Paid Advertisements:

Search


« December 2006 | Main | February 2007 »

Pyke Philosophy Photos on the Web (J. Stanley)

Many philosophers have on their shelves a copy of Philosophers, the 1993 book of photographs of philosophers with the famous photograph of Anscombe and Geach on the cover. Steve Pyke, the creator of that work, is now a staff photographer for the New Yorker. In the ensuing years, he has continued the project, and has just posted on his website not only 25 pictures from the original book, but also 25 newer photos of what are by and large somewhat friendlier looking philosophers.

UPDATE: Pyke has taken many more photos of philosophers; what is now posted on his website is only a randam sampling of what I can only assume must be the best looking ones.

The Coming War with Iran, Yet Again (Leiter)

Even the mainstream media has been picking up the war-mongering signals from Bush & his bestiary of madmen.  This transcript in Russian of remarks by Bush, I am told, is even clearer.  I would be grateful if someone who reads Russian could post a translation (at least of the key parts) in the comments.

UPDATE:  Ira Lindsay's translation in the comments section makes clear that the really belligerent remarks here are entirely the work of the right-wing site hosting the transcript.

ANOTHER:  New Virginia Senator Jim Webb, for one, is worried about this issue.  (Thanks to Ruchira Paul for the pointer.)

AND ONE MORE:  Is this the new "Gulf of Tonkin" pretext for war?

For only US$335,000 you can get a flat in the best part of London....

...but it's only 77 square feet, "slightly bigger than a prison cell and without electricity." 

How are London academics coping with the insane cost of living?

Divers from Sheffield Back to Leeds

John Divers (metaphysics, philosophy of language and logic) at the University of Sheffield will return to the University of Leeds next August to take up a Chair in the Department of Philosophy there. 

New Philosophers' Carnival is...

...here.

In Memoriam: John Arthur (1946-2007)

Professor Arthur, a well-known legal and political philosopher, taught for nearly two decades at the State University of New York at Binghamton.  A memorial notice from a local newspaper is here.

Ehrenreich on "The Suppression of Collective Joy" (Leiter)

This sounds like an interesting book; an excerpt from the article, which is largely quoting Erhrenreich (I've omitted some of the pop evolutionary psychology):

"When Europeans fanned out across the globe from the 15th to 19th centuries conquering people, they found rituals and festivities going on everywhere from Polynesia to Alaska to Sub-Saharan Africa to india. Everywhere there were occasions for dressing up -often in a religious context but not always. The Europeans were horrified by what they saw and described it as 'savagery' and 'devil worship.' They thought it showed the inherent inferiority of indigenous people that they could let go in this way. The truth is, these traditions were European, too, but forgotten. The ancient Greeks had a god for ecstasy, Dionysus. Women especially worshipped Dionysus...        

"There is evidence that Christianity until the 13th century was very much a danced religion. The archbishops were always complaining about it. When dancing was eventually banned in the churches it went outside in the form of carnival and other festivities that filled the church calendar. In 15th century France, one out of four days of the year was given over to festivities of some sort. People didn't live to work, they lived to party...                       

"Why is there so little collective joy today?  Why is our culture bereft of opportunity for this kind of thing? Mostly, we sit in cubicles at work and we sit in our cars. If you mention 'ecstasy' people think you're talking about a drug. The cure for loneliness and isolation and despair is Prozac... The simple answer is: the ancient tradition of festivities and ecstatic rituals was deliberately suppressed by elites -people in power who associated this kind of frolicking with the lower classes and especially with women...       

"The Romans had their own Dionysus worshippers in Italy and they slaughtered them in 60 BC with the kind of ferocity they later directed at Christians... The Protestants were the real killjoys. They just wiped out that entire calendar of festivities from the Catholic church and outlawed dancing and masking. Around the world it was mainly missionaries who crushed the ecstatic rituals of indigenous people. In this country, slave owners banned not only reading and books, they banned the drum.  They understood that in these kinds of rituals people found collective strength. A similar thing happened in 18th century Arabia with the rise of Wahabist Islam, the antecedent of Al Qaeda and Saudi Islam. Their main enemy was not Christians or Jews so much as it was the Sufi tradition within Islam which is ecstatic and involves music and dance.      
"Elites fear that disorderly kinds of events could turn into uprisings. And this fear is justified. Whether you're looking at European peasants in the late middle ages or Caribbean slaves in the 19th century, they were using festivity and carnival as the occasion for revolts.      

"A second reason that comes with the industrial revolution is, of course, the need to impose social discipline. It's hard to take agricultural people or herding people and convince them that they should get up and work six days a week, 12 hours a day, and then spend the seventh day listening to boring sermons in a church. To discipline the    working class and slaves was a huge enterprise."

I wonder whether any Foucauldians or similarly historically-minded philosophers have a view about whether the historical claims here are accurate?

Christensen from Vermont to Brown

David Christensen (epistemology, philosophy of science) at the University of Vermont has accepted a senior offer from the Department of Philosophy at Brown University, to start this fall.

Christensen is the third senior faculty member in the last half-dozen years at Vermont to be hired away by a major PhD program:  Hilary Kornblith (epistemology) moved from Vermont to the University of Massachussetts at Amherst; and Derk Pereboom (philosophy of action and mind, modern philosophy, philosophy of religion) moved, even more recently, to Cornell University.  Vermont's is plainly a department with a very sharp eye for philosophical talent!  Even with these losses, it still remains among the very top departments (in terms of faculty quality) offering only an undergraduate degree.

What a Surprise (J. Stanley)

Some systematic confirmation of the obvious. This research continues earlier work showing similar findings for African-Americans (available here).

A New Blog Devoted to McDowell's Philosophy...

...here.  Take that Jerry Fodor!

Should Faculty Up for Tenure Apply for Jobs Elsewhere? (Leiter)

MOVING TO FRONT FROM YESTERDAY TO ENCOURAGE MORE COMMENTS

A tenure-track faculty member at a good department recently wrote to me, reporting that a tenured colleague elsewhere thought "it was standard to go on the job market the year that one was up for tenure whatever one thought of one's chances":

His reasons [for saying this]: the unpleasantness of hanging around and the advantages of giving oneself more shots at the market if one gets denied tenure, the potential pressure on one's home institution created by an outside offer, and the general increase in visibility. He also claimed that one should apply only to roughly peer institutions to avoid indicating a lack of confidence. I have heard similar things from others. But I did just want to get your opinion. Does all the above sound right to you? One further question: should one only apply for tenured positions because applying for tenure-track positions also gives the wrong signal that one is not confident?

I am curious what philosophers with experience think about this.  My impression is that junior faculty up for tenure, especially though not exclusively at departments where tenure is often denied, do usually make a selective search that same year, applying for both tenure-track and tenured posts at "peer" departments in a very capacious sense of peer (e.g., someone up for tenure at one of the very top departments might apply for tenure-track jobs at any of the top 20-30 PhD-granting departments).  But I am not really confident that my impression is accurate.  Input from others would no doubt be helpful to many junior faculty who face this question.  Non-anonymous posts will be be preferred, as usual, though substantive and well-informed anonymous posts may also be approved.  Please post only once, as comments may take awhile to appear.  (As readers may have inferred from the dearth of postings lately, things are a bit hectic currently.)

Friday Poem: "Expectation"

Expectation

It was all a mistake

Lines around the building
Phones ringing without rest
Mailbags in the doorway
Not to mention faxes
And the internet

And we responsible for the records
Sitting at our desks
Confounded by the fuss

Unauthorized
We denied all callers
Refused admittance to the crowd
Opened no envelopes
Pulled the plug on the rest

We waited for instructions
As we had been taught

Then a message
From someone in authority

It was all a mistake
Tell all comers
Whatever it was it isn't
That's that

Which is what we did
And went about our business
Following the rules

What we had we filed
We accepted no more
Soon we reported
Normalcy restored

11/27-12/1/95, 6/1/98
Copyright 1998 by Maurice Leiter
Posted with permission

New NEH Awards to Philosophers

The National Endowment for the Humanities has announced its Fellowships for University and College Teachers.  A good year, it seems, for philosophers!  Those who won support are Jonathan Adler (Brooklyn College/CUNY); Lisa Downing (Ohio State); Alan Goldman (William & Mary); Paul Horwich (NYU); Alfred Mele (Florida State); Dennis Sepper (Dallas); and Iain Thomson (New Mexico).  (If I missed someone while scanning through the lists, please let me know.)

Of local interest, five scholars from the University of Texas at Austin--something of a record, I suspect, for a single year--won Fellowships for University Teachers this year; the norm has been 2-3.

Ted Nugent Comes to Texas... (Leiter)

...and embarrasses the (already embarrassing) Governor.  A grown-up might have anticipated this problem.

Rice Makes Bid for Leading Aristotle Scholar Rapp from Germany

The Department of Philosophy at Rice University--which is looking to fill two Chairs this year--has voted out an offer to Christof Rapp at the Humboldt University of Berlin.  Rapp is a leading Aristotle scholar, who also works in ethics and metaphysics.

Scholars affirm congressional war powers; UK chief prosecutor affirms police power (Edmundson)

A group of leading constitutional and legal scholars has endorsed a letter to leaders of Congress, (drafted by my colleague Neil Kinkopf) reminding them of their extensive powers over the conduct of the Iraq war.  The diverse group includes Bruce Ackerman (Yale), Ronald Dworkin (NYU and UCL), Richard Epstein (Chicago), and--in spirit at least--James Madison, who long ago wrote:

the constitution supposes what the History of all Gov[ernments] demonstrates, that the Ex[ecutive] is the branch of power most interested in war, & most prone to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the question of war in the Legisl[ative branch].

Meanwhile, Sir Ken Macdonald, the Director of Public Prosecutions in the UK, eloquently dismisses the notion that there is a "war on terror" in progress, according to the Guardian (Jan. 24):

[Sir Ken] acknowledged that the country faced a different and more dangerous threat than in the days of IRA terrorism and that it had "all the disturbing elements of a death cult psychology".

But he said: "It is critical that we understand that this new form of terrorism carries another more subtle, perhaps equally pernicious, risk. Because it might encourage a fear-driven and inappropriate response. By that I mean it can tempt us to abandon our values. I think it important to understand that this is one of its primary purposes."

Sir Ken pointed to the rhetoric around the "war on terror" - which has been adopted by Tony Blair and ministers after being coined by George Bush - to illustrate the risks.

He said: "London is not a battlefield. Those innocents who were murdered on July 7 2005 were not victims of war. And the men who killed them were not, as in their vanity they claimed on their ludicrous videos, 'soldiers'. They were deluded, narcissistic inadequates. They were criminals. They were fantasists. We need to be very clear about this. On the streets of London, there is no such thing as a 'war on terror', just as there can be no such thing as a 'war on drugs'.

"The fight against terrorism on the streets of Britain is not a war. It is the prevention of crime, the enforcement of our laws and the winning of justice for those damaged by their infringement."

It is worth emphasizing that the Bush-Blair posture breaches two lines: the line between fighting war and fighting crime, and the line between executive and legislative power to decide whom and how to fight, and over what.

Get your own Metaphysicians!

The Department of Philosophy at Princeton University has voted out offers to Ted Sider (Rutgers) and Dean Zimmerman (Rutgers).

Weinberg on Dawkins (Leiter)

The physicist Steven Weinberg here at UT Austin has a review in the TLS of the much-maligned Dawkins book The God Delusion.  Weinberg makes a different, and interesting, criticism:

Where I think Dawkins goes wrong is that, like Henry V after Agincourt, he does not seem to realize the extent to which his side has won. Setting aside the rise of Islam in Europe, the decline of serious Christian belief among Europeans is so widely advertised that Dawkins turns to the United States for most of his examples of unregenerate religious belief. He attributes the greater regard for religion in the US to the fact that Americans have never had an established Church, an idea he may have picked up from Tocqueville. But although most Americans may be sure of the value of religion, as far as I can tell they are not very certain about the truth of what their own religion teaches. According to a recent article in the New York Times, American evangelists are in despair over a poll that showed that only 4 per cent of American teenagers will be “Bible-believing Christians” as adults. The spread of religious toleration provides evidence of the weakening of religious certitude. Most Christian groups have historically taught that there is no salvation without faith in Christ. If you are really sure that anyone without such faith is doomed to an eternity of Hell, then propagating that faith and suppressing disbelief would logically be the most important thing in the world – far more important than any merely secular virtues like religious toleration. Yet religious toleration is rampant in America. No one who publicly expressed disrespect for any particular religion could be elected to a major office.

Even though American atheists might have trouble winning elections, Americans are fairly tolerant of us unbelievers. My many good friends in Texas who are professed Christians do not even try to convert me. This might be taken as evidence that they don’t really mind if I spend eternity in Hell, but I prefer to think (and Baptists and Presbyterians have admitted it to me) that they are not all that certain about Hell and Heaven. I have often heard the remark (once from an American priest) that it is not so important what one believes; the important thing is how we treat each other. Of course, I applaud this sentiment, but imagine trying to explain “not important what one believes” to Luther or Calvin or St Paul. Remarks like this show a massive retreat of Christianity from the ground it once occupied, a retreat that can be attributed to no new revelation, but only to a loss of certitude.

Much of the weakening of religious certitude in the Christian West can be laid at the door of science; even people whose religion might incline them to hostility to the pretensions of science generally understand that they have to rely on science rather than religion to get things done.

(Thanks to Varol Akman for the pointer.)

Another Philosophy Blog Enters the Fray...

...this one hosted by the Department of Philosophy at the University of North Florida, with a particular focus on philosophical events etc. in Florida.

Blog Watch (Leiter)

The Accidental Blogger is covering anti-Indian racism in Britain, "right-wing psychoanalysis," and the machinations of the Bushistas in the fake war on terror.

"The 50 Most Loathsome People in America, 2006" (Leiter)

The reader who sent me this list summed it up accurately:  "very crazy, very funny."  (I have to warn that a quarter of their targets I've never even heard of.)  With some justice, they name the far right Arizona Senator John McCain as "the most loathsome," noting:

The most consistently mischaracterized politician in the country, even McCain’s most nakedly self-serving machinations are universally hailed as the bold moves of an independent maverick who really, really, like, cares, man. By virtue of his five-year stay at the Hanoi Hilton and a completely ineffectual campaign finance reform bill (which was itself only PR damage control for his long-forgotten role in the Keating         Five), McCain has so successfully snowed America the he could go around kicking puppies all day and he’d be applauded for his authenticity.   In reality, McCain is as phony as slimeballs come, having reversed his  positions on Roe v. Wade, Bush’s tax cuts, the gay marriage amendment and Jerry Falwell in the last year alone, while the mainstream press looked away and whistled nonchalantly.

Bill Gates--who discovered philanthropy as soon as Microsoft became the target of a highly-publicized antitrust legal action--gets a good thrashing too:

As founder and co-chair of The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, he’s fighting global poverty and disease by investing in corporations that are the source of global poverty and disease. According to the L.A. Times, The BMGF has over $9 billion invested in companies whose activities contradict the foundation’s stated mission.

Nancy Pelosi, poster girl for spineless Democrats, is also pegged:

[She has] betrayed her supposed San Francisco values by sweeping the prospect of a well-deserved impeachment "off the table" and preemptively castrating the investigations she simultaneously promised. Anyone who thinks this brittle fundraising machine with the safest seat this side of North Korea is going to implement any ethics  reform beyond the paltriest possible cosmetic gesture needs to lay off the medicinal marijuana.

They have a good line on the pathological liar David Horowitz--"Like most fascist converts, Horowitz sees disseminating information as an act of treason. His favorite targets are university professors he declares enemies of "academic freedom," because nothing is more dangerous to a neocon than someone who actually knows what they’re talking about"--as well as apt remarks about Rush Limbaugh, Senator Lieberman and Ann Coulter, though these are not quotable for the family audience this blog attracts.  The remarks about Cindy Sheehan are stupid--but, as my correspondent said, this list is both "very crazy" and often "very funny."  Perhaps the funniest is #16 on the list--"You"--which is their Menckenesque characterization of the typical reader of InstaIgnorance or viewer of Fox News or (dare we note?) devotee of the New York Times:

Your whole life has been a pitiful exercise in rote mimicry, a meek subjugation of individuality in exchange for herd approval. Your delusions of "common sense" wisdom stem from an unwillingness to seek information and an inability to critically analyze it. You never hesitate to offer strong opinions on subjects you don’t know a damn thing about. You’re willing to believe anything a guy in a suit says on TV, as long as it        doesn’t hint at your culpability in the negligent homicide of your country and planet or otherwise cloud your streak-free conscience. You’re more  worried about friction on the "Desperate Housewives" set than the lack of health coverage at your tedious, soul-destroying job. You have no idea what is going on in the world, and you’re fine with that. You are why democracy doesn’t work.

Friday Poem: "Epitaph"

Epitaph

He insisted on placing an epitaph on his ashes
Who could deny him this expectation
While he still lived
Afterwards is a different matter

He disliked the cold the heat as well
There were few places he could live
No matter he said because wherever he was
He was elsewhere all the same

He loved poetry
But grew impatient with his contemporaries
His complaint: they didn't write about anything
By which he meant anything that mattered

This was symptomatic of his austerity
He desired little for himself
Even companionship  except for children
He would have been happy to be one of them

In many respects old-fashioned
Just now in error (?) he wrote old-vanished
Yet prided himself on what he termed his anarchism
His long-standing unadorned and thorough radicalism

Having lived alongside a plethora of American wars
Spain Korea Vietnam Iraq Greenland? France?
Couldn't remember but knew that all wars are lost
Only the dead survive the living are forgotten

And of the epitaph was there nothing to tell
And about whom to tell it  The man he is
Not the man he was even his childhood unlike him
So in the end he wrote Anon  and then anon

12/5, 12/9/04, 1/5-1/6/05
Copyright 2005 by Maurice Leiter
Posted with permission.

Jaywalking historian brought to heel (Edmundson)

Felipe Fernandez-Armesto (History, Tufts) recounts his recent occasion to reflect upon our duty to obey the law. 

What are we trying to do when we make a philosophical argument? (Leiter)

John Martin Fischer (UC Riverside) discusses the issue here (with particular reference to a recent treatment of the topic by Peter van Inwagen [Notre Dame]).

Warburton Interviews Blackburn

Here.

Philosophy of Social Science in the PGR (Leiter)

James Bohman (Saint Louis University), Paul Roth (UC Santa Cruz), Stephen Turner (South Florida) and Alison Wylie (Washington/Seattle) sent me the following thoughtful letter regarding the current specialty ratings for Philosophy of Social Science.  I am posting it here with their permission and hope to solicit other opinions from experts.  Here is their letter:

We write with some suggestions for reframing the specialty area, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. In particular, we urge that it be construed more broadly; the slate of the raters and the results reported in the most recent Philosophical Gourmet Report suggest an emphasis on philosophy of economics and rational choice/decision theoretic approaches. These are certainly important components of this subfield but, in the course of organizing the 1998 NEH Summer Institute on Philosophy of Social science and, subsequently, running  the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable we’ve been impressed by the breadth and dynamism of philosophical work on the social sciences that lies outside these areas of interest and that comprises the core of what is now a fairly well defined and stable field of research and teaching interest in English-language philosophy. Here’s our thinking about the nature of this field; some recommendations follow.

As represented at the Roundtable, in the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, and in several recent anthologies, this subfield integrates philosophical analysis of fields in the social sciences that range from qualitative (ethnographic) research programs in anthropology and historical inquiry, through the experimental research traditions now flourishing in social psychology, economics, and physical anthropology, to various forms of quantitative survey-based and demographic research, and the formal modeling typical of some areas of political science, sociology, and economics. The traditions on which philosophers draw when they engage the social sciences are equally diverse: centrally, analytic philosophy of science, philosophy of language and action theory, social ontology and political philosophy, as well as continental traditions of critical theory, hermeneutics and phenomenology.

The intellectual core of the field, as it has taken shape in English-language philosophy, is defined by a set of questions about the relationship between the social and the natural sciences, and by the "logic and methodology" orientation that structures its relationship to the multiple disciplines it studies. The stability of this core is evident in the interests of key figures—from Mill to Popper and Habermas—whose work has defined the field, and in a standard set of topics articulated in pivotal debates between, for example, Winch and MacIntyre, Hollis and Lukes, Hempel and Dray. The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of the Social Sciences (2003), featured at the top of the PGR specialty rankings page for Philosophy of Social Science, includes, for example, essays on theory formation and scientific methodology in the social sciences, on competing models of explanation and of interpretative inquiry, on questions about agency and rationality, the status of claims about social institutions and of appeals to norms and practices, the viability of ideals of objectivity, value neutrality, and critical engagement in the social sciences. In this it builds on themes evident in the canonical Brodbeck anthology of 1968: theory construction, the role of laws in explanation, holism vs individualism, teleological and functional analysis, the role of values and of a “positive” research methodology in social inquiry. This slate of topics constitutes a stable and well-defined research field; a search for "philosophy of social science" on the Cambridge University Press website, and the contents of this subject area on the Routledge or Blackwell sites, yields results that illustrate these core topics. A search for on-line examples of syllabi for Philosophy of Social Science courses at the undergraduate and graduate level generates similar results.

We are concerned that the Philosophical Gourmet Report does not take the whole of this field into account but rather, as indicated at the outset, tends to equate philosophy of the social sciences with philosophy of economics and with applications of rational choice and decision theory in the social sciences. Of the six experts assembled to rate the field, only two list philosophy of the social sciences as an AOS. One of them identifies this as “philosophy of the social sciences and economics,” and the other specifies economics as his primary interest in the field; both are centrally involved in philosophy of biology and indicate a particular interest in evolutionary theory. A third is an eminent philosopher of economics who also teaches broadly in philosophy of the social sciences. A fourth has published on economics but lists his AOS as philosophy of science and history of philosophy. And the final two are chiefly known for their work in decision theory, game theory, and theories of rational deliberation. Although these latter specializations bear on issues central to philosophy of the social sciences, we note that “Decision, Rational Choice and Game Theory” is a separately ranked specialty in the PGR. We are concerned that the distinction between this specialty and “Philosophy of Social Science” has been elided, and that the broad range of philosophical work that focuses on social sciences other than economics is not well represented.

Judging by the response to the Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable in the eight years it has been running, these are significant gaps. We routinely review 40 to 50 abstracts submitted by self-identified philosophers of social science for each annual Rountable; we select 10 to 12 of these for the program and publish 4 to 6 of these as an annual special issue of the journal, Philosophy of the Social Sciences. Of the 37 papers we will have published from the Roundtable programs when the 8th special issue appears (March 2007), there is roughly an even balance between analyses that focus on anthropology, sociology, social and developmental psychology, political science, history, and economics (there are 4 to 5 papers in each area, excluding several papers that are not discipline-specific). By topic, these papers concentrate in several broad areas: social ontology (including holism vs individualism), models of explanation, rationality and normativity, and meta-methodological topics (including ideals of objectivity, theory evaluation, and the role of values). Papers on topics in philosophy of economics, rational choice and decision theory are certainly in the mix, but they are a distinct minority given the range of other topics and social scientific fields represented. Our selections at each stage are governed by considerations of quality, not topic, so we expect that the sample of published papers is broadly representative, by area and topic, of the pool of submissions attracted by our annual call for papers.

It should be noted that the Roundtable call for papers draws submissions from philosophers of social science based in universities across North America, the U.K., Scandinavia, eastern and western Europe and, in a few instances, from Australia and New Zealand, so the resulting programs and publications represent a broad cross-section of English-language philosophy of social science. Most important, from the point of view of Philosophical Gourmet Report (as a guide for students selecting graduate programs), roughly a third of those who contribute to the Roundtable and the special issues of PoSS are young scholars; new PhD’s or advanced graduate students seek out the Roundtable because it is one of very few meetings (and the only one run on an annual basis) that provides them access to a broad spectrum of current work in philosophy of the social sciences. Their interests represent the growing edge of the field, and these track the distribution of topics we have described as the stable core of field.

The guiding principle at work in the ranking of programs by specialties, as described in the Philosophical Gourmet Report, is that each specialized field should be evaluated by experts in that field. If Philosophy of Social Science is not to be an exception to this principle it will be important to broaden the range of expertise included in the panel of raters so that it better reflects the balance of interests and core problems that animate the field. To do this effectively we recommend that a clearer distinction be drawn between philosophy of social science and decision theory and its applications, and that there be a stronger representation of philosophical interests in social sciences other than economics. Those members of the rating panel who identify philosophy of social science as an area of specialization would no doubt be able to make more specific suggestions along these lines, and the anthologies, journals, and conference programs we’ve mentioned all offer extensive lists of faculty teaching in these areas in graduate programs.

Professors Bohman, Roth, Turner, and Wylie articulate some concerns I had had about this specialty area, which is why I asked their permission to make their informative letter public.  I would welcome comments from other philosophers working in and around philosophy of the social sciences.  Non-anonymous comments will be very strongly preferred, and comments may take awhile to appear, so please post only once.

Milne from Edinburgh to Stirling

Peter Milne (Logic, Probability Theory), previously Reader in Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, has accepted a Chair in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Stirling, where he will start next month.

Littlejohn on Plantinga on Dawkins (Leiter)

Good stuff.

Congressman Ron Paul (R-Texas) on Bush's War-Mongering (Leiter)

Thank goodness there is at least one actual libertarian in Congress who is willing to turn an appropriately skeptical eye to the nonsense that emanates from the White House:

While the president’s announcement that an additional 20,000 troops would be sent to Iraq dominated the headlines last week, the real story was the president’s sharp rhetoric towards Iran and Syria.  And recent moves by the administration only serve to confirm the likelihood of a wider conflict in the Middle East.            

The president stated last week that, “Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending  its territorial integrity –  and stabilizing the region in the face of the extremist challenge. This begins with addressing Iran and Syria.” He also announced the deployment of an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the Persian Gulf, and the deployment of  Patriot air missile defense systems to countries in the Middle East.    Meanwhile, US troops stormed the Iranian consulate in Iraq and detained several Iranian diplomats. Taken together, the message was clear:  the administration intends to move the US closer to a dangerous and ill-advised conflict with Iran.            

As I said last week on the House floor, speculation in Washington focuses on when,        not if, either Israel or the U.S. will bomb Iran – possibly with nuclear weapons. The accusation sounds very familiar: namely, that Iran possesses weapons of mass destruction. Iran has never been found in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and our own Central Intelligence Agency says Iran is more than ten years away from producing any kind of nuclear weapon. Yet we are told we must act immediately while we still can!          

This all sounds very familiar, but many of my colleagues don’t seem to have learned much from the invasion of Iraq. House Democrats strongly criticized the Iraq troop surge after the president’s announcement, but then praised the president’s confrontational words condemning Iran....

We need to reject the increasingly shrill rhetoric coming from the same voices who urged the president to invade Iraq.             

The truth is that Iran, like Iraq, is a third-world nation without a significant military. Nothing in history hints that she is likely to invade a neighboring country, let alone America or Israel. I am concerned, however, that a contrived Gulf of Tonkin-type incident may occur to gain popular support for an attack on Iran.

He is not the only one so concerned.  I reitreate my hope that we are all wrong.

Deja Vu All Over Again: King on Vietnam

MOVING TO THE FRONT FROM JANUARY 16, 2006

Today is the official Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday in the United States.  Here are remarks Dr. King made in 1967 regarding the criminal and immoral war in Vietnam:

The war in Vietnam is but a symptom of a far deeper malady within the American spirit, and if we ignore this sobering reality [applause], and if we ignore this sobering reality, we will find ourselves organizing "clergy and laymen concerned" committees for the next generation. They will be concerned about Guatemala and Peru. They will be concerned about Thailand and Cambodia. They will be concerned about Mozambique and South Africa. We will be marching for these and a dozen other names and attending rallies without end unless there is a significant and profound change in American life and policy. [sustained applause] So such thoughts take us beyond Vietnam, but not beyond our calling as sons of the living God.

In 1957 a sensitive American official overseas said that it seemed to him that our nation was on the wrong side of a world revolution. During the past ten years we have seen emerge a pattern of suppression which has now justified the presence of U.S. military advisors in Venezuela. This need to maintain social stability for our investments accounts for the counterrevolutionary action of American forces in Guatemala. It tells why American helicopters are being used against guerrillas in Cambodia and why American napalm and Green Beret forces have already been active against rebels in Peru.

It is with such activity in mind that the words of the late John F. Kennedy come back to haunt us. Five years ago he said, "Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable." [applause] Increasingly, by choice or by accident, this is the role our nation has taken, the role of those who make peaceful revolution impossible by refusing to give up the privileges and the pleasures that come from the immense profits of overseas investments. I am convinced that if we are to get on the right side of the world revolution, we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values. We must rapidly begin [applause], we must rapidly begin the shift from a thing-oriented society to a person-oriented society. When machines and computers, profit motives and property rights, are considered more important than people, the giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism, and militarism are incapable of being conquered.

A true revolution of values will soon cause us to question the fairness and justice of many of our past and present policies. On the one hand we are called to play the Good Samaritan on life's roadside, but that will be only an initial act. One day we must come to see that the whole Jericho Road must be transformed so that men and women will not be constantly beaten and robbed as they make their journey on life's highway. True compassion is more than flinging a coin to a beggar. It comes to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs restructuring. [applause]

A true revolution of values will soon look uneasily on the glaring contrast of poverty and wealth. With righteous indignation, it will look across the seas and see individual capitalists of the West investing huge sums of money in Asia, Africa, and South America, only to take the profits out with no concern for the social betterment of the countries, and say, "This is not just." It will look at our alliance with the landed gentry of South America and say, "This is not just." The Western arrogance of feeling that it has everything to teach others and nothing to learn from them is not just.

A true revolution of values will lay hand on the world order and say of war, "This way of settling differences is not just." This business of burning human beings with napalm, of filling our nation's homes with orphans and widows, of injecting poisonous drugs of hate into the veins of peoples normally humane, of sending men home from dark and bloody battlefields physically handicapped and psychologically deranged, cannot be reconciled with wisdom, justice, and love. A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death. [sustained applause]

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Why Do I Ever Talk to Journalists? Or More Nonsense in Print about Philosophy (Leiter)

Jason links to the latest New York Times article on the PGR, which is mainly about how well Rutgers did.  I spoke months ago to the reporter.  He didn't mention he was going to include this piece of self-serving bullshit in his article:

Dr. McLaughlin said that Rutgers is better in analytic philosophy — things like philosophy of the mind and language — while Princeton excels in more historic areas.

Some universities known to have good departments, like Penn State, Stony Brook and Vanderbilt, do not participate in the ratings.

“Schools like Rutgers and N.Y.U. emphasize analytic philosophy, and most of the evaluators emphasize that, so schools like Vanderbilt and Northwestern and Penn State, which don’t, aren’t going to do as well,” said John J. Stuhr, a philosophy professor at Vanderbilt. “It’s like asking about the best painters of all time. If you asked Cubists, you would get a list of Cubists; Impressionists, the same thing. I’m sure Rutgers has a good department. It just doesn’t emphasize what we do.”

I'm sure Brian McLaughlin didn't say anything as ridiculous as he is represented as saying here (it was probably something closer to Rutgers ranked better in areas like mind & language), but what is more appalling is the nonsense about Penn State, Stony Brook, and Vanderbilt.  First of all, they don't have good departments, they have weak departments overall (with honorable exceptions etc. etc. etc.)--certainly relative to other PhD-granting departments--and that's true whether you're interested in philosophy of language or ancient philosophy or Continental philosophy.  Second, it is simply false that "they do not participate in the ratings."  Each of them have been included in the ratings, and each time they fared quite poorly overall, even if they each have some areas of strength.

But most breathtaking is John Stuhr's idiotic comment that Rutgers "doesn't emphasize what we do," where "we" means Vanderbilt.  It is true that Rutgers doesn't much emphasize history of philosophy or Continental philosophy (that's why NYU is #1, and Rutgers #2), but how could that explain why Vanderbilt has never been close to the top 50 and barely rates in any historical areas?  The difference between Rutgers and Vanderbilt isn't "emphasis":  it's that Vanderbilt has a weak faculty for a PhD program, even in most of the areas it purports to "emphasize" like post-Kantian Continental philosophy.  (Rutgers, by the way, is obviously much stronger in the history of ancient and early modern philosophy than Vanderbilt; only in American pragmatism does Vanderbilt have an edge.)  One would need only ask the dozens of philosophers specializing in those areas who completed the PGR surveys, after all.

I realize that journalists think that being even-handed means quoting self-serving dissemblers to get their "perspective."   And I realize that Professor Stuhr, confronted with a university administration that has realized its Philosophy Department has been selling it a fraudulent bill of goods, must say whatever is necessary to preserve the status quo.  Even so, it's a bit much for a reporter to "report" that some universities are "known to have good departments" when there is no evidence that this is true.

Professor Wilshire's characteristically sniping comments warrant separate comment, though I shall simply quote what I've written previously about his longstanding hostility to philosophy:

[I]n conversation with various philosophers, it has become apparent to me that most–-even those interested in Continental philosophy–-have almost no idea how utterly weird are the interests of Professor Wilshire & co. Many philosophers seem to take at face value the assertion of the "pluralist" clique that they represent Continental     philosophy, when what they really represent is a quite strange infatuation with an idiosyncratic version of phenomenological practice that is everywhere else (including in most of Europe) defunct; an equally idiosyncratic appropriation of American pragmatism (in which James looms large, and Peirce almost vanishes); and an affection for "New Age" flakiness (see, e.g., Professor Wilshire on Native American mysticism in Fashionable Nihilism, or the commitment to the importance of shaman healing practices in The Primal Roots of American Philosophy). This strange brew is then superimposed upon a sophomoric understanding of all the rest of philosophy, both historical and contemporary.    

Professor Wilshire's "scholarship" is a case in point: he completely misreads Nietzsche in to his strange version of phenomenological practice, the one that is defunct almost everywhere outside the SPEP coterie; he accuses analytic philosophers, as a class, with "scientism: the belief that only science can know" (Fashionable Nihilism, p. 51), apparently unaware of the dozens of major, self-described "analytic" philosophers who   are critics (far better critics than Wilshire) of scientism in its various forms (Alvin Plantinga, George Bealer, John McDowell, Hilary Putnam, Thomas Nagel, etc.); he laments that "Husserl's hope to stave off nihilism by locating all special studies…in a thematized and honored matrix of prescientific phenomena and meanings was short-circuited, forgotten, or ridiculed" (Fashionable Nihilism, p. 76), showing no awareness of the substantial philosophical critique of Husserlian phenomenology by both Continental and Anglophone philosophers that, justifiably, sealed its grave; he claims    "phenomenological description must precede scientific explanation" (87), but offers no argument for that proposition (or any other). This is not philosophy: this is some superficial and dated learning, mixed with name-dropping, dogmatic assertion and avoidance of any philosophical debate through the ruse of always accusing the opposition of succumbing to "fashion" or "bias."

That anyone should think this represents Continental philosophy would be a catastrophe! As Julian Young, one of the leading contemporary scholars of 19th and 20th-century German philosophy, has written, "The Continental tradition contains most of the great, truly synoptic, European thought of the past 200 years." Anyone who read Professor Wilshire would never know, alas, why that is true.

There is, as I know all too well, a lot of pathetic parochialness among self-identified "analytic" philosophers, to be sure, but the alternative isn't to open up "philosophy" to Wilshire's kind of sophomoric nonsense.

Rutgers Philosophy in the New York Times (J. Stanley)

Here. I'm pleased to see the article. But there are a definitely some confusions. I was particularly annoyed by the "definition" of analytic philosophy as ahistorical philosophy, and the absurd insinuation that philosophers at Penn State, Northwestern, and Stony Brook are better historians than the philosophers at so-called "analytic" departments ranked in historical areas in the Gourmet Report. Surely it doesn't take too much journalistic fact-finding to discover that this is false. If there were no rankings, would people actually give these claims some kind of credibility?

Warburton Blog

Nigel Warburton, a philosopher at the Open University in the U.K., has a blog.  Warburton has done a lot to educate the reading public, especially in Britain, about philosophy.

The Proposed U.S. Troop "Surge" in Iraq (Leiter)

So as everyone knows, Dick Cheney, through his spokesman George W. Bush, has decided that the proper response to the resounding electoral defeat of the President's policy in Iraq this past November and the recommendations of the bi-partisan committee led by Daddy Bush's right-hand man James Baker III is to ignore all of it and escalate the war.  (Bush's speech itself is too absurd to warrant extended comment, beyond the obvious points Juan Cole makes in his first paragraph here.  Reading my comments on prior displays like this would do just as well.) 

My colleagues who are students of the political process believe that the Democrats will flex their new political muscle by...approving the funds necessary.  (If any readers live in democratic societies, where elections matter, please write and share your experiences about what that is like.)  Outside of the war-mongering far right in America (which is far louder and more prominent than its actual electoral strength), domestic reaction has been critical, but not, it seems to me, in very compelling ways.  Paul Krugman, for example, here betrays his limited ideological horizons in assessing the proposal for escalation of the war:

The only real question about the planned “surge” in Iraq — which is better described as a Vietnam-style escalation — is whether its proponents are cynical or delusional.

Senator Joseph Biden, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, thinks they’re cynical. He recently told The Washington Post that administration officials are simply running out the clock, so that the next president will be “the guy landing helicopters inside the Green Zone, taking people off the roof.”

Daniel Kahneman, who won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science for his research on irrationality in decision-making, thinks they’re delusional. Mr. Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon recently argued in Foreign Policy magazine that the administration’s unwillingness to face reality in Iraq reflects a basic human aversion to cutting one’s losses — the same instinct that makes gamblers stay at the table, hoping to break even....

Well, we don’t have to settle the question. Either way, what’s clear is the enormous price our nation is paying for President Bush’s character flaws.

I began writing about the Bush administration’s infallibility complex, the president’s Captain Queeg-like inability to own up to mistakes, almost a year before the invasion of Iraq. When you put a man like that in a position of power — the kind of position where he can punish people who tell him what he doesn’t want to hear, and base policy decisions on the advice of people who play to his vanity — it’s a recipe for disaster.

Is that really the best Krugman can do:  reduce the whole thing to one man's (admittedly defective) character?  Psychological explanations often make sense, especially when no rationalizing explanations are in the offing.  But Krugman, an economist by training, ought to take seriously for a moment the thought that states and leaders of states are sometimes rational maximizers of their interests, and consider whether there isn't a quite rational explanation for the escalation of the war.

Part of the difficulty here is that the "public" discussion of  Iraq in the U.S. is so thoroughly infantilized, so weighed down by outright lies (e.g., the Iraq war is part of the [fake] war on terror) or self-serving myths (e.g., the purpose of the war was to liberate the people of Iraq), that the basic facts openly discussed everywhere else in the world--for example, that Iraq has the second largest proven reserves of oil in the world; that the U.S. faces increasing competition for energy resources from China and India; and that the U.S. has been establishing permanent military bases in Iraq since shortly after the invasion--make it clear why the U.S. would, from the standpoint of rational self-interest, not want a fundamentalist, Iran-style regime in Iraq, or even a genuinely independent Iraq, one that might not welcome U.S. military presence in perpetuity.  As another commentator, more cosmopolitan than Professor Krugman, has observed:

As is obvious to anyone not committed to the party line, taking control of Iraq will enormously strengthen US power over global energy resources, a crucial lever of world control. Suppose that Iraq were to become sovereign and democratic. Imagine the policies it would be likely to pursue. The Shia population in the South, where much of Iraq's oil is, would have a predominant influence. They would prefer friendly relations with Shia Iran.

The relations are already close. The Badr brigade, the militia that mostly controls the south, was trained in Iran. The highly influential clerics also have long- standing relations with Iran, including Sistani, who grew up there. And the Shia-dominant interim government has already begun to establish economic and possibly military relations with Iran.

Furthermore, right across the border in Saudi Arabia is a substantial, bitter Shia population. Any move toward independence in Iraq is likely to increase efforts to gain a degree of autonomy and justice there, too. This also happens to be the region where most of Saudi Arabia's oil is. The outcome could be a loose Shia alliance comprising Iraq, Iran and the major oil regions of Saudi Arabia, independent of Washington and controlling large portions of the world's oil reserves. It's not unlikely that an independent bloc of this kind might follow Iran's lead in developing major energy projects jointly with China and India.

Looked at this way, Bush's efforts to escalate the war are completely instrumentally rational and require no psychologizing about the man's character:  if the actual objective is to secure U.S. military influence and control over energy resources, then the war must go on until threat to such influence and control is destroyed.  If we had an actual opposition party in the United States, perhaps these points would be aired publically, and then public discussion would focus on the moral propriety of letting these kinds of objectives steer policy.

UPDATE:  There is a sharp critique of the appalling news coverage of the Bush speech here.  And this item from last Sunday's Independent in London is pertinent:

The Independent on Sunday has learnt that the Iraqi government is about to push through a law giving Western oil companies the right to exploit the country's massive oil reserves.                                         

And Iraq's oil reserves, the third largest in the world, with an estimated 115 billion barrels waiting to be extracted, are a prize worth having. As Vice-President Dick Cheney noted in 1999, when he was still running Halliburton, an oil services company, the Middle East is the key to preventing the world running out of oil.

Now, unnoticed by most amid the furore over civil war in Iraq and the hanging of Saddam Hussein, the new oil law has quietly been going through several drafts, and is now on the point of being presented to the cabinet and then the parliament in Baghdad. Its provisions are a radical departure from the norm for developing countries: under a system known as "production-sharing agreements", or PSAs, oil majors such as BP and Shell in Britain, and Exxon and Chevron in the US, would be able to sign deals of up to 30 years to extract Iraq's oil.

PSAs allow a country to retain legal ownership of its oil, but gives a share of profits to the international companies that invest in infrastructure and operation of the wells, pipelines and refineries. Their introduction would be a first for a major Middle Eastern oil producer. Saudi Arabia and Iran, the world's number one and two oil exporters, both tightly control their industries through state-owned companies with no appreciable foreign collaboration, as do most members of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Opec....

[T]he new legislation was drafted with the assistance of BearingPoint, an American consultancy firm hired by the US government, which had a representative working in the American embassy in Baghdad for several months....

The draft went to the US government and major oil companies in July, and to the International Monetary Fund in September....

On 18 March 2003, with the invasion imminent, Tony Blair proposed the House of Commons motion to back the war. "The oil revenues, which people falsely claim that we want to seize, should be put in a trust fund for the Iraqi people administered through the UN," he said.  "The United Kingdom should seek a new Security Council Resolution that would affirm... the use of all oil revenues for the benefit of the Iraqi people."

That suggestion came to nothing. In May 2003, just after President Bush declared major combat operations at an end, under a banner boasting "Mission Accomplished", Britain co-sponsored a resolution in the Security Council which gave the US and UK control over Iraq's oil revenues. Far from "all oil revenues" being used for the Iraqi people, Resolution 1483 continued to make deductions from Iraq's oil earnings to pay compensation for the invasion of Kuwait in 1990....

The Independent on Sunday has obtained a copy of an early draft which was circulated to oil companies in July. It is understood there have been no significant changes made in the final draft. The terms outlined to govern future PSAs are generous: according to the draft, they could be fixed for at least 30 years....

Iraq's sovereign right to manage its own natural resources could also be threatened by the provision in the draft that any disputes with a foreign company must ultimately be settled by international, rather than Iraqi, arbitration.

In the July draft obtained by The Independent on Sunday, legislators recognise the controversy over this, annotating the relevant paragraph with the note, "Some countries do not accept arbitration between a commercial enterprise and themselves on the basis of sovereignty of the state."

It is not clear whether this clause has been retained in the final draft.

Under the chapter entitled "Fiscal Regime", the draft spells out that foreign companies have no restrictions on taking their profits out of the country, and are not subject to any tax when doing this.

"A Foreign Person may repatriate its exports proceeds [in accordance with the foreign exchange regulations in force at the time]." Shares in oil projects can also be sold to other foreign companies: "It may freely transfer shares pertaining to any non-Iraqi partners." The final draft outlines general terms for production sharing agreements, including a standard 12.5 per cent royalty tax for companies.

It is also understood that once companies have recouped their costs from developing the oil field, they are allowed to keep 20 per cent of the profits, with the rest going to the government. According to analysts and oil company executives, this is because Iraq is so dangerous, but Dr Muhammad-Ali Zainy, a senior economist at the Centre for Global Energy Studies, said: "Twenty per cent of the profits in a production sharing agreement, once all the costs have been recouped, is a large amount." In more stable countries, 10 per cent would be the norm.

While the costs are being recovered, companies will be able to recoup 60 to 70 per cent of revenue; 40 per cent is more usual....

Production sharing agreements of more than 30 years are unusual, and more commonly used for challenging regions like the Amazon where it can take up to a decade to start production. Iraq, in contrast, is one of the cheapest and easiest places in the world to drill for and produce oil. Many fields have already been discovered, and are waiting to be developed.  Analysts estimate that despite the size of Iraq's reserves - the third largest in the world - only 2,300 wells have been drilled in total, fewer than in the North Sea....

James Paul of Global Policy Forum, another advocacy group, said: "The US and the UK have been pressing hard on this. It's pretty clear that this is one of their main goals in Iraq." The Iraqi authorities, he said, were "a government under occupation, and it is highly influenced by that. The US has a lot of leverage... Iraq is in no condition right now to go ahead and do this."

Mr Paul added: "It is relatively easy to get the oil in Iraq. It is nowhere near as complicated as the North Sea. There are super giant fields that are completely mapped, [and] there is absolutely no exploration cost and no risk. So the argument that these agreements are needed to hedge risk is specious...."

Iraqi trade union leaders who met recently in Jordan suggested that the legislation would cause uproar once its terms became known among ordinary Iraqis.

"The Iraqi people refuse to allow the future of their oil to be decided behind closed doors," their statement said. "The occupier seeks and wishes to secure... energy resources at a time when the Iraqi people are seeking to determine their own future, while still under conditions of occupation...."

 Despite US and British denials that oil was a war aim, American troops were detailed to secure oil facilities as they fought their way to Baghdad in 2003. And while former defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld shrugged off the orgy of looting after the fall of Saddam's statue in Baghdad, the Oil Ministry - alone of all the seats of power in the Iraqi capital - was under American guard.

Halliburton, the firm that Dick Cheney used to run, was among US-based multinationals that won most of the reconstruction deals - one of its workers is pictured, tackling an oil fire. British firms won some contracts, mainly in security. But constant violence has crippled rebuilding operations. Bechtel, another US giant, has pulled out, saying it could not make a profit on work in Iraq....

"By 2010 we will need [a further] 50 million barrels a day. The Middle East, with two-thirds of the oil and the lowest cost, is still where the prize lies" Dick Cheney; US Vice-President

For Those Who Attended the Eastern APA...

...some information about hotel refunds for the night of the fire is here.

"When the moral facts are obvious, there is no need for philosophy" (Leiter)

So remarked the political philosopher Brian Barry (as quoted here).  This is a view for which, as longtime readers know, I have some sympathy.  Who can doubt, though, that in an era when every dimwit and moral leper has his own blog that there are, in fact, legions ready to "dispute" Barry's example of a case where no philosophy was needed because "the moral facts are obvious," namely, whether the use of nuclear weapons in war could be justified?

Harry Frankfurt on The Daily Show (Edmundson)

Harry Frankfurt (Philosophy, Princeton) plugs his new book, On Truth, on Comedy Central's The Daily Show--after the ad.  (Thanks to my colleague Andrew I. Cohen for the pointer.)

The Wittgenstein Fallacy Continued (J. Stanley)

I've received a lot of feedback on my post on The Wittgenstein Fallacy. Since I'm in Miami at the Fourth Annual Graduate Student Epistemology Conference, and the semester is about to begin, I didn't open comments. But Aidan McGlynn has continued discussion of the matter on Boundaries of Language, and I've also received many emails about it (for those that are curious, fans of Wittgenstein are for some reason VERY attached to the idea that Wittgenstein wouldn't have landed a job nowadays). At any rate, I'm going to post a couple of the most interesting emails that I have received, together with my replies. If you think you can best explain why Wittgenstein wouldn't get a job in a top philosophy department today, now is your chance to prove it.

"Nano-Philosophy"...

...the search for "very, very small philosophical questions."  Courtesy of Robert Stainton (Western Ontario) and his former colleagues from the University of Waterloo.

A 10-Year-Old Boy in Iraq Speaks (Leiter)

I recommend reading the whole thing, but here is a brief excerpt:

"I am 10 years old but I have not been to school for the past three years because I'm scared of the killings taking place in Iraq. Many of my friends have either been kidnapped or killed....

"Two weeks ago, a close friend of mine was killed while she was leaving the school with her father. A car with men wearing black crossed in front of them and the men shot them dead. It was horrible and there were many children at the school's gate at that time.

"I have two brothers, Amir and Younis. Both of them are in school. Amir, who is 13, says he is not afraid of killers or kidnappers and he has become a man and is not afraid. But Younis used to cry every day when he had to go to school with me. He is only seven but was seriously sad and traumatised from the violence but my parents don't understand this and used to force him to go with me anyway.

"I dream of leaving Iraq but this is only a dream because my parents are too poor to do that. Sometimes I think I will go crazy with the tension I have in my head and the pressure from all sides, especially from my mother who insists that I have to go to school to be someone important. Inside me I know that what I want is just to be away from this violence....

"I want to stay at home because somehow I will be safer. I prefer to be illiterate than to die or see a friend killed in front of me or maybe kidnapped and have my ears sent to my family as happened to one of my best friends three months ago."

The Wittgenstein Fallacy (J. Stanley)

In the comments section two posts down, my friend Aidan McGlynn cites Michael Dummett's famous quote making what I've come to call the Wittgenstein Fallacy. As Aidan writes:

Does the push away from conservative careful publishing mark a change in the attitudes held by philosophers, or is it rather a response to external pressures placed upon them by current system for advancing one's career in philosophy?...Dummett noted in the intro to 'Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics' that Wittgenstein wouldn't have fared too well in the current climate, given his reluctance to publish anything he'd written.

The Wittgenstein Fallacy is the claim that the profession of philosophy as currently practiced is somehow flawed, because a modern day Wittgenstein would not receive recognition or employment.

Would a modern day Wittgenstein succeed in our times? Wittgenstein was a student of Bertrand Russell at the height of his philosophical powers and professional reputation in the field, right after the publication of the Principia Mathematica and before he started publishing popular works. As a graduate student at Cambridge University, he not only dazzled Russell, but also Moore. Previously, he also had greatly impressed Gottlob Frege. He then went off to war, during which he wrote a book. After the war, the book was published, and immediately had a tremendous influence on the next generation of leading younger philosophers (such as Frank Ramsey and the emerging Logical Positivists). A modern day Wittgenstein would be, say, a graduate student at Princeton in the 1980s under David Lewis and Saul Kripke. His letter of recommendation from Lewis would note that Lewis abandoned a nearly finished book manuscript because of his trenchant criticisms. He would also have an outside letter praising his genius from a philosopher not at Princeton, who was admired by the very best mathematical philosophers (perhaps George Boolos?). As a very young man, right after graduate school, he would have written an enormously influential book, one that deeply influenced some of the best of the subsequent generation of younger philosophers and was soon recognized as a philosophical classic. He would also be bad-tempered, rather self-important, and not a very responsible colleague. Is the claim really that a modern day Wittgenstein wouldn't have tenure somewhere really quite respectable? There are various reasons why the Wittgenstein Fallacy is pernicious. It should be put to rest.

New Philosophers' Carnival is...

...here.

The Changing "Sociology" of the Philosophy Profession: Presentation Style, "Brilliant Loners" and Group Work, and the Empirical Facts (Leiter)

A senior philosopher wrote with the following interesting observations about "the changing sociology of the field," with particular regard to philosophy of language:
When I was in graduate school [in the 1960s], papers delivered to philosophy departments were almost always read out by the speaker from a typescript. This practice reflected a conception of the field in which it was judged important never to make a mistake—even if this was accomplished by saying little and saying it unintelligibly. This is changing of course, and some prominent younger philosophers are overturning this and other established practices and established ideas of philosophy. This generation is likely to see creativity and provocativeness as more important than being anal about every little detail, and this goes with publishing more and more flamboyantly rather than publishing little and conservatively. Another interesting generational change: the older generation had a myth of the brilliant loner producing insights out of the blue, whereas the younger generation is more communitarian, focusing more about projects that emerge out of group discussions. Another change in philosophy of language in particular is that the younger generation in philosophy of language thinks that philosophical mileage can be gotten out of linguistic facts in a way alien to many older philosophers. And in philosophy of mind and even ethics, there is much more emphasis on empirical work. These developments are not unconnected since practices in linguistics and psychology are much more communitarian than has been the case in philosophy.

Comments are open for other perspectives on these changes, both the extent to which my correspondent has accurately captured them, and the extent to which we should view them as good developments.  As usual, non-anonymous comments are preferred, and comments may take awhile to appear, so post only once.

 

Video Game for Xmas: Convert to Christianity or Die! (Leiter)

If you failed to put this under the tree for the kids a few weeks back, perhaps you can get a post-Xmas discount?  Story here:

Liberal and progressive Christian groups say a new computer game in which players must either convert or kill non-Christians is the wrong gift to give this holiday season