Guggenheim Foundation Biased Against M&E and "Technical" Areas of Philosophy?

Ned Block (Philosophy, NYU) writes:

I just got my copy of the Guggenheim Foundation report for 2004 and was shocked to find that by their own reckoning, they gave NO fellowships to philosophers in 2004.  A closer look at the list reveals that actually they gave one in 2004 to Peter Kivy whom they classified in the field of Literary Criticism!  Their web site shows, ostensibly, 3 awards in 2005 that involved philosophy, one to Eckart Förster on Kant and Hegel, one to Alexander Jones (who is a professor of classics, history and philosophy of science and technology) and one to Gerald Postema on philosophy of law.    Looking back over the last few years, there seems a strong bias against certain central non-historical areas of analytic philosophy. Since 2001: I counted only two that I would categorize in any of metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, mind, math, logic or science (and one of those two had a continental and probably historical aspect), even as they regularly give out 2 or 3 in many subfields of history and literature.  For example, in 2004, they gave out 3 in medieval literature plus another in medieval history, 3 in Iberian and Latin American history, 4 in near eastern studies, 2 in American literature, 2 in folklore and popular culture and 4 in history of science and technology. (These listings by fields are in the annual reports sent to former fellows but do not appear to be on the web. But the web does have an annual list for each year from 1925.)  A quick scan of the awards they have given since 1980 suggests a change of policy in the 1990s compared to the 1980s when awards in the areas of philosophy I mentioned were much more numerous as were total awards to philosophers.  I estimate that they gave out 50% more fellowships to philosophers in the 1980s than in the 1990s.  Maybe some of your readers will have some insight into what is going on that will lead to a letter to the Foundation.   The selection committee of 2004 was Neil J. Smelser, Roger D. Abrahams, Lynn A. Hunt, Jack Miles, Peter H. Raven and J. Robert Schrieffer.

An unknown here is how many philosophers have been applying for these awards.  Comments are open for any additional information or insight into what is going on here.  (Remember:  comments may take awhile to appear; please post only once.)

Comments

[G. Recco]

Cry me a river. The near-total dominance of M&E is not near-total enough? It must be dutifully reflected in every corner of the academic world? Selection committees must now be purified of rogue elements or have their names dragged through the dust? And what are some of the "impure" elements being complained about here? Work on philosophy of law, or Kant and Hegel? What is the presumption here: that these subfields ought to get to the back of the bus where they belong?

[Keith B.]

Well suppose the GF is indeed biased against M/E (broadly construed). So what? Aren't they entitled to the view that historically oriented scholarship is more important than the M/E stuff? Of course, such a preference expresses a certain conception of philosophy that not everyone will like.

On the other hand, the converse preference is equally well entrenched. The PGR, for example, exemplifies a clear bias in favor of M/E (what is often called the 'core areas'), which is borne out by the fact that departments which are very strong in M/E but have little capacities in historical areas (Rutgers, MIT) are ranked (much) higher than departments which have little capacities in M/E but exceptional strengths in historical areas (Chicago), or even than departments which have at least solid strengths in M/E and exceptional strengths in historical areas (Berkeley).

So, my question is: if there is nothing wrong with a bias in favor of M/E, why should an occasional bias against M/E, and in favor of historically oriented philosophy, not be equally legitimate? Times have been and are still hard for people who work in the history of philosophy in the Anglo-American world (I recall a recent relevant discussion on this blog). I find it puzzling that a foundation which encourages and supports such people should have to defend itself for such a practice. Of course, it all depends on the quality of the scholarship of the people who get the award. But there can be little doubt that Eckart Foerster's seminal work on Kant and Hegel exemplifies not just excellent scholarship but - also excellent philosophy (for those, like me, who still think that there is a connection here).

[Brian Leiter]

These first two comments are not directly responsive, though since they raise interesting issues and were not anonymous, I have decided to post them, though I hope this thread might also address the issue originally posed: e.g., have philosophers working in M&E of the caliber of, for example, Eckart Forster and Gerald Postema been applying for Guggenheims without success? I took that to be the issue of fairness that Professor Block was raising.

The PGR does not have a bias in favor of M&E, and I certainly don't personally. As data I printed in 2002 showed, and as Kieran Healy's analysis of PGR data from 2004 confirmed, historians of philosophy tend to evaluate departments about the same as those who work in M&E (who evaluate departments about the same as those who work in value theory and so on). The examples adduced above by Keith Buchanan seem to trade on slight mischaracterizations of the departments in question. Rutgers, in fact, covers both ancient and early modern, and while its M&E is as good as NYU's, it's historical coverage is not as strong overall, which explains why NYU outperforms Rutgers in the PGR. Chicago has "exceptional" strength in Kant and post-Kantian German philosophy, but not in all historical areas (take a look at the specialty evaluations). How do we compare a department like Chicago, with its largely (but not entirely) historical strengths, to a department like MIT, with its non-historical strengths? The PGR data suggests that there is a convergence in judgment among professionals that strength in metaphysics and epistemology (again, I'm speaking loosely) is, all things being equal, more important--though the NYU v. Rutgers (or v. MIT) results also suggest that, all things being equal, it's better to have substantial strength in M&E *and* history, than just the former. It would seem odd to call this professional sentiment "bias," even if one didn't share that judgment. And insofar as the PGR correctly reflects that judgment, it would be odder still to call that "bias." But, please, this isn't a thread about the PGR. The original question was whether the Guggenheim Foundation is rejecting the professional judgments of philosophers about the value of M&E in its awarding of fellowships.

[Keith B.]

Just some points: "...though the NYU v. Rutgers (or v. MIT) results also suggest that, all things being equal, it's better to have substantial strength in M&E *and* history, than just the former." Yes, but then again, the PGR also suggests that it is much better to have significant strengths in M/E and no significant strengths in historical areas than vice versa (otherwise, the rankings of MIT and Chicago would be inexplicable). This is what I meant.

But I agree this should not be a PGR discussion. My point was just: given the (as another poster puts it) "near-total dominance of M&E" in the Anglo-American philosophy world, I shall find it very healthy if a foundation like Guggenheim supports the somewhat repressed instances of historically oriented scholarship. (Of course, under the condition that it is good work which is being supported! But Foerster's work is seminal.)

The M/E people should relax and consider the fact that their dominance is well-entrenched and very close to becoming absolute. Why not grant those poor remaining history souls (they'll die out soon enough anyway) some last bastions of support? Isn't it enough that hiring practices at most research departments speak clearly and unambiguously in favor of M/E people? Why shouldn't it simply be tolerable that the GF has a somehwat different conception of what is significant philosophical work than the M/E people (again, as long as it is good work that is being supported)?

Of course, this does not cover all the concerns Professor Block raises. For he also says: "I estimate that they gave out 50% more fellowships to philosophers in the 1980s than in the 1990s." This, I take it, should be conceived as a real cause for concern among philosophers (meaning 'philosophers' as a whole, rather than history people versus M/E people).

[David Velleman]

Seems very unlikely to me that the Guggenheim Foundation can be charged with bias. There is a selection committee for the Fellowships. There is a method for selecting members of the selection committee. If the Guggenheim is like other national fellowships, the outgoing members of the committee have some input into the selection of their replacements. (So: I was appointed to a fellowshp selection committee at another foundation on the recommendation of an outgoing member who trusted my judgment, and when I cycled off the committeer I recommended a replacement whose judgment I trusted.) Such committees therefore tend to drift rather slowly in their tastes and interests, but they do drift. Maybe the Guggenheim selection committee has drifted into anti-M&E territory in recent years; it will drift out again in time. No big deal.

[Anonymous Philosopher]

M&E or M/E = Metaphysics and Epistemology??? Is that correct? I'm having trouble following the discussion as I have not seen that abbreviation before.

(The analytic/continental divide is/was bad enough for philosophy. If the analytic philosophers are now dividing themselves into camps it does not bode well for philosophy's future.)

[David Velleman]

Emails from colleagues indicate that my previous comment was badly written. Let me try again.

If there is bias, it isn't attributable to the Foundation; it may not even be attributable to the selection committee. The bias may be attributable, instead, to the method by which such committees are typically constituted -- a method that makes it more or less inevitable that they will go through phases of enthusiasm for some things and lack of enthusiasm for others. And if this hypothesis is correct, then the "bias" will drift more or less randomly -- which makes it less of a worry.

[Ned Block]

To clarify: I think it is GREAT that the Guggenheim Foundation is giving awards to excellent people in history of philosophy, philosophy of law and continental philosophy. I am not suggesting that they give awards in M&E INSTEAD of these areas. What I am suggesting is that they also give awards to excellent people in M&E. If awards to some other areas have to be reduced, one place to look is fields of the humanities—notably history and literature--in which the SUBfields often get as many awards as or more than all of philosophy.

[Mike Bishop]

I have no experience with the Guggenheim Foundation. But I can speak a bit to the success rate issue as it applies to NEH Fellowships, where philosophers' success rates are consistently below average (according to a NEH Program Officer). There are, of course, a number of possible explanations for this. On the basis of my *very* limited experience, I speculate that at least two factors are at play: (1) It's on average harder to make research programs in philosophy (as opposed to research programs in English, history, etc.) clear & attractive to a general humanities audience - particularly research programs in the "technical" areas of philosophy. And (2) we eat our own; philosophy panels give top marks to a smaller percentage of proposals than do panels in other areas. (This suspicion is shared by a NEH Program Officer with some experience with philosophy & non-philosophy panels.)
Again, I don't know if these suspicions generalize to the GF, but I do think they are plausible when thinking about how philosophers fare at the NEH.

[Keith B.]

Thanks for the clarification Ned. In this form, your suggestion sounds much more attractive than it did in the initial posting.

[Margaret Atherton]

I think both of the points Mike Bishop makes are good ones and are supported by experiences I have had. It often is very hard to explain to non-philosophers what the point or value of a particular philosophy proposal is. I don't know, however, whether it is easier to explain a proposal in the history of philosophy or not. It sometimes can be the case that people in other disciplines bring their own ways of dealing with the same texts into play, and respond negatively to a philosophy proposal that they take to be wrong headed. On the other hand, I do think that the remark about philosophers "eating their own" does distinguish philosophers doing history of philosophy from those doing M&E in a way which I have seen work to the disadvantage of people in M&E on grant panels. Historians of philosophy do seem to react more favorably to the work of others and to assume they are going to be able to learn from them, whereas those working in M&E appear to be conditioned to respond negatively. (To be frank, that's one reason why I like doing history.)

[Steve Hales]

Margaret Atherton: "Historians of philosophy do seem to react more favorably to the work of others and to assume they are going to be able to learn from them, whereas those working in M&E appear to be conditioned to respond negatively"

I have to disagree with this one. I have been savagely attacked during questions after giving a Nietzsche talk, and never after giving talks in M&E (my main areas). And I have witnessed vicious Hume scholars at conferences too. I think some people are (1) unable to deal with ideas different from their own or (2) just jerks, no matter what their specialty. Now, maybe philosophers are just more savage than usual, and this explains our relatively poor showing on major grants. Hard to quantify or measure, I'm afraid.

[Mike Bishop]

Actually, I think it would be fairly easy to get some decent evidence about whether our hyper-critical professional tendencies are hurting our success rates. Have (say) the NEH normalize individual panelist's ratings & then have judgments be made on the basis of these normalized scores.
The idea is that the average (mean) score handed out by a rater gets a zero. A rating one standard deviation above her mean gets a one. Two standard deviations above her mean gets a two. And so on for each rater. This would "control" for the fact that some raters (and perhaps some panels) are tougher than others.
If philosophers succeed more often when decisions are made on the basis of normalized scores, this would be pretty decent evidence that we've been harsher on applicants in philosophy than others have been on applicants in their fields.
When I've made this suggestion to philosophers, I typically get a "You philistine" look (a look I'm all too familiar with, alas). And when I've made the suggestion to folks at the NEH, they've very politely put me off ("Yes, that *would* be interesting").
(The normalizing suggestion is from Hal Arkes. For an amusing tale about his futile attempt to convince the NEH, NSF & NIH to simply test (not implement!) this and other suggestions, see his January 2003 article in Psychological Science.)