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"In Praise of Realism (and Against 'Nonsense' Jurisprudence)"

I've posted on SSRN a draft of my Dunbar Lecture in Law and Philosophy, titled as above, which I will deliver tomorrow at the University of Mississippi.  The Lecture is sponsored by the Law School and Department of Philosophy.  When they kindly invited me to deliver the lecture, I was told that past Dunbar Lecturers had included, as it happens, one of the subjects of my Lecture, Ronald Dworkin.  The abstract follows:

Ronald Dworkin describes an approach to how courts should decide cases that he associates with Judge Richard Posner as a Chicago School of "anti-theoretical, no-nonsense jurisprudence." Since Professor Dworkin takes his own view of adjudication to be diametrically opposed to that of the Chicago School, it might seem fair, then, to describe Dworkin's own theory as an instance of "pro-theoretical, nonsense jurisprudence." That characterization is not one, needless to say, that Professor Dworkin welcomes. Dworkin describes his preferred approach to jurisprudential questions, to be sure, as theoretical, in opposition to what he calls the practical orientation of the Chicago School. But while there is a real dispute between Dworkin and Posner, it is not one illuminated by the contrast between theory and practice. It is, rather a dispute about the kind of theory that is relevant and illuminating when it comes to law and adjudication. And the fault line marked by this dispute is profound indeed, one that extends far beyond Dworkin and Posner and has a venerable and ancient history. I shall describe it, instead, as a dispute between Moralists and Realists, between those whose starting point is a theory of how things (morally) ought to be versus those who begin with a theory of how things really are. The Lecture endeavors to show that our contemporaries, Ronald Dworkin and Richard Posner, are reenacting a version of the dispute between the paradigmatic philosophical moralist Plato and the paradigmatic historical realist Thucydides.

JD/PhD Programs in the U.S.: A Comment

I've had some inquiries lately about the section on the study of philosophy in law schools in the PGR like this one:

I am considering enrolling in a joint JD/PhD in philosophy next year, and I was reading through your rankings in philosophy, law, and joint JD/PhD programs. First, let me say thank you so much for the time and energy you've put in to make this information and these rankings available; it has been very helpful for me. My question, however, is if there is any reason why Harvard and Stanford are virtually not mentioned on the "The Study of Philosophy in Law Schools" page on philosophicalgourmet.com. Do their programs for law and philosophy not match up with the other schools mentioned? I ask because they both have very strong respective law and philosophy programs. I know you're extremely busy, so if you don't have time to respond about this, I completely understand. However, if you do get a chance, any comments would be greatly appreciated. Again, thanks so much for the rankings and information you've compiled about law schools and philosophy programs.

Legal academia is more pedigree-sensitive than academic philosophy (and I'm sure many of you think academic philosophy is way too pedigree-sensitive!), so this student's question is quite understandable.  Four law schools dominate the market for new law teachers:  Yale, Harvard, Chicago, and Stanford.  On a per capita basis, Yale is way ahead of the other three, and these four are way ahead of everyone else.  Yet two of these three "feeder" schools for legal academia go unmentioned in the current PGR section.

Continue reading "JD/PhD Programs in the U.S.: A Comment" »

Is the "Rule of Recognition" a Conventional Rule?

I know you folks have been wondering!

New: Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law

I am very pleased to announce that Leslie Green and I will be editing a new annual, the Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law, which will publish commissioned and solicited work by leading established and emerging scholars in the philosophy of law. The first volume will appear in 2009, and all volumes will appear in both cloth and paperback. OSPL will be part of the distinguished Oxford Studies series, including existing volumes in Ancient Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, Metaphysics, Epistemology, and Metaethics.

The OSPL will include a broad range of problems and approaches, such as work in general jurisprudence, in the philosophical foundations of areas of substantive law, and in cognate areas of philosophy.  Both systematic essays and historical studies will be welcome.

All papers, including commissioned works, will be subject to review by the editors and by external referees. Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law will showcase the best new work in this growing field.

(Given this new project, I should note that I will be stepping down after seven years as an editor of Legal Theory.)

Interviews with Legal Philosophers

I have been posting some excerpts from the new book Legal Philosophy:  5 Questions over at my Legal Philosophy Blog, most recently, from the interviews with Jules Coleman and John Gardner.  Some readers may find these of interest.

Justifying Originalism as a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation

Some readers might find this of interest. 

"Why Evolutionary Biology is (so far) Irrelevant to Law"

A revised, penultimate version of this paper I wrote with the philosopher of biology Michael Weisberg is now on-line for those who might be interested.  It will appear some time in 2008.

Deontic Logic and Jurisprudence

Who knew it was so controversial?

Kelsen and Anglophone Jurisprudence Redux

Here.

Kelsen's Relative Neglect in Anglophone Jurisprudence

Discussion here.

"Legal Philosophy: 5 Questions"

An update on the book.

"Objectivity in Law and Morals" in Paperback

Cambridge has, happily, released a paperback version of this collection of essays I edited back in 2001.  Since I periodically get inquiries about the book, I thought I'd post the information about the new paperback edition here.

Over in Legal Philosophy Land...

...an epistemological puzzle about legal positivism?

UPDATE:  For the benefit of new readers, I should note, again, the purpose of the new blog and its commenting policy.

"New" Legal Realism?

From another Brian Leiter.

New URL for my Legal Philosophy Blog--Plus a New Paper on "Explaining Theoretical Disagreement"

My legal philosophy blog has moved to its new (and this time permanent) location, where I have also posted the abstract for a new paper on the problem Dworkin dubbed "theoretical disagreement" about law.

A Separate Blog on Issues in Legal Philosophy

I have not generally tried to "do philosophy" on the blog, though I have often linked to philosophical work by myself and others.  But, as an experiment, I've created a new blog in which I'm going to work through some issues in legal philosophy.  The posts will not be aimed at a generalist audience, but at specialists (students or scholars) in jurisprudence.  The first substantive post discusses Brian Simpson's well-known paper on "The Common Law and Legal Theory."  If writing up my thoughts or the comments on them proves instructive, I'll probably keep this up.

Interview about Legal Philosophy

I've posted at SSRN the text of an interview with me about legal philosophy, which will appear in the volume Legal Philosophy:  5 Questions, due out later this year.  The questions that all those interviewed address are the following:

1. Why were you initially drawn to the philosophy of law?

2. For which of your contribution(s) to legal philosophy so far would you most like to be remembered, and why?

3. What are the most important issues in legal philosophy, and why are they distinctively issues of legal philosophy rather than some other discipline?

4. What is the relationship between legal philosophy and legal practice? Should legal philosophers be more concerned about the effect of their scholarship on legal practice?

5. To which problem, issue or broad area of legal philosophy would you most like to see more attention paid in the future?

I hope some readers might find this interview, as well as the volume as a whole, of interest.

"Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy"...

...has now been published in the U.S.  It is available in paperback, so hopefully someone will read it!

For Legal Philosophers: Review of Two Books: One by, One on Dworkin (Leiter)

The penultimate draft of the review (which will appear in the TLS) is here.  The books discussed are Dworkin's recent collection Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press, 2006) and Scott Hershovitz (ed.), Exploring Law's Empire (Oxford University Press, 2006).  I was operating, needless to say, under a word limit!

"Naturalism in Legal Philosophy": Revised Version Now On-Line at SEP...

...here, for those who might be interested.

"Why Evolutionary Biology is (so far) Irrelevant to Law" (Leiter)

A revised version of this paper I wrote with the philosopher of biology Michael Weisberg at Penn is now on-line at SSRN.  This is pretty much the penultimate version, and comments would still be timely and welcome for a few more weeks.

Rorty's Pragmatism and Judge Posner's Moral Skepticism

I've posted a draft of a short paper (slated for the University of Chicago Law Review) on Richard Rorty's Dewey Lecture at the University of Chicago Law School last year, on the subject of Dewey, Posner, and moral skepticism.  There is more detail here.  Although this isn't a rigorous philosophical piece, it might interest some readers.

UT Law & Philosophy Program (Leiter)

For those who might be interested, we have finally updated the site for 2006-07.  Prospective students should feel free to contact me with any questions.

Posner on "Pragmatic Adjudication" (Leiter)

Last Thursday at the University of Chicago Law School, Judge Posner and I discussed this topic in a public forum.  More information, and a link to the podcast of the session, is available here.

Soames on "Analytic Philosophy," and the Special Case of Philosophy of Law (Leiter)

I am grateful to Jason for calling attention to the lovely, lucid, and synoptic essay by Scott Soames (USC) on "Analytic Philosophy in America," which I read with appreciation yesterday evening.   I concur with Jason's recommendation that this is an essay that educated non-philosophers ought to read if they want to have an idea what has been going on the last 40-50 years in English-speaking philosophy (as Soames notes at the end, much of what he is describing is philosophy in the English-speaking world, not just philosophy in America).  That being said, I want to note one reservation and then raise one question.

The reservation is this:  the two pages on philosophy of law contain errors.    Soames is not a philosopher of law, and he quite reasonably gives most of his attention to developments in philosophy of language--given his own expertise and the importance of that field to the story he is telling.  But the errors in the two pages (pp. 28-29) on philosophy of law range from the minor to the fundamental, and they deserve flagging (and perhaps they can still be corrected).

On the rather minor end of the spectrum:  he compares the "revival" in political philosophy effectuated by Rawls and Nozick to the "revival" in philosophy of law effectuated by Dworkin.  But surely it was Hart who brought about the integration of jurisprudence into English-speaking philosophy generally, and rejuvenated philosophical interest in law; Dworkin, Feinberg, Raz, Finnis and others simply continued that development.  (One can acknowledge this point without agreeing with my stronger claim that the Dworkinian program is now discredited and defunct.)  Indeed, among philosophers who think about law, Raz's influence is far greater than Dworkin's.  Also, and even more minor, Soames describes Dworkin as "at New York University since 1994," when he joined the NYU faculty in the late 1970s (1977, according to the Directory of American Law Teachers).  (Perhaps 1994 is meant to be a reference to the date of his cross-appointment to the philosophy department.)

On the more important, substantive end of the spectrum:  Soames describes Hart's positivism as "a view according to which legal validity is, in the main, a matter of fidelity to the institutional sources of positive law, and, except at the margins, independent of substantive moral considerations."  Soames's gloss on Hart is a Razian one (no quarrel there, this is a survey piece, after all), but even on that gloss, it is no part of the positivist view that legal validity is ever a matter of "substantive moral considerations":  such considerations may influence how a judge decides cases, but they are not themselves criteria of legal validity.  This conflation (between criteria of legal validity and how judges ought to decide particular cases) suggests that Soames has simply adopted wholesale the confusion for which Dworkin is most famous (or infamous, as it were) among legal philosophers, namely, between the questions "what is law?" and "how ought a judge decide the case before him?"  This comes out even more clearly when Soames writes:

As opposed to this [the positivist view of legal validity], Dworkin argues for a theory of "constructive interpretation" in which there are no cases in which the contents of laws, and their applications to particular cases, are, in principle, entirely determined by the routine application of conventional, legal rules--independent of any moral assessment of the consequences of particular applications, and any judgment about how those consequences bear on the social purpose of the laws, and the intentions of those who enacted them. 

The bolded portion conflates the distinction, emphasized by Raz, between "pure" and "applied" legal statements:  that is, the distinction between "pure" statements like "character evidence is inadmissible in a civil trial to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion" (which is a legally valid rule of evidence in the U.S.) and "applied" statements like "defendant's prior conduct reveals his habitual behavior, and so may be admitted into evidence."  Positivists are not committed to the view that applied legal statements are always "entirely determined by the routine application of conventional, legal rules," and Hart, of course, is explicit that there will be a range of cases where judges will have to exercise discretion. No positivist believes, either, that valid "pure" legal statements should be applied in particular cases without regard to "the consequences of particular applications."  To the extent that a judge has a duty to decide according to law, then the judge must apply the valid legal norms (those with the requisite institutional sources); but it is no part of the positivist thesis about legal validity to deny that in some cases, the duty to apply legally valid norms is, and ought to be, overriden by other equitable and moral considerations.

Soames then characterizes Dworkin's view of adjudication as follows:

Instead, all adjudication is seen as requiring the judge to weigh substantive moral concerns with existing legal history, so as to arrive at the most just and morally desirable principles for achieving the legitimate ends of law, while accomodating, so far is reasonably possible, the results of past decisions and existing legal practices.

The "instead" is misplaced, of course, since the positivist view of validity is not a theory of adjudication.

Now to the question.  As longtime readers know, I don't think "analytic philosophy" exists except as a kind of sociological artifact, and I don't think anyone can give a satisfactory account of it that isn't wildly over- or under-inclusive.  (See here for one of many discussions of this topic.)  In this regard, I was struck by Soames's gloss on page 6:

[I]t is important to remember that analytic philosophy is neither a fixed body of substantive doctrine, a precise methodology, nor a radical break with most traditional philosophy of the past--save for varieties of romanticism, theism, and absolute idealism.  Instead, it is a discrete historical tradition stemming from Frege, Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and the logical positivists, characterized by respect for science and common sense, belief in the relevance of logic and language for philosophy, emphasis on precision and clarity of argumentation, suspicion of a priori metaphysics, and elevation of the goals of truth and knowledge over inspiration, moral uplift, and spiritual comfort--plus a dose of professional specialization.

I assume most informed folks think Paul Churchland, John McDowell, Bernard Williams, Alvin Plantinga, Laurence BonJour, Hilary Putnam, George Bealer, and Christopher Peacocke are "analytic" philosophers, but doesn't each of them fail to fit one or more of the characteristics noted by Soames?  What do readers think?  Non-anonymous postings will, as usual, be strongly preferred.

"From Legal Realism to Naturalized Jurisprudence" (Leiter)

I've posted the penultimate draft of the introduction to my collection of papers on Naturalizing Jurisprudence:  Essays on American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy, which Oxford University Press will publish (simultaneously in both cloth and paper, happily) in 2007 (during the Spring, I hope).  The introduction, "From Legal Realism to Naturalized Jurisprudence," gives a general overview of the papers in the volume and the set of problems they address, and how they all hang together, more or less.  I've posted a short excerpt here.  The book will also include two new Postscripts responding to a variety of critics.

Some Realism about the U.S. Supreme Court (Leiter)

Courtesy of Judge Posner.  It would be salutary, indeed, if Judge Posner's observations were read aloud at the start of every confirmation hearing for a Supreme Court Justice; perhaps, then, we might have a grown-up discussion of the relevant merits and demerits of the nominees.

"New Legal Realism" (Leiter)

Those interested in legal philosophy may find this post of value.

Tamanaha Awarded Mahoney Prize in Legal Theory by Sydney

Details here.

New Paper: "Why Tolerate Religion?" (Leiter)

MOVING TO THE FRONT FROM FRIDAY, MAY 26, since that was the start of a holiday weekend in the US (I appreciate the strong interest and comments already received).

=======================

A working draft of this essay of mine--reworked a fair bit from the version I gave as the 'Or 'Emet Lecture at York University in Toronto back in March--is now on-line.  Links and abstract here.  Comments welcome.  Thanks.

New Paper: "Why Evolutionary Biology is (so far) Irrelevant to Law" (Leiter)

Michael Weisberg (Philosophy, Penn) and I have made available on SSRN here what we hope is the penultimate draft of this paper, which is being submitted currently to the law reviews.  Here is the abstract:

Evolutionary biology—or, more precisely, two (purported) applications of Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection, namely, evolutionary psychology and what has been called “human behavioral biology”—is on the cusp of becoming the new rage among legal scholars looking for “interdisciplinary” insights into the law. We argue that as the actual science stands today, evolutionary biology offers nothing to help with questions about legal regulation of behavior. Only systematic misrepresentations or lack of understanding of the relevant biology, together with far-reaching analytical and philosophical confusions, have led anyone to think otherwise.

Evolutionary accounts are etiological accounts of how a trait evolved. We argue that an account of causal etiology could be relevant to law if (1) the account of causal etiology is scientifically well-confirmed, and (2) there is an explanation of how the well-confirmed etiology bears on questions of development (what we call “the Environmental Gap Objection”). We then show that the accounts of causal etiology that might be relevant are not remotely well-confirmed by scientific standards. We argue, in particular, that (a) evolutionary psychology is not entitled to assume selectionist accounts of human behaviors, (b) the assumptions necessary for the selectionist accounts to be true are not warranted by standard criteria for theory choice, , and (c) only confusions about levels of explanation of human behavior create the appearance that understanding the biology of behavior is important. We also note that no response to the Environmental Gap Objection has been proferred. In the concluding section of the article, we turn directly to the work of Professor Owen Jones, a leading proponent of the relevance of evolutionary biology to law, and show that he does not come to terms with any of the fundamental problems identified in this article

Comments would be welcome.

Ronald Dworkin, Again (Leiter)

Readers familiar with my views on Dworkin's jurisprudence will not be surprised that I find myself in agreement with the interesting (and also amusing) recent review by Thom Brooks (Politics, Newcastle) of Justin Burley's collection Dworkin and His Critics with Replies by Dworkin (Blackwell, 2004) in the January 2006 Modern Law Review (access may depend on whether your institution has a subscription, but the whole review is worth reading):

Ronald Dworkin's influence on legal philosophy is in some ways puzzling.  No series of lectures in jurisprudence can ignore his tremendous presence and he is one of the most cited and read legal philosophers alive.  Yet this wide readership has not translated into more than a small number of disciples.  It is quite rare to find anyone in the field identifying herself as a "Dworkinian."  Indeed, Andrea Dworkin may well have the larger following....

What will historians of legal philosophy make of Ronald Dworkin's work?  They will surely note his being a major figure, but perhaps best known as a foil to advance competing views of both natural law and legal positivism rather than as someone who began a school of legal thinking.  No one disputes the importance of Dworkin for legal philosophy.  However, his importance for the field is well on the wane now as this collection seems to make clear.  Not only is relatively little (or new) attention given to his third theory of law, but he seems more concerned with advancing his more successful views on egalitarianism among political and moral philosophers....[T]he question for legal philosophers today is how much longer Dworkin will command lectures on his views.  I believe these days are drawing swiftly to a close.

The Oxford "Jurisprudence Census"

If you know something about legal philosophy--especially Oxford-centric legal philosophy--you will find this rather amusing.  (Thanks to Les Green for the pointer.)

UT Law and Philosophy Program for 2005-06 (Leiter)

The web site has finally been updated, for those who might be interested.

"American Legal Realism" (Leiter)

A reader just pointed out that my paper on "American Legal Realism" is the most downloaded jurisprudence paper in the history of SSRN--and certainly the most downloaded one that is actually on a jurisprudential topic!  (The SSRN categories are, shall we say, a bit loose.)  That's one of the best things about blogs (one can get one's scholarly work into wider circulation)--and, of course, about SSRN.

A Question about the Literature on Religious Toleration

I am wondering whether any readers know of literature making the case for toleration of religion qua religion.  What has struck me in reading the literature is that while religious toleration is often a paradigm case for discussions of toleration, the arguments for it are not specific to religion:  arguments from autonomy and well-being would equally well encompass toleration of many other kinds of belief that are not religious in character; the Lockean argument is not specific to religion, since state tools for coercion are ineffective in inculcating belief simpliciter, not simply religious belief; Millian arguments from versions of the Harm Principle cast the net much more widely than religion; and so on.

The only exception to this generalization I have found in the literature is an interesting paper by Timothy Macklem (Law, King's College, London) on "Faith as a Secular Value," which appeared in the McGill Law Journal in February 2000.  Macklem argues that the distinctive religious state, faith, is one that has a special value that warrants its special treatment in liberal societies.  I don't think the argument succeeds, but that's not what concerns me here.  What I'm wondering is whether there are other articles that try to argue why religion in particular should be tolerated, arguments that make claims appealing to distinctive features of religious belief and practices.  Or as Macklem frames the question:  "What is it that distinguished religious beliefs from other beliefs, so as to make them worthy of distinctive, perhaps superior constitutional protection?"  That, to my mind, would be an argument for religious toleration.

Comments are open.  Because I have somewhat erratic computer access, it may take awhile for comments to appear, but please post your comment only once.  Thanks, as always, learned readers for your assistance.

Some Realism about Supreme Court Justices

Given the extraordinary public ignorance about what it is judges really do, these points really can't be made often enough.  A litigation partner with one of the nation's leading law firms writes:

I read your recent posts on the Alito nomination. For 30 years now I have litigated business cases.  I also handle a significant number of appeals in both the federal and state systems.  And, not unusually, I have acquaintances and friends who are state and federal trial and appellate judges.   I mention that because I wonder at the sanity of those who think that it is realistically possible in close and controversial cases on issues of public import (and most Supreme Court cases are precisely that or they wouldn't have had cert granted) to ignore your own predilections and beliefs. In fact, it is just such cases that seem to call for a leap of faith or logic at some critical point; the means to accomplish that leap often stems from personal beliefs. It is so obvious to those of us who live in the courtroom that it is hardly worth discussion. No single fact or circumstance is more important than to know the judge who will decide the case.  To take another example, every firm that I know of with a significant Supreme Court practice brings to bear on a Supreme Court brief and argument the views of former clerks to as many current Justices as possible. There is only one reason to do that, and it is not to consider the precedents or even "super precedents." (I apparently missed the law school course on those.)  Roe sadly and inevitably gets all the attention in Supreme Court nominations.  And it may well be that the unique pressure of the nomination process leads even a Justice Alito to be wary of reversing Roe outright and soon.  But it will be for that reason that he does not do so, not because he really believes that a Justice has no ability to bring to bear his or her personal views.  And even if they are disguised in the Roe context, his personal views will surely come out in many other contexts that escape close Senate scrutiny during the hearing process.  (In that regard, the ability of a judge to decide cases without bringing his personal views to bear in the every day criminal or immigration or business case is almost entirely irrelevant to this issue; it is easy to keep a steady hand on the tiller when you don't much care about the destination).

The Case Against Confirming Judge Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court

We have touched on this topic before, but the case is especially well-put here by Geoffrey Stone (Law, Chicago).

The Nomination of Judge Alito to the U.S. Supreme Court

What was said of the record of the new Chief Justice John Roberts applies equally, it appears, in the case of Judge Alito of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:

The record...clearly documents his single-minded focus on limiting legal protections and opportunities for African-Americans, Latinos, alien children, people with disabilities, women, and others.

This describes the actual referent of the term "conservative" in U.S. political culture these days.  The short overview of Judge Alito's record here and the longer overview here give some flavor of the man's moral and political commitments.  Orin Kerr (Law, George Washington) suggests Judge Alito is more like the new Chief Justice, John Roberts, than like Antonin Scalia.  (That assessment is confirmed by a former clerk at the end of this article--though bear in mind that Justice Scalia wrote a far better opinion on the most important issue before the Court in recent years than most of the liberals and moderates.  Justice Scalia's commitment to "original meaning" (not original intent) is a double-edged sword.)  Note that fifteen years of service on the Federal Bench has not seemed to temper his conservative activism in any measure.

Let us recall the words of Judge Posner, an honest man:

I don't object to the fact that Senators are concerned about the ideology of judicial candidates; the President is concerned, so why shouldn't the Senators be?  Anyone who is realistic about the American judicial process knows that ideology affects decisions, especially the 'hot button' decisions that engage the attention of politicians; and Senators are politicians.

While some number of cases that reach the highest stages of appellate review--namely, the U.S. Supreme Court--will demand only technical legal skills for their resolution, a significant number will, as Judge Posner correctly notes, demand moral and political judgment, and thus will engage the "ideology" of the judge.  Every grown-up knows this, of course, which is why there is such a fierce political battle over the appointment of someone who will, on a range of issues, act as a super-legislator.  I assume no Democrat would vote for Bush or Alito for President; there is no reason, then, why they should vote for him as a super-legislator.

As usual, Pharyngula cuts to the chase:

Samuel Alito is a polyp sprouting from the diseased colon of the Republican party. I don't care if he's kind to his family, has a wonderful sense of humor, or refrains from branding women with an iron in the shape of an "A"—his political lineage is unambiguous, and that makes him a scabrous chancre not suitable for the office. He's a last-gasp representative of an absolute failure of an administration, the final ghastly moan of a set of bankrupt political policies that are utterly wrong for our country. He must be opposed. Sign on to MoveOn's petition.

On the other hand, there is the hopeful tale told by my colleague Scot Powe in The Warren Court and American Politics (Harvard University Press), and echoed in the work of other political scientists and students of the Supreme Court, according to which the Court is not an initiator of social and political changes, but simply the reflection of them in society at large.  Perhaps this is right; if it is, there is less at stake than may appear in these confirmation battles, and the super-legislature may be closer to the mirror-legislature:  if its decisions are cruel and reactionary it is because the society as a whole is cruel and reactionary.  Time, as always, will tell.

UPDATE:  Useful analysis by Jack Balkin (Law, Yale) of what the confirmation of Judge Alito to the Supreme Court is likely to mean in a number of contested areas.

An Interesting Canadian Perspective on Appointing Supreme Court Justices...

from Allan Hutchinson, legal theorist and Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada, at Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto. 

On the day the next Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court will be Confirmed, Let's Recall Why He Shouldn't Be

We have been here before:  judges--and especially appellate judges, and especially Justices of the Supreme Court--are inevitably confronted with a range of issues on which they must make moral and political judgments, and thus it makes perfectly good sense to evaluate them based on their moral and political views.  A particularly powerful case against confirming Judge Roberts has just appeared; I'll quote the conclusory opening and closing paragraphs, and invite readers to consult the full article for the documentation and support:

The most intriguing question about John Roberts is what led him as a young person whose success in life was virtually assured by family wealth and academic achievement to enlist in a political campaign designed to deny opportunities for success to those who lacked his advantages. It is a question of great relevance to Roberts's candidacy for the Supreme Court. As the late Charles Black has written, no serious person is under the illusion that "a judge's judicial work is not influenced...by his sense, sharp or vague, of where justice lies in respect to the great issues of his time."

After a privileged upbringing in an Indiana suburb, attendance at an exclusive, expensive private school, high ranking at the undergraduate and law schools of Harvard, and clerkships with Federal Appeals Judge Henry Friendly and Supreme Court Justice William Rehnquist, John Roberts took a job in the Reagan administration. There he joined in its efforts to dismantle the civil rights gains of the 1960s and 1970s....

The record made by John Roberts in his decade of public service clearly documents his single-minded focus on limiting legal protections and opportunities for African-Americans, Latinos, alien children, people with disabilities, women, and others.

There are reasons, still, to hope that as a judge he will be neither more nor less conservative than the late Chief Justice Rehnquist, which also means he will not be as venal and dangerous as, say, Justice Thomas.  Within the next two years, we should have a fairly clear idea where he stands.

Meanwhile, tomorrow, the alleged President will nominate a successor to Associate Justice O'Connor.  If he nominates Janice Brown, Edith Jones, Michael Luttig, or Priscilla Owen, there will be, justifiably, a ferocious confirmation battle, the outcome of which may well determine whether the U.S. will be a free society in the decades ahead (the U.S., of course, is not a just society, so at least that's off the table as an issue!).

Philosphical Work on Tolerance: Advice Sought

I'd be grateful to get recommendations from knowledgeable readers about good philosophical literature on problems of tolerance, in particular:  (1)  religious tolerance; (2) tolerating the intolerant; and (3) tolerating the false.  I am less interested in the "tolerance as a personal virtue" literature, and more interested in questions about the duties of tolerance, and their limits, of the state.  No need to mention the "classics" (Locke's Essay, Rawls's treatment in A Theory of Justice, Scanlon's essays, Marcuse's critique, etc.). 

Relatedly, I'm interested in whether there is any good literature on the justification of religious liberty that isn't really just a general case for liberty of conscience.  Is there good literature that makes the case for liberty specifically of religious conscience.

Many thanks.

New International Prize for Work in Legal Theory from the University of Sydney

The Julius Stone Institute of Jurisprudence at the University of Sydney has announced a new, and rather lucrative, prize for jurisprudential work in the tradition of Professor Stone:

The prize will go to the author or authors of an outstanding published work in the field of jurisprudence which best reflects an approach combining legal theory with sociological inquiry, in the tradition of the jurisprudence of the late Professor Julius Stone. Stone’s approach, expounded in his seminal work of 1946, The Province and Function of Law and in many other works throughout his life, sought to demonstrate that the law inexorably responds and changes as society changes.

A ‘published work’ need not necessarily be in the form of a traditional book or journal publication. Other types of publication, including reports or papers, are eligible.

The recipient of the prize will receive a cash prize of AU$50,000, with the offer of an invitation to participate in the activities of the Faculty of Law at the University of Sydney for a period of up to one semester. He or she may also receive an invitation to deliver the prestigious Julius Stone Address in the year following the award of the prize.

Entries may be directly submitted by the author(s), or on the nomination of a third party. Entrants are required to submit an application form and five copies of the work, plus five copies of their curriculum vitae. Four copies will be returned following judging, and one will be kept in the archive of the Julius Stone Institute.

Applications close on 1 January 2006. The prize winner will be announced in May 2006.

Note that the work(s) need not have been published in the last five years to qualify for consideration.  I don't usually post these kinds of notices, but this is an unusual opportunity for legal philosophers.

The Nomination of Judge Roberts to the U.S. Supreme Court

Bush's advisors are clever.  (It goes without saying that the alleged President did not pick the nominee.)  In nominating Judge John G. Roberts of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, they have picked someone it will be very hard to oppose in a way that would be explicable to the "man on the street," or even "the lawyer on the street."  (Professor Balkin's comments are apt.)  Judge Roberts has excellent academic credentials.  He has excellent practice experience, and is, by all accounts, a gifted oral advocate.  He was confirmed overwhelmingly to the Court of Appeals not long ago, which means that many current Senators have voted for him already and, at the same time, he has very little paper record since he has not been a judge very long.  Most of the purportedly tangible evidence of his far right ideology (and here) consists of positions he took as an advocate for others, not as a judge or a scholar or a commentator on legal affairs, where he would have clearly been speaking in his own voice.

Yet the somewhat less tangible evidence that this is a quite conservative nominee is rather powerful, far more powerful than any of the evidence on Associate Justice David Souter of the Supreme Court, who has turned out to be far more liberal than many on the right had hoped at the time of his nomination nearly fifteen years ago.  Roberts's work as an attorney in both the Reagan and Bush I Administrations, his involvement with the Federalist Society and the right-wing National Center for Law and the Public Interest, are all part of the pedigree of a real conservative lawyer these days, and Justice Souter had nothing comparable in his past (at least not that I can recall, perhaps someone will correct me).  Perhaps this is why the Christian Coalition quickly jumped on board the nomination the night it was announced?  Contrary to the nonsense we will hear over and over again in the coming weeks, any judge on the highest court of the land will be called upon to make moral and political judgments; and someone as skilled an appellate advocate as Judge Roberts will be able to find the legal arguments to support the moral and political conclusions he wants to reach in those instances.  His professional background strongly suggests those conclusions will be "conservative" in some sense of that term.

I'm skeptical, then, that Judge Roberts will turn out to be a Justice Souter, as some on the far right fear with respect to any nominee whose ideological bona fides have not been vetted by the secret police.  The best hope--and this tells us a lot about the condition of America today--may be that he will be a Justice Scalia and not a Justice Thomas.  (This informed observer, though, thinks he will be more like Chief Justice Rehnquist, for whom he clerked.  [This equally informed observer agrees.]  And this article compares him, even more alarmingly, to Judge Luttig of the reactionary Fourth Circuit.)  Justice Scalia is a smart ideologue, as opposed to a dull-witted one, and he does not carry the heavy psychological baggage of profound self-doubt and seething resentment.   One suspects Judge Roberts is similar, though we do not know whether he is quite the purist about constitutional interpretation and judicial role (a purist without a justification for the purism, alas) that Justice Scalia has proven to be, traits that usually explain Justice Scalia's "liberal" decisions in some cases.

Right now in America, abortion must rank as one of the lesser issues of constitutional moment, which says more about what is at stake in America today than about the importance of abortion rights to hundreds of thousands of women facing unwanted pregnancies.  When the President of the United States claims the authority to spirit citizens away to military brigs without judicial oversight of his conduct--an authority dear to the heart of every authoritarian history--it is not trivial that Justice Thomas was willing to uphold that authority while Justice Scalia took a more sensible and assertive position than several of the liberals and moderates.  If Roberts is a Scalia rather than  a Thomas, that may mean there will still be a judicial bulwark against the closted (and not-so-closeted) authoritarians in our midst.  (Judge Roberts, though, did recently join a unanimous opinion finding that Guantanamo detainees have no rights under the Geneva Convention, but the legal issues there were rather different than in the Hamdi case.)

I have an anecdotal sense that judges and justices of lesser intellectual ability are more inclined to do the bidding of those who appointed them.  Like all hypotheses based on anecdotes, this may prove to be nonsense.  The respective performances of Justices Scalia and Thomas on the U.S. Supreme Court are among the relevant anecdotes; so too the performances of, for example, Judges Easterbrook and Posner on the Seventh Circuit compared to some of the right-wing mediocrities on the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, who shall remain nameless.  But if, on the off chance my anecdotal sense is correct, then an Associate Justice Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court may still sometimes side with the values of freedom and democracy against the encroachments of grinning apologists for tyranny.  That is about the most optimistic diagnosis I can muster, though I can not, on the evidence before us, offer it with confidence.

Of course, he should not be confirmed.  He should not be confirmed because on a range of issues the U.S. Supreme Court is unavoidably a super-legislature, and one should not vote to confirm someone whose moral and political views are, on many of these issues, likely to be depraved and repellent.  (If we had meaningful confirmation hearings, we would find out what those moral and political views actually are in some detail.  Recall the remarks of Judge Posner.)  But this honest discussion will not be had in America in the year 2005, so there is no point in dwelling on it.

UPDATE: This is also informative as to Judge Roberts's work on the D.C. Circuit.

AND ANOTHER:  Robert Gordon (Law, Yale) also has apt observations on the nominee and the nomination.

AND ONE MORE:  More thoughts and predictions from Jack Balkin (Law, Yale)--plausible, and worrisome--especially his assessment of Judge Roberts's approach to questions of executive power.

AND YET ANOTHER:  This commentary makes some points worth quoting:

The United States long ago ceased to be anything like a living, thriving republic. But it retained the legal form of a republic, and that counted for something: as long as the legal form still existed, even as a gutted shell, there was hope it might be filled again one day with substance.

But now the very legal structures of the Republic are being dismantled. The principle of arbitrary rule by an autocratic leader is being openly established, through a series of unchallenged executive orders, perverse Justice Department rulings and court decisions by sycophantic judges who defer to power - not law - in their determinations. What we are witnessing is the creation of a "Commander-in-Chief State," where the form and pressure of law no longer apply to the president and his designated agents. The rights of individuals are no longer inalienable, nor are their persons inviolable; all depends on the good will of the Commander, the military autocrat.

George W. Bush has granted himself the power to declare anyone on earth - including any American citizen - an "enemy combatant," for any reason he sees fit. He can render them up to torture, he can imprison them for life, he can even have them killed, all without charges, with no burden of proof, no standards of evidence, no legislative oversight, no appeal, no judicial process whatsoever except those that he himself deigns to construct, with whatever limitations he cares to impose. Nor can he ever be prosecuted for any order he issues, however criminal; in the new American system laid out by Bush's legal minions, the Commander is sacrosanct, beyond the reach of any law or constitution.

This is not hyperbole. It is simply the reality of the United States today. The principle of unrestricted presidential power is now being codified into law and incorporated into the institutional structures of the state, as Deep Blade Journal reports in an excellent compendium of recent outrages against liberty.

For example, on July 15, a panel of federal appellate court judges upheld Bush's sovereign right to dispose of [non-citizen] "enemy combatants" any way he pleases, the Washington Post reports. In a chilling decision, the judges ruled that the Commander's arbitrarily designated "enemies" are non-persons: neither the Geneva Conventions nor American military and domestic law apply to such garbage. Bush is now free to subject any [non-citizen] he likes to the "military tribunal" system he has concocted - a brutal sham that some top retired military officials have denounced as a "kangaroo court" that will be used by tyrants around the world to "hide their oppression under U.S. precedent."

One of the kowtowing jurists on the appeals panel was none other than John G. Roberts. Four days after he affirmed Bush's autocratic powers, Roberts was duly awarded with a nomination to the Supreme Court. Now he will be sitting in final judgment on this case - and any other challenges to Bush's peremptory commands. This is what is known, in the tyrant trade, as "a safe pair of hands."

AND YET ANOTHER UPDATE/CORRECTION:  Despite the initial press reports, it turns out Judge Roberts is not, and has not been, a member of the Federalist Society.  Now, of course, we can all breathe easy...or maybe not.

AND ANOTHER: This is informative on the subject of Justice Roberts's moral sensibility.

Is There an "American" Jurisprudence?

I've posted on SSRN a review essay that originally appeared in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies discussing Neil Duxbury's 1995 book Patterns of American Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press).  The book has a number of virtues, but it is also deeply confused, and sometimes clearly mistaken, on a number of central topics, especially related to American Legal Realism.  I've been dismayed to notice an increasing number of law review articles that cite these errors as authoritative, and so I'm hoping that by putting this paper, which of course appeared in a British journal, into circulation via SSRN, I can counteract this unfortunate tendency. 

Here's an excerpt from the essay:

Continue reading "Is There an "American" Jurisprudence?" »

Pharyngula Chews Up Another Volokh Conspirator and Spits Him Out

Deservedly so, I'm afraid.  Perhaps when Michael Weisberg and I finish our piece on evolutionary biology and law, we can put a stop to this kind of nonsense.

UPDATE (MOVING TO THE FRONT AS WELL):  Although Professor Myers appears to have had the misfortune to attract some lovely bottom-feeders from the Volokh site, the basic problem with Professor Zywicki's post remains quite simple.  It is not reasonable, given what we know, to express doubts about Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection, nor is it reasonable, given what we know, to think Intelligent Design creationism deserves equal time with Darwin's theory in secondary school science classes.  That some conservative pundits expressed both unreasonable views is to their lasting embarrassment. 

By contrast--and this is why Professor Zywicki's original posting is so inapt--it is extremely reasonable, given what we know, to express doubts about evolutionary psychology and its selectionist hypotheses about differences between the sexes, since none of these hypotheses (as in none) have been confirmed by standards that approach those in biology.  The fundamental difficulty is that there exist important non-selectionist evolutionary mechanisms (for example, genetic hitch-hiking or genetic drift), so that one can not, as evolutionary psychologists do, treat the selectionist explanation as the default one.  This is just bad science.  This point is also the stuff of baby biology textbooks; herewith Stearns & Hoekstra (OUP, 2000), p. 8::  “much of the variation in DNA sequences [over time] is neutral with respect to selection.”  The challenge for evolutionary biologists studying, e.g., sex differences, is to figure out what role selection, if any, is really playing.  Evolutionary psychology is silent on this problem.  (There is a separate problem, of course, pertaining to the role of non-biological factors in observed sex differences.)

Consider some actual evolutionary biologists who do research on the evolution of mating preferences [Kirkpatrick, Mark and Michael J. Ryan (1991).  “The Evolution of Mating Preferences and the Paradox of the Lek,” 350 Nature 33-38 (March].  Kirkpatric & Ryan identify 14 possible evolutionary mechanisms that account for these preferences, only 7 of which involve selectionist mechanisms, and only two of which even figure (by analogy) in the evolutionary pscyhology literature (namely,  “males provide resources to females or offspring” and “costs of searching for mates”).  As Kirkpatrick & Ryan observe:  “the primary factors responsible for the evolution of [mating] preferences remain controversial” (1991:  33).  And they are talking about the evolution of mating preferences in lizards, frogs, guppies, insects, and birds, not humans! 

The danger of assuming selectionist explanations is well-illustrated by the preference of some female animals for males “with the most extreme plumage, vocalizations, and displays,” preferences that are so strong in some cases that the male “secondary sexual characters have evolved to such extremes that they decrease male survival” (1991:  33).  The crude adaptationist, like an evolutionary psychologist, might postulate that females prefer such traits in males because they signal that the male in question will be able to provide resources for offspring and to protect offspring, and will likely be highly fertile, and so on (David Buss's 1994 book on human female mating preferences is typical). 

It turns out, however, that in many animals, natural selection has nothing to do with it:  “Because females use their sensory systems for other tasks besides mate choice, these systems will often be subject to natural selection for other reasons, such as foraging ability or predator detection, with the side-effect that preferences for traits that decrease male survival are likely to be established” (Kirkpatrick & Ryan 1991:  36) (i.e., it is due to pleiotropic hitch-hiking):  “One example comes from studies of insectivorous anolid lizards.  Their visual system is exquisitely adapted to detect the motion of prey.  The male ‘pushup’ courtship display seems to have evolved to match these sensory biases in order to attract the attention of females.”  (Id.) This means the scientific question is to distinguish the cases involving natural selection and those involving other evolutionary mechanisms.  Evolutionary psychology fails to come to terms with this central issue, and so it is quite reasonable to doubt its hypotheses; indeed, it is probably unreasonable not to doubt them.

This doesn't mean evolutionary psychology will not progress from speculation to science, as it were.  It's clearly an important research program, but the quality of its results at present are not up to those of evolutionary biology.  Therefore, it is simply preposterous for Professor Zywicki to equate them.

I have addressed the wholly appropriate reaction to the remarks of Larry Summers previously.  Since, as we have noted, rational agument has little effect, I note that some on the right still want to pretend there was a weighty academic freedom issue in that case.

Originalism Redux

In my discussion of the constitutional case for impeaching Bush, I remarked on the current reigning pathology of American constitutional law, namely, the infatuation with originalism on both the right and the left; I wrote:

Originalism (whether about intentions or meanings) is now the dominant, almost entirely unquestioned touchstone of constitutional argument and interpretation in the United States.  This is odd since there is no plausible, theoretical justification for it that speaks to the kinds of issues I noted in passing and that are taken up by Professor Marmor in the piece linked to, above. 

Although there are analogous questions that could be raised about constitutionalism itself, the issue of originalism as a theory of interpretation is severable.  We might agree that later majorities should be bound by an earlier foundational document (the crux of constitutionalism), but that simply does not settle the question of how the meaning of that document should be fixed.  (Last year, when I pressed Akhil Amar about this during a visit to Texas, he argued that to be bound by the text one has to be bound by the original understanding.  This is, alas, also a non-sequitur, and not just conceptually:  in practice, for example, Canadian courts are barred from originalist interpretations of the Charter, yet still manage to interpret and apply it.) 

Those who would supplement constitutionalism with originalism need to explain why the original meaning or intentions are authoritative.  Intentions might be authoritative if, for example, we had consented to be bound by them; but that is inapposite in this case. Intentions might be authoritative if they reflected a kind of practical/moral expertise or insight, such that (to put it in Razian terms) we are more likely to do what we really ought to do by treating these original intentions as authoritative with respect to our decisions and choices today; but that also seems inapposite in this case, absent some extended moral and political defense of the special expertise of the framers of the Constitution. 

In general, originalists fail to come to terms with the question of why original meanings or intentions should be authoritative, and opt instead for instrumentalist arguments of the form, "We need originalism to constrain judges."  But there are multiple ways to constrain judges (make their decisions appealable; permit legislative overrides [as, e.g., the Canadian Charter does in certain contexts]; adopt a simple rule like, 'Appellant always wins' [this last being far more efficient than originalism!]; adopt a more complex rule like "the plain, current meaning controls," and where it is unclear, do a Gallup poll to see what the "people" want), and so what is needed is some clear explanation of why originalism should be the preferred way of achieving constraint (why is constraint a value?  how much constraint can originalism deliver compared to alternatives?  etc.). 

Perhaps originalism can meet these challenges.  It is a decidedly odd feature of our contemporary constitutional culture in the U.S. that, despite the absence of answers--indeed, despite the recognition in many quarters that these are real challenges!--originalism should be so widely accepted across the political spectrum.

Mike Rappaport (Law, San Diego) responds with an argument that he believes is not caught by these criticisms; here is the relevant portion:

[John] McGinnis and I root the normative basis for following the original meaning of the Constitution in the fact that constitutional provisions can only be enacted by passage under strict supermajority rules. (See Articles V and VII of the Constitution.)

Laws that must pass under a strict supermajority rule are apt to be better than laws passed by majority rule. While the specific effects of supermajority rules depend on the type of laws being passed, the circumstances, and the model of the legislative process that one employs, one can make certain generalizations. First, that supermajority rules require the approval of a greater percentage of the legislature operates to protect minority interests from being exploited. Second, the greater support required under supermajority rules also means that laws must in general produce significant public benefits in order to pass. (For other arguments, see the paper.) While supermajority rules don’t make sense in all circumstances, they are desirable when applied to the passage of constitutional norms that will be entrenched against change by ordinary legislative majorities.

The supermajoritarian process for enacting constitutional norms provides a reason why constitutional provisions should be preferred to ordinary statutes passed under majority voting rules: the constitutional norms are likely to be of higher quality than ordinary legislation. The supermajoritarian process also suggests that the Constitution should be given its original meaning: it is only the original meaning of the provisions that would have been reviewed by the participants in the strict supermajoritan process.

[I]t is not who the Framers were that justifies following their Constitution, it is the supermajoritarian process by which they enacted the Constitution. This process also justifies not following their handiwork when the Constitution has been amended.

This supermajoritarian defense of the Constitution is reinforced by the fact that original meaning interpretation guides and constrains judges. Under the loose interpretive approach favored by Marmor and most liberal academics, there is little to stop the Supreme Court Justices from imposing their own views on the nation. Since this amounts to constitutional amendment by a majority of 9 unelected judges, as opposed to constitutional amendment by a supermajority of elected officials, this process of judicial amendment is far worse than following the original meaning.

In the end, then, originalism is justified because it enforces provisions enacted in a process that suggests they will be desirable and assigns to judges the task of enforcing, not making, the law.

I find this argument a bit confusing, and Professor Rappaport will no doubt correct me if I am reconstructing the argument incorrectly.  But here is how I understand it:

1.  The text of the Constitution clearly provides that it only may be amended by procedures requiring super-majorities.

2.  Legal norms enacted by super-majorities are generally superior (along various relevant evaluative dimensions) to legal norms enacted by simple majorities (let alone legal norms enacted by simple majorities of very small groups, such as nine judges on a court).

3.  Originalism is the preferred mode of interpretation, then, because (a) the original meaning is the one vetted in the super-majoritarian procedure, and (b) the original meaning constrains judges from effecting non-super-majoritarian amendments through "loose" interpretation of the text.

The crucial premise here is, I take it, (2):  it justifies 3(a)'s claim that the original meaning/intention should be authoritative; and it explains why the kind of constraint in 3(b) is to be preferred over other possible kinds of constraint. 

Unfortunately, I don't see how 2 can possibly bear any of this argumentative weight.  At best, 2 establishes that norms so enacted are likely (how likely?  it's unclear) to be normatively superior to norms not so enacted.  It can not possibly establish that the norms so enacted in fact have normative authority. 

Remember:  the fundamental question is why a particular meaning has a justfieid claim of authority over us, i.e., why we should comply with that way of construing the meaning rather than some other.  It is very hard to answer this question without some explicit account of what confers normative authority.  Two possibilities (but there are others) are:  a meaning is authoritative because we have consented to be governed by those who authored it; or a meaning is authoritative because we are more likely to do what we really ought to do if we are governed by that meaning.  Let's call the latter, following Raz, the service-based conception of normative authority.

Continue reading "Originalism Redux" »

Which "Liberal" Media? Bashing Justice Kennedy in the NY Times

Philosopher Samuel Rickless (UC San Diego) writes with kind words and apt observations:

I do so enjoy reading your blog.  I look forward to it every morning,
and consider it a breath of fresh air, especially after spending most
of my breakfast cursing at the NYTimes.

Case in point: today's front page story about how much the right wing
hates Anthony Kennedy
.  Now I know that the story is about right-wing
reaction to Kennedy's views, but the article is notably unbalanced in
its treatment of Kennedy's jurisprudence.  His admirers are described
as praising his judicial temperament: "good judgment, fairmindedness
and a willingness to disentangle his own moral values from the law".
His detractors (including Bork, who was interviewed for the piece) are
described as questioning his "judicial views" on the grounds that he
does not "stick to the Constitution."  The two scholars who are quoted
as praisin