The other keynote speaker controversy making the rounds concerns a talk by philosopher of religion Richard Swinburne (Oxford) at a regional meeting of SCP at Evangel University in Missouri. This appears to be a sympathetic account of what transpired from someone in attendance. Briefly: Swinburne offered the usual awful arguments for anti-gay bigotry that "natural law" theorists and Christian philosophers usually trot out. No one outside the sect takes the arguments seriously, because they aren't serious arguments, but put that to one side. This talk was given inside the "sect": should anyone have been surprised that a keynote address at a Christian philosophy conference included familiar arguments rationalizing anti-gay bigotry? Many self-identified Christian philosophers reject such arguments, but many others plainly do not. As philosopher Chris Swoyer (Oklahoma) noted:
A substantial portion of Christians hold views like those attributed to Swinburne and do so on the basis of their understanding of Christianity. So it's surely not surprising for him to express such views in the setting he did.
That is surely right, and poses a difficult question for those Christian philosophers who repudiate such views about whether they want to be in that "setting" as it were.
In the case of the other keynote speaker controversy du jour, Professor Shelby was asked by a Black woman in his Q&A why he had not cited or discussed any Black feminist authors; Professor Shelby, unsurprisingly, was dismissive of the question, calling it a request for a "bibliography" and indicating he was just trying to do philosophy. He, correctly, supposed that a question of the form, "Why didn't you mention authors with particular racial and gender attributes?" is not a serious philosophical question, in contrast to, say, the question, "Why didn't you address the following argument by author X [who is also a Black feminist]?", which is an appropriate question. (Readers should review the full statement by the aggrieved audience member at the end of this post.) Other audience members shared this aggrievement as well. The organizing committee, instead of taking the opportunity to educate the aggrieved philosophy graduate student about the intellectual norms of the profession she plans to enter instead sent out a missive to all those who attended the conference stating that,
In particular, we apologize for the effects of the Saturday keynote address [by Prof. Shelby] and for our failure to do more about a situation in which SAF members felt personally and collectively hurt. When members identify effects including the erasure of Black women’s bodies and words, then we have to do better. What was said was wrong, and inappropriate at a feminist conference, and we take responsibility for our roles in the events that took place.
So one initial difference between the two cases is that Professor Swinburne's views really are a philosophical embarrassment, whereas Professor Shelby's views and his response to an inappropriate question were not. Indeed, the philosophical embarrassment is that the organizing committee of a philosophy conference caved in to meritless aggrievement by someone who apparently does not know what constitutes an appropriate philosophical question. The other difference involves the "official" SCP response to the Swinburne talk. Michael Rea (Notre Dame), the President of SCP, made the following public statement in the wake of attention being called to the Swinburne talk:
I want to express my regret regarding the hurt caused by the recent Midwest meeting of the Society for Christian Philosophers. The views expressed in Professor Swinburne's keynote are not those of the SCP itself. Though our membership is broadly united by way of religious faith, the views of our members are otherwise diverse. As Preisdent of the SCP, I am committed to promoting the intellectual life of our philosophical community. Consequently (among other reasons), I am committed to the values of diversity and inclusion. As an organization, we have fallen short of those ideals before, and surely we will again. Nonetheless, I will strive for them going forward. If you have thoughts or feedback you would like to share with me, I would welcome hearing from you via email or private message.
Like the SAF conference organizers, Prof. Rea rebukes the speaker to the extent of feeling the need to apologize for the effects of the talk (both statements apologize for "hurt"). Unlike the SAF conference organizers, Prof. Rea at least does not pronounce "what was said" to be "wrong" and verboten "for a Christian conference," which would, for the reasons noted by Prof. Swoyer, be a difficult position to defend in this "setting." Prof. Rea's response would have been better had it just consisted in the statement that "The views expressed in Professor Swinburne's keynote are not those of the SCP itself. Though our membership is broadly united by way of religious faith, the views of our members are otherwise diverse." If he'd left it at that, this would not be notable at all.
Q: To what extent did Yale teach you the art of critical thinking?
DC: Any critical thinking that I got from Yale was in my undergraduate courses, maybe in the true sense of the term, from the great Paul Weiss, Sterling professor of philosophy. Paul Weiss taught his class Socratically, asking to have questions fired at him, and he never failed to take down any five students simultaneously, if he needed to. I later put him on television, on the Jack Paar Tonight Show, and then I had Paul Weiss on my own show, as I did William F. Buckley, [whose] faculty advisor was Paul Weiss.
Weiss, by the way, was the first Jew hired with tenure in philosophy at Yale. (The episode is described in Neil Gross's biography of Richard Rorty: basically, Brand Blandshard championed the appointment, but it met with opposition from his anti-semitic colleagues and administrators, but Blandshard prevailed.) Fifty years on, the former Sterling Professor of Philosophy at Yale is now barely known or read.
The comical sanctimony of certain segments of the philosophy "profession" is a regular topic of conversation and head-shaking among adults, but the insulting treatment of philosopher Tommie Shelby (Harvard) after his keynote at the meeting of the Society for Analytic Feminism (SAF) sets a new low. Justin Weinberg (South Carolina), who always has his finger on the racing pulse of the hyper-sensitive, offers this account:
At the SAF, some members of the audience found the keynote talk by Tommie Shelby (Harvard), drawn from his forthcoming book Dark Ghettos, highly objectionable. My understanding (which may not be entirely accurate) is that the controversy concerned some remarks in the talk about procreative ethics, how (as he puts it in an earlier article), “basic duties are not suspended or void because one is oppressed,” and whether what he said was disrespectful to poor, black women. Some attendees apparently thought that an apology was in order, perhaps from the organizers. (UPDATE: two days after the SAF conference ended, its organizers sent an email to the participants issuing an apology, and requesting feedback from them regarding the event and future conferences.) (UPDATE 2: further details regarding Shelby’s talk can be found in the comment below from “a poor black woman who was there.”)
I suppose Professor Shelby (and everyone else) has learned an important lesson here, namely, that the meeting of the Society for Analytic Feminism is not really a philosophical conference, but one in which failure of ideological purity (which is marked by giving "offense"--heavens!) is verboten and results in an "official" repudiation by the organization.
Again, if we were dealing with professionals--it appears we are not--then we would expect SAF to issue an apology to Prof. Shelby for this shameful treatment at what was supposed to be a philosophical event. (I should add that the sins of SAF should not be visited on those who work in feminist philosophy, though there is, of course, some overlap in the two groups. But I guess if I were a job candidate, I would get SAF off my CV, lest the sins of the SAF organizers be visited on the innocent.)
UPDATE: Philosopher Kate Norlock (Trent) tells me that Professor Weinberg's account is not accurate, and therefore the inferences I have drawn from it are not warranted. She writes:
Tommie Shelby spoke to an attentive and quiet audience without interruption.the question-and-answer period afterward involved many members of the audience providing substantial and critical comments and questions to him. I can attest, since I was there, that their objections were not to the notion that the oppressed can have moral duties.
Interestingly, one of the more unfortunate moments in the discussion period was a moment when Shelby attempted to deflect a robust criticism with the comment that he was "just doing philosophy." Since the unfortunate implication of this ill-chosen deflection is that his questioner may not be trying to do the same, I found myself asserting, as I closed the event, that I appreciated the extent to which we all, including our keynote speaker, remained engaged and did philosophy together. It is therefore disappointing to read your statement that "the meeting of the Society for Analytic Feminism is not really a philosophical conference."
Presentations at our conference included the works of philosophers from 30 different states and 3 countries. I provide you the link to our program so that you may be better informed as to the philosophical content of our conference:
I know you care about truth and fact more than your post indicates. I believe that you wish to be accurate and right. Your post about SAF is neither. It is not reflective of actualities and instead seems to merely echo Justin Weinberg's likewise uninformed post at Daily Nous. Your recommendation that my organization should not appear on a philosopher's CV may be well-intended but is predicated on misunderstanding on your part.
Last, please provide me with any proof that I or my organization officially repudiated Tommie Shelby or owes him an apology. Proof should include more than your repetition of Justin Weinberg's gossip. That the blogs cite each other does not constitute proof. Again, I know that you know this, or would ordinarily know this.
I appreciate the additional detail, but I am, I confess, still puzzled. I am surprised that Prof. Weinberg's posting would remain uncorrected on these points after more than a day and despite dozens of comments including from members of SAF. (UPDATE: Prof. Weinberg's post was updated to reflect this point after I posted this.) I have asked Prof. Norlock for the apology e-mail organizers allegedly sent to members; Prof. Norlock's message to me was silent on tHis. When I have more information, I will post more.
ANOTHER UPDATE: Another SAF meeting attendee has forwarded me the e-mail sent out by the organizers, which confirms the crucial part of Prof. Weinberg's original account:
We write to all participants in the SAF 2016 conference so that those of us not on Facebook or social media have the same access to our acknowledgement of the harms some participants have already identified, and opportunities to participate in addressing them.
In planning this conference, we wanted to create a safe and nurturing space for feminist philosophers and feminist philosophies. We recognize that this was not the case for everyone present, and for that we apologize. In particular, we apologize for the effects of the Saturday keynote address [by Prof. Shelby] and for our failure to do more about a situation in which SAF members felt personally and collectively hurt. When members identify effects including the erasure of Black women’s bodies and words, then we have to do better. What was said was wrong, and inappropriate at a feminist conference, and we take responsibility for our roles in the events that took place.
...yes, I'll get to that one too, but today is the first day of the quarter, so there's work to be done, and I've already spent too much time on the earlier brouhaha. The details of this one are available here. I'lll just note the comment of philosopher Chris Swoyer (Oklahoma) at Prof. Rea's FB page:
A substantial portion of Christians hold views like those attributed to Swinburne and do so on the basis of their understanding of Christianity. So it's surely not surprising for him to express such views in the setting he did.
Following up on last week's post: of course, the first standpoint epistemologist in the contemporary, "inverted" and unMarxian sense was Lukacs who, in the 1920s, proposed that, in fact, the proletariat, in virtue of their class position, had special epistemic access to the pathologies of capitalism. The pedigree of that idea--an unabashed Left Young Hegelian who later became an unabashed Stalinist--would perhaps give one pause, but since most analytic philosophers, in their blissful historical ignorance, don't know anything about the pedigree, the unhappy history of 20th-century standpoint epistemology does not arise as a concern.
(Last week, I was in Vienna for a conference on relativism in German-speaking philosophy in what Martin Kusch (Vienna) calls, aptly enough, "the long 19th-century," roughly from Herder through the 1930s. Among the things I learned, thanks to an excellent paper by Johannes Steizinger (also at Vienna), is that the Nazis, and their philosophers (there were a lot of them!), were also (in a way) standpoint epistemologists, though for them the relevant standpoint was defined by the racial group, with each racial group having its own epistemic criteria. Since the Nazis also believed in an objective hierarchy of races, this required some philosophical gymnastics to square that with their epistemic relativism!)
It was Marx and Marxists who were the inventers of "standpoint epistemology," the idea that one's "social" position--for Marxists, "class," for later writers, race, gender, and so on--exercises an important, sometimes decisive, influence on a person's beliefs. For Marxists, the key thought was that the "standpoint" resulted in distortion of one's knowledge, because it was tainted by the interests associated with one's social position. In the Marxist version of standpoint epistemology, the working classes did not have any special epistemic access to the actual facts about their situation--to the contrary, their understanding of the actual state of affairs was distorted by the ideology propagated by a different, dominant class, which systematically distorted social reality in its own interests. Marxists, like Marx, assumed (correctly) that there is an epistemically superior description of social reality that is not tainted by standpoint, and which can serve as a check on the ideological delusions promoted by dominant groups.
By contrast, in recent bourgeois academic philosophy--that is, philosophizing by well-to-do professors who never challenge the prerogatives of the capitalist class, which is basically almost all of current philosophy in the Anglophone world--standpoint epistemology has, ironically, been turned on its head. Now the social position of the purported "knower"--usually "race" or "gender" or "sexual orientation"--is not taken to be a distorting influence on cognition, but rather an epistemic advantage, one which even demands epistemic deference by others. We have travelled rather far from Marx.
(I thank Clifford Sosis for a stimulating e-mail exchange on this topic, though the ideas are strictly my own!)
What matters in the narcissistic world of late capitalism is not what you think or do but how you feel. And since how you feel can’t be argued against, it is conveniently insulated from all debate. Men and women can now stroll around in continuous self-monitoring mode, using apps to track their changes of mood. The brutal, domineering ego of an older style of capitalism has given way to the tender self-obsession of the new....
What Davies recognises is that capitalism has now in a sense incorporated its own critique. What the system used to regard with suspicion – feeling, friendship, creativity, moral responsibility – have all now been co-opted for the purpose of maximising profits. One commentator has even argued the case for giving products away free, so as to form a closer bond with the customer. Some employers have taken to representing pay increases they give to their staff as a gift, in the hope of extracting gratitude and thus greater effort from them. It seems that there is nothing that can’t be instrumentalised....
Happiness for the market researchers and corporate psychologists is a matter of feeling good. But it seems that millions of individuals don’t feel good at all, and are unlikely to be persuaded to buck up by technologies of mind control that induce them to work harder or consume more. You can’t really be happy if you are a victim of injustice or exploitation, which is what the technologists of joy tend to overlook. This is why, when Aristotle speaks of a science of well-being, he gives it the name of politics. The point is of little interest to the neuroscientists, advertising gurus or mindfulness mongers, which is why so much of their work is spectacularly beside the point.
The intellectual historian Peter Gordon (Harvard) offers an informative review of the new biography of Habermas. Among other things, I was struck by the irony that Habermas--always an admirable critic of post-Nazi complacency in Germany, as Gordon emphasizes--secured his habilitation and first academic post thanks to the influence of the disgusting Nazi and lifelong anti-semite Gadamer! (I wonder if Habermas knew? For a long time, Gadamer was quite good at keeping it under wraps.) Gordon, in my view, significantly overstates Habermas's philosophical importance (in contrast to his invaluable role as a public intellectual holding post-War Germany to moral account). When Marxism returns, as it no doubt will, in something more like Marx's form, Habermas will be remembered mainly as taking the philosophically feeble (and irrelevant) attack on instrumental reason that began with Horkheimer and expanding it to the point that so-called "Critical Theory" collapsed into precisely the kind of bourgeois moral theorizing Marx loathed. (For anyone interested, I discuss this in a bit more detail here.)
The APA has released the 2016 edition of this document. I haven't had a chance to look carefully at it, so do not know how useful it is or isn't.
UPDATE: A reader who earned a B.A. and M.A. in philosophy from state universities writes:
I’m a daily reader of your blog and I very much appreciate your services to the profession (philosophical news, the PGR, academic freedom watchdogsmanship, and so forth). Anyway, I hold an MA from one of the so-called Leiterific programs and turned down a PhD spot to go into the real world job market. Naturally I noted the APA post on careers outside of philosophy that you linked to with great interest, but was disappointed to see the backgrounds of the folks they profiled: Yale Law; Princeton and Columbia; Chicago, Berkeley, Cambridge; Harvard. I think it’s great that the APA has decided to take alt-ac careers seriously (since so many PhD students don’t complete the degree), but in a field that is already so hierarchical and pedigree conscious, it struck me as especially snooty for them to exclusively highlight individuals with such prestigious backgrounds. I only mention it because many of those people trying to make it in the world with a Philosophy degree are not coming from Harvard or Princeton, and if they were, they would not be having some of the difficulties that they are. As someone who attended state schools and already feels like the professional elites in philosophy think my kind are deplorable morons (since after all, pedigree is a quick heuristic for intelligence and whatnot), it just seems especially tasteless for what was putatively a community service project to read more like a who’s who of alt-ac royalty. Anyway, I know you aren’t even a member of the APA, but if they ever ask for your two cents, perhaps you could mention that many of us wish their research ventures would take them outside of the ivory tower more often. Thanks again for everything you do!
Just to be clear, I'm sure no one in philosophy thinks a student with an MA from Northern Illinois or Wisconsin/Miwaulkee or Georgia State or any of the other excellent terminal MA programs at public schools is a "deplorable moron," but the mindless pedigree effect outside those "in the know" is real enough.
This is an interesting response from a political theorist to the unfortunate piece by Professors Garfield and van Norden we discussed some time ago. It is true that much, but not all, of Western philosophy can be traced back to Plato, more or less, but I suppose Garfield & Van Norden would just say, "OK, then call philosophy departments 'Departments of Philosophy After Plato,'" an even more misleading title than the one they proposed! Why should lineage to Plato get special claim to the field? And what about the pre-Socratic philosophers? There's a reason they get called philosophers too! And just because styles of argument in some non-Western traditions are different (some are not different at all however!), the concerns are often recognizably similar.
Still, there is something to be said for disciplinary expertise and depth, and a department of philosophy can't be all things to all people. It is true that many wise and deep writings are not philosophy--it would be remarkable to suggest otherwise!
David Shoemaker (Tulane) calls my attention to the fact that Peasoup, the long-running ethics blog, has a new home and a new sponsor, the Prindle Institute of Ethics at DePauw University under the direction of Andrew Cullison. Prof. Shoemaker and David Sobel (Syracuse) will continue as the editors, and Shoemaker tells me they will be moderating comments a bit more actively to insure quality discussion.
...so the only remedy is to require them all to have blogs. (Having blogs hasn't slowed me down that much, alas, but 50% of what I read in jurisprudence should have been on a blog instead; 80% in the case of alleged Nietzsche scholarship [down from 99%]).
My friend John Doris, a philosopher at Washington University, St. Louis, is working on a new book on expertise, in which chess figures as an important example (there is apparently a large psychology literature on it), but he himself is not a serious chess player. He writes: "If any ELO-rated or titled chess players would be willing to chat with me for a few minutes in connection with my research on the development and assessment of expertise, I'd be delighted if they could send an email to email@example.com with 'chess' in the subject line." John is in Princeton this year at the University Center for Human Values, if any of you chess experts are local!
Back in the old days (from 1989 through the late 1990s), the PGR consisted in my assessement of professional opinion about the quality of graduate programs in the form of an annual guide to prospective PhD students in philosophy in the Anglophone world. This was my assessment of professional opinion, not my own opinion about quality. I was sufficiently good at that that the PGR became hugely influential throughout the profession, so much so that faculty at departments not doing so well began protesting back in 2001. I gradually shifted to more systematic measurements--elaborate on-line surveys of senior and junior faculty--which just amplified the influence of the PGR. The results were not very dissimilar from when I was doing it from the armchair, but the evaluations of particular areas of specialization were clearly improved.
Brit Brogaard's plan is try to undertake new PGR surveys in fall 2017, but that doesn't obviate the need for some updated guidance. What follows is my best judgment as to how the faculty changes in the interim should lead prospective PhD students to think about the relevant hierarchy of PhD programs in the U.S. and elsewhere compared to the 2014 survey results. Rather than offer a guestimate about an ordinal rank, I put the PhD programs into "clusters" of what I think should reasonably be considered "peer" programs among which students should choose based on considerations other than "overall prestige." But I generally think it's reasonable to choose between programs in adjacent peer groups based on other considerations (financial aid, location, particular faculty, specialty strength etc.). I'll try to update the "specialty rankings" in the coming weeks. (Note: there are other moves that may transpire: e.g., Pittsburgh has made a senior offer to L.A. Paul at North Carolina; Stanford is trying to recruit Philip Pettit and Victoria McGeer from their half-time posts at Princeton [they are also half-time at the ANU, which would not change]; Berkeley is trying to recruit Sally Sedgwick from Illinois/Chicago. I'll update things accordingly during the year.)
An * indicates a program that arguably belongs in the next highest peer grouping.
Group 1 (1) Anglophone Programs outside the U.S.
New York University
Group 2 (2-8)
Princeton University *Oxford University
*Rutgers University, New Brunswick
University of California, Berkeley
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
University of Pittsburgh
University of Southern California
Group 3 (9-15)
Columbia University University of Toronto
Massachussetts Institute of Technology
University of Arizona
University of California, Los Angeles
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Group 4 (16-22)
Brown University Cambridge University
City University of New York Graduate Center Australian National University
University of California, San Diego
University of Chicago
University of Notre Dame
University of Texas, Austin
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Group 5 (23-27)
*Cornell University University of St. Andrews/University of Stirling Joint Program
Duke University University of Edinburgh
Indiana University, Bloomington King's College, London
University of California, Irvine University College London
Washington University, St. Louis University of Sydney
Joshua Smart from the University of Missouri asked me to share this announcement, which I'm happy to do:
While advisors and committees are important, it can be incredibly helpful to discuss one’s work with peers in a lower-stakes environment, and it can be particularly enlightening to do so with those who take a different approach or have a different focus. Not only that, but there is evidence from psychological research that thinking about problems in relation to persons who are geographically distant can increase creativity. With students in programs from 8 countries and 20 different U.S. states, Virtual Dissertation Groups are a great (free!) way to capture some of these benefits.
The setup is that each member is grouped with two others working on dissertations in the same general area of philosophy. About once a month, one member sends the others a 3-6k word piece of their dissertation to the other two for feedback and comments.
I'd be interested to hear from students who've participated what their experience was like. Comments are open for that purpose. Please identify yourself in some general terms (e.g., "top 10 PGR program," "SPEP department," "unranked PhD program," also mention your country).
...about his kind of empiricism and anti-realism...and rock-climbing. It's an interesting read. Bear in mind that van Fraassen is a religious believer (but not when it comes to the unobservable features of the physical world!).
Philosopher Neil McArthur (Manitoba) comments. He notes that he will be writing regularly for VICE "on sexual ethics and on sex and the law" and would welcome "thoughts about issues/debates in that area" that readers think should "get some media attention." You can reach him at mcarthun-at-gmail-dot-com.
Professor Clarke, who taught for many years at University College Cork, was best-known for his work on Descartes. From an e-mail forwarded by a colleague in Ireland:
Professor Desmond Clarke, one of Ireland's leading philosophers, died on 4 September.
He is best known for his work on Descartes, including Descartes: A Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2005) and Descartes’s Theory of Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003).
His most recent book appeared this year: French Philosophy, 1572-1675 (Oxford University Press, 2016). He published widely on the 17th Century, in particular on theories of science, the work of Blaise Pascal, and women in philosophy, including: The Equality of the Sexes: Three Feminist Texts of the Seventeenth Century, trans. Desmond M. Clarke (Oxford University Press, 2013) and 'Pascal’s Philosophy of Science' in The Cambridge Companion to Pascal (Cambridge University Press, 2003).
Des Clarke was co-editor of the Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy series. Apart from history of philosophy, he published widely on political philosophy, human rights and legal theory, including the highly influential Church & State (Cork University Press, 1984.) In 2015 he was awarded the Royal Irish Academy Gold Medal in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the Humanities.
He is survived by his wife, the philosopher Dolores Dooley, two daughters and grandchildren.
The funeral will be held at 11am on Wednesday 8 September at Newlands Cross Crematorium. Further details here.
MOVING TO FRONT FROM YESTERDAY--MORE COMMENTS WELCOME
A senior philosopher elsewhere writes:
Over the summer, this blog hosted a brief discussion of how journals choose their editors-in-chief. As a follow-up to that discussion, I would be interested in learning more about the selection and duties of associate editors and members of editorial boards. I believe that associate editorships can be quite burdensome, since I'm told that the associate editors of at least some journals read and comment on a significant number of papers every year. But to be named an associate editor of a top journal is also significant professional recognition, and is therefore an honor. It would be interesting to know how various journals decide upon whom to confer it. And are members of editorial boards also expected to read and comment on submissions, or are positions on editorial boards entirely honorary? How are members of those boards chosen?
Please submit comments only once, they may take awhile to appear.
Professor Sartwell writes: "I have been reinstated at Dickinson. All I'm permitted to say is that the parties have amicably resolved their differences in a manner that resulted in my return to employment."
Many thanks to all those who contributed to Prof. Sartwell's legal fund. I have no doubt that being able to retain excellent legal counsel was crucial to this happy outcome. (I should also acknowledge Dean William Carter of the University of Pittsburgh Law School who kindly responded to my request to find an experienced Pennsylvania lawyer familiar with employment law and higher education issues.)
31% of respondents have a positive view of "analytic metaphysics," 28% a fairly negative view, and 23% say we should just "ignore it." Since "analytic metaphysics" is a current prestige area of philosophy--well-represented at all the leading PhD programs--some of this may be tainted a bit with jealousy. Certainly I wish actual fields with cognitive criteria, like the ones I work in, were as important on the contemporary landscape!
UPDATE: Wow, 5 1/2 hours and nearly 700 votes! "Analytic metaphysics" gets people passionate! I'll let this run until tomorrow, but here's where things stand as of now: Yeah! 17% Just say "No"! 10% Prison 5% Ridicule & contempt 13% Praise & glory 11% Ignore it 23% None of the above 21%
ANOTHER: A funny note from philosopher Jon Kvanvig (Wash U/St. Louis): "I saw the new Dennett poll on your website, and you forgot to include the most obvious possibility of all: we should all refuse to teach anything by Dennett in any class from now on! Call it the Sterba option."
Continental Philosophy Farhang Erfani, a philosopher at American University, provides a useful set of links to news, events, interviews, reviews, videos, etc. related to "Continental philosophy" (broadly construed)