the “slave revolt” in philosophy exacerbated by the Internet is now a real obstacle.
Could you explain the term "slave revolt" for folks unfamiliar with Nietzsche?
By “slave revolt,” I’m alluding to Nietzsche’s idea that our Judeo-Christian morality arose from an inversion of previous values, an inversion that was self-interested, but in the interest of the “slaves,” literal and otherwise. I do think what’s happened in the last few years is that people who aren’t very good at philosophy and/or feel otherwise marginalized in the profession have taken to the Internet, and under various high-minded sounding moralized banners—equality, fairness, inclusiveness and so on—have launched an attack on the idea of philosophical excellence and smarts.
Now along comes the latest example, a presentation on "Prestige: The first and final hurdle for a more inclusive philosophy," though it might just as well have been called, "Excellence: The first and final hurdle for a more inclusive philosophy." The author, philosopher Helen De Cruz, has a PhD from the University of Gronignen, and is, I am guessing, concerned that those, like herself, from non-prestige departments are unfairly excluded from professional opportunities in philosophy. Now she herself is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Oxford Brookes University (not part of Oxford, but a separate institution in the same town), so she has done well, but might, of course, be doing better were if not for the supposed "prestige" bias.
Since I know nothing about her work, it may well be that Professor De Cruz is someone who has been a victim of pernicious "prestige" bias. Pernicious prestige bias is when someone thinks that because someone got a PhD from Fancy Pants University they must be competent (or, the reverse). That's bullshit and pernicious, of course, and the PGR upset that apple cart a long time ago. But what most cyber-complainers call "prestige bias" is that hiring departments prefer candidates from well-regarded departments. That's plainly true, but perhaps well-regarded departments are so-regarded because they are actually departments with very good faculty and very goods student? Prof. De Cruz never fairly considers that possibility. Non-pernicious prestige bias is simply a rational and time-saving heuristic for identifying candidates with excellent qualifications trained by excellent faculty, attributes that, in the PGR era, are well-tracked by what's now called "prestige." As Prof. De Cruz notes, "prestige" bias is a feature of academic hiring in all disciplines; the difference in philosophy is that it no longer simply tracks "brand name" universities, but now reflects where the strongest clusters of philosophers and students actually are. (In what other academic field does everyone know that two of the very best programs are at NYU and Rutgers? There is none.)
"Excellence" doesn't, in reality, exclude any demographic groups, except the mediocre.
Let me begin by thanking all the people who signed the Change.org petition to save the WIU philosophy major. Though I have signed quite a lot of petitions, I used to think signing them was silly, and now I know they are broadly ineffective. But what I didn’t anticipate was the feeling of emotional and psychological support the kind words of friends and strangers from across the globe could provide. So, thank you.
It will come as no surprise to those paying attention that the Board of Trustees has voted unanimously to authorize the elimination of philosophy and three other programs at Western Illinois University, but readers may be interested in how this happened so quickly over the last two weeks.
...at IHE. There are a number of dubious claims in the article. None of what is happening is a conspiracy by the Board of Trustees; the leadership comes from President Robert Zimmer, a mathematician, who has a definite vision, and who has been, by all accounts I've heard, the real decision-maker who enjoys strong support from the Board. It is reasonable, in retrospect, to wonder whether all the building was a good investment, though I think it probably was. More controversial, and debatable, was the decision to make a massive investment during the past five years in an Institute for Molecular Engineering, a field where the University of Chicago had no investment previously. The cost of a couple of dozen faculty, many senior, and their labs must have been tens of millions of dollars. The IHE article also misstates the budget: the budget of the university (including the medical school but excluding the hospital) is about $2.6 billion. (The hospital actually makes a profit.)
Crain's has the basic facts, and notes (in an earlier piece linked in the new one) that the new cuts come on top of earlier ones. The article attributes the cuts to the building spree on the U Chicago campus, which has added a lot of attractive new facilities, though other sources around campus say much of this results from the huge investment in the new Institute for Molecular Engineering, a field in which the University previously had no presence at all. The Social Science Division is also facing an 8% cut as well.
Note, of course, that many listed jobs, especially around 2008-2010, may not have been filled due to budgetary pressures. Philosophy listings are down 50% from their recent high a decade ago, and below where they were in 2002-03.
A young philosopher tells me that he's been repeatedly solicited by the infamous David Publishing outfit. Getting tired of the repeated solicitation, he replied that they should "fuck off" since he knows they're a scam. This generated the following reply:
Sorry to disturb you. But in fact, our company has been founded more than 10 years, our authors are from all over the world, our journals are indexed in some world famous databases such as
EBSCO, CSA, CAS, Ulrich, ProQuest, Summon, CEPS and so on, can all the people be cheated by us? We admit our mistake or weakness at the begining of our set-up, but we are perfecting ourselves these years and we think every coins have two sides, which is what we cannot avoid. And we publish the papers,
upload them to our website and post hard copies to authors, which can say we are not a scam. Hope you can understand.
ADDENDUM: As if on cue, Audrey Yap (Victoria) (yes, that Audrey Yap). At least the "battle lines" are clear, and many on the wrong side of these issues have identified themselves.
INDEED as this mindlessness migrates to philosophy, the results should be interesting. The typical "intro" graduate seminar to 20th-century analytic philosophy would involve reading Frege, Russell, Strawson, Carnap, Quine, Kripke, maybe some Davidson or Putnam or D. Lewis too. That course would have to go. The study of German Idealism: that's out too, all a bunch of white guys, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel etc. 19th-century German philosophy: forget it, all white guys again, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, maybe also Feuerbach and Schopenhauer (and all Germans to boot--what a disgraceful lack of diversity). Of course, the study of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy would have to go, once again all white guys (were they white? I'm not even sure, but they were definitely guys!). The future of academic philosophy is going to be interesting!
...as told, quite honestly and accurately, by a former Admissions Dean at the University of Chicago. Having now been through two rounds of college applications, one for a child applying mostly to top private research universities, and one applying mostly to top private liberal arts colleges, I've gained a lot of insight into this process. I'll write more about it at a later date.
On Facebook, I've got, broadly speaking, three "kinds" of friends: academic lawyers, academic philosophers, and regular people (the latter category including some lawyers, relatives, neighbors etc.). The FB habits of these three groups are strikingly different.
Regular people use FB the way I thought it was supposed to be used (and the reason I joined): to post photos of kids and pets, recent vacations, occasionally a bit of personal or professional news. Academic philosophers do a little of that, and so do academic lawyers, but for most of them, that's only a small portion of their posting.
Academic philosophers increasingly treat FB like a blog, a forum for pontification about everything from real politics to academic politics. Until I realized I could "unfollow" people without "unfriending" them, I dumped a fair number of academic philosophers because their pontifications were so tiresome. My advice: get a blog! Anyone who wants to read me pontificating, can come here, but I don't impose it on my FB friends.
Academic lawyers do a fair bit of pontificating too, though not nearly as much as the academic philosophers, and theirs is almost always confined to real politics. The really revolting aspect of some academic philosopher behavior on FB is its "high school with tenure" quality: back-stabbing, preening and posturing, endless displays of righteousness and "pearl clutching", faux solidarity with all the oppressed and "wretched of the academy" (less often the actual wretched of the earth), and so on. An awful lot of academic philosophers on FB come across as teenagers desperately seeking approval and affirmation. I've managed to "unfriend" most of the offenders, but it was really a kind of depressing and sickening spectacle while it lasted.
Story at IHE, with some particularly interesting remarks by philosopher Talbot Brewer (Virginia); an excerpt:
For Talbot Brewer, professor and chair of philosophy at the University of Virginia, the liberal arts need saving in part from the “black mirrors” so many of us are glued to each day. Cellular phones, computers and, especially for children, television, facilitate a kind of “reverse-Weberian,” late capitalistic assault on our collective attention, he said. The effect is that we no longer know how to interact with the meaningful, valuable media that take time and effort to understand— that is, the bulk of what makes up the liberal arts.
Calling attention a “vital resource,” Brewer described it as “the medium of passion, of friendship, of love. The sign of our presence to one another, both in intimate spaces and in public. The antidote to listlessness and heedlessness.”
It’s also the prerequisite “for any concerted activity, including the activities of reading, viewing, critical thinking, writing and intensive conversational exchange that are central” to the liberal arts, he said.
So amid the clamor of “manipulative messages when there suddenly appears something quite different, something called literature, or art or philosophy, it is not easy to open ourselves to this newcomer,” Brewer continued. “The attentional environment has not encouraged the traits required for properly appreciate engagement — the habit of devoted attention, and of patience and generosity in interpretation, the openness to finding camaraderie and illumination from others in the more treacherous passages of human life [and] the expressive conscience that insists upon finding exactly the right words for incipient thoughts.”
In short, almost half the students are majoring in economic, biology or math. But some of my colleagues think this is typical of national trends, with students gravitating towards majors that purportedly lead to jobs (or, I guess, business school or medical school--or law school, if you add in poli sci). But barely 4% History majors, even though Chicago has one of the best history departments in the country? If you look at the core humanities fields, they account for just 12% of undergraduate majors. Do readers know of other data on undergraduate majors from other schools?
The concept of "diversity" as a positive good is now a commonplace in academia and beyond. But where did this "idea" come from? My assumption has always been that it derives from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bakke, a case challenging affirmative action for African-Americans at the medical school at the University of Calfornia, Davis. In the key opinion, written by Justice Lewis Powell (a successful lawyer from the heart of the old South, Richmond, before Nixon appointed him to the Court), the Court rejected the many sensible rationales for affirmative action policies (and "quotas" in particular): e.g., compensatory justice, counteracting continuing discrimination (absent a record that had to meet a rather high evidentiary bar). Instead, Justice Powell opined that "diversity" is a factor universities could rightly consider in admitting students, since that (purportedly) had some independent academic value (though not one to be realized by a "quota").
My question for readers, especially those older than I, is whether "diversity" as a concept with a positive valence has a history that pre-dates Bakke, or whether Bakke is really the key to understanding how "diversity" became such a pervasive concept and mantra in America?
Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner recently appointed John C. Bambenek to the Illinois Board of Higher Education as the sole faculty representative. Many have criticized the move by claiming that Bambenek’s views aren’t representative of most faculty members. I claim this is irrelevant. What is relevant is that Bambenek should not be eligible to serve as the lone faculty representative to the IBHE since he isn’t even eligible to represent the University of Illinois faculty on their Senate.
The Illinois State Senate still has to approve Rauner’s appointment. State Senator Antonio Muñoz is the Chair of the Executive Appointment Committee. Professor Gay is sending letters to both Senator Muñoz and Governor Rauner objecting to Bambenek’s appointment. There is still time for philosophers, faculty, and citizens of Illinois to ask for an actual faculty member who understands the needs and concerns of faculty in Illinois to represent them on the IBHE.
Continental Philosophy Farhang Erfani, a philosopher at American University, provides a useful set of links to news, events, interviews, reviews, videos, etc. related to "Continental philosophy" (broadly construed)