If you try to think of which group has been the most consistent target of social media shaming, it is surely women who dare to express their opinions or to break up with boyfriends. The major effect of social media is that it enables people to broadcast an opinion—or, more accurately, a gut reaction—to the whole world, instantly, without pausing to give it any thought. This, combined with pervasive anonymity and traditional animosity to anyone who acts or thinks unconventionally, has awoken atavistic instincts that are multiplied a hundredfold through herd mentality. And then these ill-considered reactions are stored indefinitely, while being immediately accessible to anyone, thanks to the efficiency of search engines.
...but it's not just the feminist bloggers and tweeters who are withdrawing. I know of male philosophers who have withdrawn for a similar reason--the main difference, of course, is that threats of sexualized violence are rarely directed at men in cyberspace. But round-the-clock abuse, and threats of non-sexual violence, are a constant for anyone who takes positions that are at all controversial or non-mainstream. The pathology of cyberspace and the ugly behavior it elicits warrants more attention from the law than it has yet received.
...against outspoken law professor (though see the very good statement by the Law Dean towards the end of the article). This is really appalling. The only silver lining is that I guess they concluded they couldn't get away with firing him outright.
More novel is the bill’s requirement that schools and universities conduct surveillance on their students. Section 25.1 states that education institutions are among the ‘specified authorities’ – along with councils, prisons, hospitals and police chiefs – that must ‘have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’....Administrators must conduct ‘risk assessments’ to uncover ‘where and how’ their students might be drawn to extremist ideology, including ‘non-violent extremism’. All staff members should be trained in ways to ‘challenge extremist ideas’, and if they find anyone who appears ‘vulnerable to being drawn into extremism’, refer them to local anti-terrorism panels for ‘support’....
In addition, all visiting speakers must be vetted for their anti-extremist credentials at least two weeks in advance, and their lecture notes and slides scrutinised. Maybe this will help procrastinating academics to plan their lectures ahead of time. Or perhaps they will just stop speaking....
This is an open letter on behalf of the Harvard Philosophy Department’s Graduate Student Organization. We were very concerned to learn about the public attacks by Marquette Professor John McAdams against Marquette graduate student Cheryl Abbate.
Anyone who teaches ethical theory will have to manage conversations involving politically sensitive topics, and in doing so, it is impossible to express agreement with every student on every occasion. Indeed, part of the point of an ethical theory course is to equip students to examine critically even their most deeply held views on moral issues.
These are sound and sensible points. But then the letter continues:
However one may characterize Cheryl Abbate’s way of managing a discussion of same-sex marriage inside or outside the classroom, she ought not to have been subject to the public attack orchestrated by Professor John McAdams. As a foreseeable result of this attack, Cheryl Abbate has been subject to an overwhelming volume of hate mail and threats, as well as negative attention in national media. In initiating this flurry of attacks, we believe that Professor McAdams exploited the power differential between a professor and a graduate student.
Universities owe their graduate students—who are among the most vulnerable members of their communities—a guarantee of protection from this kind of treatment. But at Marquette, we were recently disturbed to learn, Cheryl Abbate was put in a position where her best option was to transfer out of her doctoral program.
We call on Marquette to articulate a clear policy for protecting its graduate students from abuses by more powerful members of its community.
There is much that is strange about this, in roughly ascending order of significance:
1. Ms. Abbate was able to transfer to a much better program (Colorado), a silver lining in an otherwise dark rain cloud. It's hard not to see her as being better off professionally in the end, despite the ugliness that prompted her to transfer.
2. Professor McAdams's creepy behavior was not in any way facilitated by "the power differential between a professor and a graduate student." Note, first, that McAdams is, despite his many years in the academy, still merely an Associate Professor of Political Science. And apparently even his local institutional clout is so meager that the University is unabashed to suspend him without a hearing. More importantly, since Ms. Abbate was a student in the philosophy department, McAdams had no power over her at all. What enabled him to ignite a right-wing firestorm was his ability to use his blog to tap into a pre-existing network of "conservative" social and traditional media that love narratives about intolerant liberals in the academy. This has nothing to do with power differentials between faculty and students; graduate students, after all, have pulled the same kind of stunt against tenured professors! There is a serious problem with the way in which social media is used to harass faculty and students, which we have noted before, and universities ought to defend their teachers and students against such attacks, as they sometimes do, but not by punishing faculty or student speech.
3. In this regard, I do wonder what these graduate students are asking Marquette for by way of "a clear policy for protecting its graduate students from abuses by more powerful members of its community"? Presumably, the University already protects students, including instructors, from sexual harassment, physical assault, and other unlawful misconduct. But is it to protect them from speech critical of their pedagogy? How can a university, consistent with a commitment to free speech and inquiry, including about its own teaching and research, possibly "protect" anyone from that?
IMPORTANT UPDATE: A PhD student in philosophy at Harvard writes:
As a PhD student in the philosophy dept. here at Harvard, I wanted to write you regarding your recent post on your blog, entitled “More on the Marquette Case.” As you noted there, a letter was written by the “graduate students in philosophy at Harvard,” addressed to the Dean at Marquette. However, not all the students in our department approved of this letter, and indeed, some of us wanted not to send it. It was sent because we were outnumbered in a straight vote about whether to send it; effectively we had no choice after that vote.
I, for one, agree with your analysis of the latter half of the letter, and wanted to clarify, for what it’s worth, that the letter does not speak for all the students of the department. Rather it represents some of the more politically-inclined folks who get riled up about these sorts of things and then take action ‘on behalf of the students’ as soon as they have a straight majority. There is at least some significant minority of us not represented by this letter.
I had suspected as much, but it's good to have confirmation of this fact.
ANOTHER: Jeremy David Fix, another PhD student at Harvard (who gave permission to use his name), writes:
While I did not help compose the letter, the voting process did not require a 'straight majority'. A 75% majority was required to pass the motion and send the letter. This requirement was clearly stated in the open graduate student meeting where the letter was discussed, the email that asked for the vote through an anonymous online survey, and the email that confirmed the result of the vote, as far as I remember. Though my colleague is correct that "not all the students in our department approved of this letter, and indeed, some of us wanted not to send it", the actual percentage of supporting votes was significantly higher than 75%. Whatever the validity of the concerns about the content of the letter, this letter in no way indicates that the graduate community is overrun by politically motivated folks illegitimately pretending to speak for others.
I agree that there is no evidence that "the graduate community is overrun by politically motivated folks illegitimately pretending to speak for others," and I did not interpret the original e-mail, above, that way. The unknown is how many of the graduate students actually voted (my originally correspondent thinks only about 20 of the 40 students in the program voted). In any case, the important point, given that the letter is not very sensible, is that not all Harvard graduate students supported it.
What the editorial says seems right--in shorter form, the U.S. is a lawless, criminal nation on the international scene, but we all knew that, right?--but what it omits is the role the Times, like most of the mainstream media in the US played, in shilling for war and offering apologetics for criminality until such apologetics could no longer be sustained. After all, the report describes standard operating procedure of the CIA for decades.
UPDATE: Some highlights of American tax dollars at work. As with most important moral questions, there were no hard philosophical questions here.
Speaking of unchecked punitive impulses: responding to this post, David Velleman advises on Facebook: "The key is to stop visiting Leiter's site and adding to his traffic stats. It only encourages him -- and adds to his income." I think Velleman, a "moral" philosopher, is now the first person to suggest that my speech warrants a financial penalty as well! But what percentage of my income is a proportionate remedy for my speech concerning punishment and proportionality?
ADDENDUM: Velleman offered this boycott proposal several days ago; yesterday, the blog had over 14,000 visits. Go figure?
I was astonished to learn that some people thought it was inappropriate for Peter Ludlow to be an evaluator in the current PGR. Ludlow has been a regular respondent to the surveys for many years; we have always invited past participants (except when they ask to be removed), and we did so this year as well (including, for example, those who signed the boycott statement--many of them did, in the end, participate happily). On what basis could Brit and I take the punitive measure of excluding him as an evaluator because of misconduct and allegations of misconduct unrelated to his philosophical competence?
In an earlier thread on the controversy about an administrative decision to deny Colin McGinn a visiting position at East Carolina University, a young philosopher wrote, in response to the question I posed:
"Should loss of a job for sexual misconduct bar someone from any future academic appointment?"
Uh - YES. Is this a serious question?
John Gardner, the Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford, then weighed in with the following comment that deserves some serious consideration from those with unchecked punitive impulses:
Of course it's a serious question. We need to begin by asking whether the refusal to hire is punitive, and if so whether the punishment is porportionate to the offence. Or whether the refusal to hire is preventative, in which case whether there are ways to prevent that do not destroy someone's life so completely. If the answer is 'both', we need to know in what proportions, so that we can work out whether the constraints on each goal are being sensibly applied. If the answer is 'neither - we're just trying to send out a signal' (see David Sobel below), then I invite you to consider whether it's morally acceptable to use a person, any person, to do that. Unpleasant narcissists are people too and it's not open season when one of them gets exposed for what he is. It still matters how we treat him. It shocks me that anyone would doubt whether 'How should we treat a wrongdoer in such a situation?' is a serious question.
It is shocking.
UPDATE: A philosopher elsewhere writes:
I wonder if people think being disciplined for sexual misconduct should bar someone from employment of ANY kind?
Or is it any employment with supervisory responsibilities? Or any employment that involves interactions with other people?
And while we are at, what about other offenses? Other crimes against persons? Property crimes?
Should people with a criminal record be allowed to hold jobs?
If not, should they be eligible for public assistance?
...as he now threatens the University of Wisconsin (Madison) for cancelling classes during President Obama's visit to campus. How could such a malevolent neanderthal be elected in the formerly progressive state of Wisconsin?
(Thanks to David Lay Williams for the pointer.)
UPDATE: Larry Shapiro points out, correctly, that this is past michief from Representative Vos, not current.)
I agree with Jennifer Lackey that universities which really want complainants about sexual harassment and misconduct to come forward should, as a matter of course, indemnify them for subsequent legal risks, but I did think this proposal was rather startling and dangerous, as did others (complete with the overused word "bullying"!).
UPDATE: A philosopher in the UK writes:
According to Eric Schliesser (boiled down) we should shun colleagues (call them Ys) who resort to law to defend themselves against colleagues (call them Zs) who accuse them of harassment, even falsely. Unless, presumably, a Y resorts to law only to accuse a Z of harassment (even falsely). In that case, surely, we should stand shoulder to shoulder with the Y and instead shun the Z who resorts to law. Unless, I guess, the Z in question resorts to law only to accuse the Y in question of harassment (even falsely). In that case, I assume, we should stand shoulder to shoulder with the Z and instead shun the Y who resorts to law. Unless, I suppose, that same Y resorts to law only to accuse that same Z of harassment (even falsely). In that case shouldn't we stand shoulder to shoulder with the Y and instead shun the Z who resorted to law? Unless, perhaps, that Z resorts to law ... etc. etc. He started it. No, she did. No, he did.
One important aim of living under the rule of law is to control (by final authoritative determinations of who did what to whom, made in open court following full contestation of evidence) the baneful effects on all concerned of this facile morality of the playground. If resorting to law is itself available as a kind of playground intimidation, that only goes to show that we do not live under the rule of law. It seems to me that we should put our energies, not into shunning law-users, but into creating an adequately funded legal aid system that can retain excellent lawyers chosen by those they represent. In a barbarian land (like mine) where funding such a legal aid system through taxation is ruled out by the forces of darkness, I guess we may have to fall back on other sources of funding (such as university indemnification), tant pis. But turning against legal determinations of fact - that's playing right into the hands of the forces of darkness by abandoning the system that gives us our last line of protection.
The Republican agenda for next year also includes several changes for the University of Wisconsin, according to Vos. He said that he wants to ensure that faculty spend more time teaching, and that research is geared toward helping the state's economy.
“Of course I want research, but I want to have research done in a way that focuses on growing our economy, not on ancient mating habits of whatever,” said Vos. “So we want to try to have priorities that are focused on growing our economy.”
Vos and Joint Finance Committee Chairman John Nygren were asked whether they were open to a budget request by the UW that would increase funding for the System by $95 million dollars. Nygren called that a “tough sell,” saying he didn't think the state should make up for funding the System lost as part of a mandatory tuition freeze.
Continental Philosophy Farhang Erfani, a philosopher at American University, provides a useful set of links to news, events, interviews, reviews, videos, etc. related to "Continental philosophy" (broadly construed)