Kieran Setiya (Philosophy, Pittsburgh) poses the question:
[D]oes their professional education equip them to...what really matters: good moral judgement?
It is hard to see why it should. Moral judgement is in an exercise of character, and moral philosophers are not notably more virtuous than anyone else....
Are the intellectual virtues fostered by doctoral study in philosophy – a sense of coherence, simplicity, logical order – the primary virtues of moral reflection? Is morality in this respect so much like science? The suggestion that it is can be found not only in the utilitarian tradition – for instance, in Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality – but in some Rawls-inspired Kantianism, and in the "virtue ethics" of Michael Slote. But I am sceptical.
The general question, how our moral-philosophical studies, or our methods, reflect on our moral character is one that is rarely asked. I am fond of Simon Blackburn's purportedly disparaging remark, that
[often] nothing is conveyed [by apologies for objectivity and fact in moral philosophy] except that their authors are very well-brought-up and serious people.
It ought to be more surprising than it is that opponents of objectivity and fact in moral philosophy, like Blackburn, are not at all chastened by this.
My suspicion is Professor Setiya has missed the sarcasm in Blackburn's quip.
UPDATE: Corresponding with Professor Setiya, I realize I may have missed the ironic character of Professor Setiya's riposte to Blackburn's admittedly sarcastic comment. Tone is always hard to catch in print. In any case, the bit about Blackburn is minor, and the interesting issue Professor Setiya raises concerns the moral expertise of moral philosophers.