Philosophy of Social Science in the PGR (Leiter)

James Bohman (Saint Louis University), Paul Roth (UC Santa Cruz), Stephen Turner (South Florida) and Alison Wylie (Washington/Seattle) sent me the following thoughtful letter regarding the current specialty ratings for Philosophy of Social Science.  I am posting it here with their permission and hope to solicit other opinions from experts.  Here is their letter:

We write with some suggestions for reframing the specialty area, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. In particular, we urge that it be construed more broadly; the slate of the raters and the results reported in the most recent Philosophical Gourmet Report suggest an emphasis on philosophy of economics and rational choice/decision theoretic approaches. These are certainly important components of this subfield but, in the course of organizing the 1998 NEH Summer Institute on Philosophy of Social science and, subsequently, running  the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable we’ve been impressed by the breadth and dynamism of philosophical work on the social sciences that lies outside these areas of interest and that comprises the core of what is now a fairly well defined and stable field of research and teaching interest in English-language philosophy. Here’s our thinking about the nature of this field; some recommendations follow.

As represented at the Roundtable, in the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and in several recent anthologies, this subfield integrates philosophical analysis of fields in the social sciences that range from qualitative (ethnographic) research programs in anthropology and historical inquiry, through the experimental research traditions now flourishing in social psychology, economics, and physical anthropology, to various forms of quantitative survey-based and demographic research, and the formal modeling typical of some areas of political science, sociology, and economics. The traditions on which philosophers draw when they engage the social sciences are equally diverse: centrally, analytic philosophy of science, philosophy of language and action theory, social ontology and political philosophy, as well as continental traditions of critical theory, hermeneutics and phenomenology.

The intellectual core of the field, as it has taken shape in English-language philosophy, is defined by a set of questions about the relationship between the social and the natural sciences, and by the "logic and methodology" orientation that structures its relationship to the multiple disciplines it studies. The stability of this core is evident in the interests of key figures—from Mill to Popper and Habermas—whose work has defined the field, and in a standard set of topics articulated in pivotal debates between, for example, Winch and MacIntyre, Hollis and Lukes, Hempel and Dray. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2003), featured at the top of the PGR specialty rankings page for Philosophy of Social Science, includes, for example, essays on theory formation and scientific methodology in the social sciences, on competing models of explanation and of interpretative inquiry, on questions about agency and rationality, the status of claims about social institutions and of appeals to norms and practices, the viability of ideals of objectivity, value neutrality, and critical engagement in the social sciences. In this it builds on themes evident in the canonical Brodbeck anthology of 1968: theory construction, the role of laws in explanation, holism vs individualism, teleological and functional analysis, the role of values and of a “positive” research methodology in social inquiry. This slate of topics constitutes a stable and well-defined research field; a search for "philosophy of social science" on the Cambridge University Press website, and the contents of this subject area on the Routledge or Blackwell sites, yields results that illustrate these core topics. A search for on-line examples of syllabi for Philosophy of Social Science courses at the undergraduate and graduate level generates similar results.

We are concerned that the Philosophical Gourmet Report does not take the whole of this field into account but rather, as indicated at the outset, tends to equate philosophy of the social sciences with philosophy of economics and with applications of rational choice and decision theory in the social sciences. Of the six experts assembled to rate the field, only two list philosophy of the social sciences as an AOS. One of them identifies this as “philosophy of the social sciences and economics,” and the other specifies economics as his primary interest in the field; both are centrally involved in philosophy of biology and indicate a particular interest in evolutionary theory. A third is an eminent philosopher of economics who also teaches broadly in philosophy of the social sciences. A fourth has published on economics but lists his AOS as philosophy of science and history of philosophy. And the final two are chiefly known for their work in decision theory, game theory, and theories of rational deliberation. Although these latter specializations bear on issues central to philosophy of the social sciences, we note that “Decision, Rational Choice and Game Theory” is a separately ranked specialty in the PGR. We are concerned that the distinction between this specialty and “Philosophy of Social Science” has been elided, and that the broad range of philosophical work that focuses on social sciences other than economics is not well represented.

Judging by the response to the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in the eight years it has been running, these are significant gaps. We routinely review 40 to 50 abstracts submitted by self-identified philosophers of social science for each annual Rountable; we select 10 to 12 of these for the program and publish 4 to 6 of these as an annual special issue of the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Of the 37 papers we will have published from the Roundtable programs when the 8^th special issue appears (March 2007), there is roughly an even balance between analyses that focus on anthropology, sociology, social and developmental psychology, political science, history, and economics (there are 4 to 5 papers in each area, excluding several papers that are not discipline-specific). By topic, these papers concentrate in several broad areas: social ontology (including holism vs individualism), models of explanation, rationality and normativity, and meta-methodological topics (including ideals of objectivity, theory evaluation, and the role of values). Papers on topics in philosophy of economics, rational choice and decision theory are certainly in the mix, but they are a distinct minority given the range of other topics and social scientific fields represented. Our selections at each stage are governed by considerations of quality, not topic, so we expect that the sample of published papers is broadly representative, by area and topic, of the pool of submissions attracted by our annual call for papers.

It should be noted that the Roundtable call for papers draws submissions from philosophers of social science based in universities across North America, the U.K., Scandinavia, eastern and western Europe and, in a few instances, from Australia and New Zealand, so the resulting programs and publications represent a broad cross-section of English-language philosophy of social science. Most important, from the point of view of Philosophical Gourmet Report (as a guide for students selecting graduate programs), roughly a third of those who contribute to the Roundtable and the special issues of PoSS are young scholars; new PhD’s or advanced graduate students seek out the Roundtable because it is one of very few meetings (and the only one run on an annual basis) that provides them access to a broad spectrum of current work in philosophy of the social sciences. Their interests represent the growing edge of the field, and these track the distribution of topics we have described as the stable core of field.

The guiding principle at work in the ranking of programs by specialties, as described in the Philosophical Gourmet Report, is that each specialized field should be evaluated by experts in that field. If Philosophy of Social Science is not to be an exception to this principle it will be important to broaden the range of expertise included in the panel of raters so that it better reflects the balance of interests and core problems that animate the field. To do this effectively we recommend that a clearer distinction be drawn between philosophy of social science and decision theory and its applications, and that there be a stronger representation of philosophical interests in social sciences other than economics. Those members of the rating panel who identify philosophy of social science as an area of specialization would no doubt be able to make more specific suggestions along these lines, and the anthologies, journals, and conference programs we’ve mentioned all offer extensive lists of faculty teaching in these areas in graduate programs.

Professors Bohman, Roth, Turner, and Wylie articulate some concerns I had had about this specialty area, which is why I asked their permission to make their informative letter public.  I would welcome comments from other philosophers working in and around philosophy of the social sciences.  Non-anonymous comments will be very strongly preferred, and comments may take awhile to appear, so please post only once.

Comments

[Eric Schliesser]

I wholeheartedly support the main gist of the letter by Bohman, Roth, Turner, and Wylie (leaving aside the fact, that at Syracuse we were very puzzled by our lack of presence in the rankings in these areas). In particular, I agree that there should be a far more careful distinction between decision theory (and formal epistemology) and philosophy of social science in the rankings. I do worry, however, that if their recommendations are taken to heart that in the future philosophy of economics will be lumped together with decision/game theory. This will not only encourage a misleading picture of what serious theorizing about economics amounts to, it also also will just encourage a division between the 'formal fetishists' and more 'soft' reflection on social science. Moreover, I balk a bit at the claim that 'philosophy of social science constitutes a stable and well-defined research field.' From the present one can always construct a narrative in which this stability is apparent. But, of course, as in other areas these fields are contested. (Note how unpopular the demarcation problem is in contemporary philosophy of science; teleology/function was unpopular before the 70s, etc.) Finally, I am not entirely convinced that an AOS in 'philosophy of social science,' if it is perceived as 'soft' (or Continental/Theory) will be of much help in getting jobs in the discipline. But that is an empirical question.

[Anna Alexandrova]

As a self-identified philosopher of social science I enthusiastically second the recommendations made by the authors of the letter. The current Gourmet evaluators of this field are all excellent scholars, but their list needs to be expanded to include, for example, the authors of the letter (at the very least) and perhaps also Philip Pettit, Jim Woodward, Harold Kincaid, Nancy Cartwright, Don Ross (each of which has an active research interest in philosophy of social science). Such a list would represent philosophy of social science for what it is - a diverse field with roots in many areas. I can think of many young philosophers of social science, for example, Dan Steel and Carole Lee, doing excellent work that is best evaluated by a broader panel that includes more than philosophers of economics.

Within philosophy of economics, Eric's point is also crucial. Just because some areas are well described as parts of decision and rational choice theory, does not mean that decision and rational choice theorists are well placed to evaluate all work in philosophy of economics. A number of young philosophers of economics such as Erik Angner, Julian Reiss, Damiel Fennel, Till Gruene-Yanoff, Eric Schliesser, myself and the more senior Francesco Guala (apologies to those I forget) all work in areas that are, in part, not appropriately described as decision or rational choice or game theory. We do methodology of economics (questions on models, causality, experiments, measurement etc). It is natural and important that philosophers of economics should speak to methodology, just as many philosophers of biology do. I urge Professor Leiter not to treat philosophy of economics as a subset of Decision, RC and Game Theory for the purposes of the Gourmet report.

[Francesco Guala]

I agree that the crucial distinction is not economics vs other social sciences, nor formal vs discoursive approaches. One way to achieve a shaper distinction between decision/game theory vs other philosophy of social science, is to identify with the former all work that is predominantly concerned with normative issues of rationality. This work is often contiguous with debates in (formal) ethics, foundations of probability (especially Bayesianism), social choice. It's influence in other areas of the philosophy of social science/economics (e.g. methodology, social ontology, hermeneutics, historical and political dimension of social science, etc.) is much more tenuous.

[Eric Schliesser]

Francesco suggests the right way to go. However, the situation is tricky because game theory, in particular, is also widely used in important parts of (what economists like to call) 'positive' economics, including experimental economics (the area of economics that Francesco has written quite insightfully about). So, I could imagine a philosopher working on game theory and making a contribution to 'philosophy of economics' (or economics!), even if the philosopher's own interest is in the normative side (think of Gibbard's work in the 70s).

[JimJohnson]

I am not a philosopher, but have attended a couple of the PSS Roundtables and have published several papers resulting from that participation - all in journals in my own field of political science. I also teach in a department that is heavily oriented toward rational choice and game theory (Rochester) and teach a course in it myself at the ICPSR Summer camp each summer at UMichigan. Having said all that in order to situate myself, I will say a couple of things:

(1) There is very little "normative" work drawing on rational choice/game theory in political science or sociology (let alone, say, anthropology). Like economists, folks in those disciplines view themselves as involved almost exclusively in a "positive" endeavor. (I happen to think that they are largely confused in that self-assessment, but will leave my qualms aside). So, on that basis there is real disjuncture between work on the ground and the view of rational choice/game theory articulated by Fransesco Guala.

(2) If we are interested in the normative issues of rationality, that is surely not solely the domain of those influenced by rational choice/game theoretic work. I think of the debates coming out of Winch's assessment of social anthropology including the papers collected in the Wilson "Rationality" and then Hollis/Lukes "Rationality & Relativism" volumes. But one might think of work in the Weber through Habermas orbit as addressing normative issues of rationality as well.

(3) Much of what goes on in game theory is not concerned with rationality at all ... think about burgeoning research in evolutionary game theory.

All this might just complicate life; but I think that makes the Bohman et. al. diagnosis is even more persuasive.

[Francesco Guala]

Just a brief reply to Eric's and Jim's comments, to clarify:
Eric is right that a lot of work ON game theory concerns its use as a "positive" (explanatory, predictive) theory. I would classify that under the "methodology" label.
Jim is right that most of the work done BY SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SCIENTISTS is of the "positive" kind. The point is that most of the work done BY PHILOSOPHERS is probably of the "normative" kind, and is quite disjoint (not entirely, of course) from the "methodological" work mentioned above. (It is often more closely connected with other "normative" literatures, e.g. in ethics and political philosophy.)
Of course the distinction is fuzzy, and I'm really not sure where to place evolutionary GT or the wider debate of rationality in social science (Jim's point). But let's remember that we are not looking for a purely theoretical distinction: the issue, if I remember well, is how to prevent work that should fall in one area (game and decision theory) to "contaminate" the rankings in the other area (philosophy of social science). And, more practically: Who should do the rankings?!
Now, my proposed distinction, roughly, works as follows:
Philosophers whose work is mostly of the "normative" game/decision theoretic kind:
Isaac Levi, Teddy Seidenfeld, Alan Gibbard, Wlodek Rabinowicz, John Broome, Philippe Mongin, Luc Bovens,... etc etc
Philosophers whose work is mostly on the "positive" side of the divide (but still concerned with decision/game theory, some of the time):
Dan Hausman, Nancy Cartwright, Don Ross, Anna Alexandrova, myself, etc. etc.
Of course there are people who contribute to both literatures (Cristina Bicchieri, Bob Sugden) but even in this case it's not impossible to determine which part of their work belongs to which area.
However, there is another option: to create a new ranking especially for The Philosophy of Economics, separate from the other social sciences (if it's done for physics and biology, why not for economics?) where BOTH literatures (the "normatively" oriented and the "methodologically" oriented) coexist. But again, one would have to make sure that the "rankers" are chosen with an eye to maintain a balance between the two perspectives ("normative" vs "positive/methodological").

[Eric Schliesser]

I can't resist: I just came across Brian Weatherson's very fine piece, "Keynes, uncertainty and interest rates," Camb. J. Econ. 2002 26: 47-62. This is a subtle article that uses recent developments in theory of probability to model uncertainty in ways unavailable to Keynes. (Keynes has roughly the Knight-ian distinction between risk vs uncertainty--I see 'roughly' because I am not sure if Knight would accept the Benthamite calculus.) Brian also investigates if 'uncertainty' can then do the work that Keynes wants from it. (He concludes negatively.) Keynes' particular models are not in fashion anymore [somewhat ironically, Milton Friedman's name is spelled incorrectly in the paper]. Yet, Brian's article is the kind of work in formal theory that illuminates 'positive' economics past and present, while (at the same time!) its anti-Bayesian thrust represents a normative element.
Now, I think this paper is really a beautiful example of what philosophy of economics *could* be, but rarely is (although I agree with Francesco that Sugden is a nice other example). Too much so-called 'philosophy of economics' merely applies questions and/or concepts from a prior, more general philosophy of science. From the point of view of the present rankings, it's hard to see how Brian's paper could make much of an impact. Now, in a separate 'philosophy of economics' ranking such a paper can appeal to the methodologists and what I call the 'formal fetishists.'